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The Cooperative as a Proletarian
Corporation: The Global Dimensions
of Property Rights and the
Organization of Economic Activity in
Cuba
By Larry Catá Backer*
Abstract: Since the 1970s, the relationship between productive property, and the
state and individual has been contested in Marxist-Leninist nations. Though
China has moved to permit robust private activity and the private aggregations
of capital in corporate form, Cuba has strictly adhered to traditional communist
principles. In the face of recent financial upheavals, Cuba is seeking to
liberalize its approach to economic organization, but in a way that would retain
a state monopoly of the use of the corporate form while opening a small and
well-managed consumer oriented private sector. Among the most innovative
alternatives being developed is the cooperative, which has the potential to
develop into a useful form of what this Article calls a proletarian corporation.
But innovation faces substantial hurdles. This Article examines in Part II the
context for the development of this new approach to cooperative organization.
Part III then turns to a close study of the cooperative and its constraints,
starting with a consideration of the agricultural cooperative as template for
changes. It then turns to a critical consideration of the development of a
theoretical basis for changing the function and operation of cooperatives
developed by Cuban intellectuals, and ends with an examination of the
transposition of that theory into the guidelines for restructuring the Cuban
economy (Lineamientos) adopted by the Cuban government, and then
articulated through a regulatory framework. Part IV then briefly considers the
role of the cooperative in efforts to internationalize the Cuban economic model
through vehicles such as the Alianza Bolivariana. This Article concludes that
while the cooperative fits nicely within Cuba’s efforts to develop a complex and
well-integrated program of economic organization, its theoretical elegance
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remains in tension with the realities of Cuban politics. This tension increases
the risk that cooperatives will be reduced to little more than a means of
privatizing central planning.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cuba has been facing increasingly challenging economic problems
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since the fall of the Soviet Union1 and the end of the Soviet system of stateto-state based economic activity.2 In the absence of Soviet aid, and in the
face of U.S. political and economic hostility,3 Cuba has sought new partners
and allies.4 Cuba also has increasingly experimented with innovative ways
of organizing economic activity that avoid reducing the paramount power of
the State to own and control property, especially capital, but that also
permit the aggregation of effort for mutual economic benefit.5 At the center
1

See Jorge Pérez-López, The Cuban Economic Crisis of the 1990s and the External
Sector,
8
CUBA
TRANSITION
386,
386
(1998),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume8/pdfs/41perez.pdf.
2
On the Soviet trade system, see Nicolas Spulber, The Soviet Block Foreign Trade
System, 24 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 420 (1959). Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union
and its trade system, some argued that the Soviet economic trade model mimicked, in one
important respect, the exploitative traits of Western markets-based trade systems. See David
Ray, The Dependency Model of Latin American Underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies,
15(1) J. INTERAMERICAN & WORLD AFF. 7–10 (1973) (arguing that Soviet economic
imperialism produces economic dependence within the Soviet system similar to that ascribed
to capitalist states in their relationship with developing states); but see Guy J. Gilbert,
Socialism and Dependency, 1 LATIN AM. PERSPS. 107 (1974).
3
See generally Daniel Hansen, Dayne Batten & Harrison Ealey, It’s Time for the U.S. to
End Its Senseless Embargo of Cuba, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013, 8:36 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senselessembargo-of-cuba/;
see
also
Cuba,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/cuba/index.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2013) ( news, reference, and archival information as well as
photographs, graphics, audio, and visual files published on Cuba).
4
Among the most important partners are China, Venezuela and Brazil. See Agence Fr.
Presse [AFP], China Pledges Financial Aid to Cuba’s Castro, GOOGLE NEWS (July 5, 2012),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jp478hKoBt_VhSt_Figsg5y7wsw?docId=CNG.729b36b74b4f8c4edaf9dedb0dadc5cb.401 (“China on Thursday
pledged financial aid to Cuba as it undertakes historic economic reforms, promising visiting
President Raul Castro a new credit line as well as help in health care and technology.”); Juan
O. Tamayo, Raul Castro’s Long Trip to China Raises Questions About a Secret Stopover,
MIAMI HERALD (July 5, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/05/2883487/raulcastros-long-trip-to-china.html#storylink=cpy (“China is Cuba’s second or third-largest trade
partner after Venezuela and neck-and-neck with Canada, with bilateral trade totaling $1.8
billion in 2010. Beijing’s interests in Cuba and other parts of the Caribbean have been
growing in recent years.”); see generally María Alejandra Calle, A Brief Note About the
China-Latin American Trade Partnership: An Opportunity for Trade Diversification or a
Threat to a Green Agenda in the Region?, 3 REVISTA DE NEGOCIOS INTERNACIONALES 57
(2010), available at http://publicaciones.eafit.edu.co/index.php/rni/article/download/50/48;
Daniel Erickson, Cuba, China, Venezuela, New Developments, 15 CUBA TRANSITION 410
(2005), http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume15/pdfs/erikson.pdf; Jorge
F. Pérez-López, Swimming Against the Tide: Implications for Cuba of Soviet and Eastern
European Reforms in Foreign Economic Relations, 33 J. INTERAMERICAN STUD. & WORLD
AFF. 81 (1991); Hernán Yánez, The Cuba-Venezuela Alliance: ‘Emancipatory NeoBolivarismo’ or Totalitarian Expansion (Inst. for Cuban & Cuban Am. Studies, Occasional
Paper No. 7, 2005), available at http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/iccaspapers/7.
5
Larry Catá Backer, Cuban Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: Cuban Marxism,
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of this tension, Cuba faces issues of the role and character of property,
along with the issue of how to divide the power to control and use property
between the State and individuals. This Article considers one of the most
interesting innovations—the Cuban cooperative—both as a theoretical and
practical solution to the peculiar political and economic problems of Cuba,
as constrained by its own legal system, and as a vehicle of economic
activity with application beyond the peculiarities of Cuba.
In the West, notions of property are at the center of economic and
political organization.6
The law-state—that complex of social,
governmental, administrative, and economic organization7—is to a great
extent grounded on the elaboration of rules and systems for the taxonomy
and systemic protection of property. This means creating systems for
dividing things and ideas into manageable and negotiable bits, and then
developing rules to govern transactions in these bits, along with rights to
exploit these bits.8 Individuals can aggregate property for the production of
private wealth; organized as corporations, this property assumes a double
character.9 In one sense, corporations are understood as property that is
represented, for example, by shares, which in turn constitute property in the
hands of shareholders, giving each shareholder certain rights including
control, income, and assets of the entity. In another sense, corporations are
also understood as autonomous entities with a governance architecture
constructed and existing outside the direct control of the shareholders in
whose collective interests the enterprise operates. In this sense, as a
government independent of investors, but operating to further investors’
interests, corporations resemble other institutions formed by communal
aggregations—such as religious institutions and even states10—in their
Private Economic Collectives, and Free Market Globalism, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 337 (2004); Raj Desai, Can Raúl Castro Revive Cuba’s Private Sector?, BROOKINGS
POL’Y BRIEF SERIES (Brookings Inst., Wash., D.C.), no. 165, Mar. 2008, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/03/cuba-desai.
6
For an excellent short discussion, see JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:
PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT UNJUST ENRICHMENT 7–31 (2006); UGO MATTEI, BASIC
PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 39
(2000).
7
See generally Larry Catá Backer, On the Tension between Public and Private
Governance in the Emerging Transnational Legal Order: State Ideology and Corporation in
Polycentric Asymmetric Global Orders (Consortium for Peace & Ethics, Working Paper
Apr. 16, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2038103.
8
See,
e.g.,
Index
of
Economic
Freedom,
HERITAGE
FOUND.,
http://www.heritage.org/index/property-rights (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (“The more certain
the legal protection of property, the higher a country’s score; similarly, the greater the
chances of government expropriation of property, the lower a country’s score.”).
9
Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 584 (1999).
10
Larry Catá Backer, Reifying Law—Government, Law and the Rule of Law in
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character though, of course, with a more limited scope.11 As an entity, for
example, corporations may acquire political rights under domestic law12 and
at least some measure of responsibility under international law.13
A very different picture emerges in Marxist-Leninist states.14 In such
states, the means of production traditionally belong to the revolutionary
elements of society organized within a structure of a democratic
dictatorship awaiting the transition from socialism to pure Marxism. 15
Deeply embedded in these states is the distinction between property
ownership and property use.16 Productive property17 is understood as
inherently political in character—an instrument for the satisfaction of the
Governance Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2000).
11
See generally JENNIFER A. ZERK, MULTINATIONALS AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: LIMITATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2006); David
Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933 (2004).
12
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
13
See Larry Catá Backer, From Institutional Misalignments to Socially Sustainable
Governance: The Guiding Principles for the Implementation of the United Nations’
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” and the Construction of Inter-Systemic Global Governance,
25 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 69 (2012); Larry Catá Backer, Multinational
Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in
International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2006) [hereinafter Multinational
Corporations].
14
See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 5–16 (1988) (offering
a critical assessment of prominent property theories, from Marxist to libertarian theories);
Barden N. Gale, The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People’s Republic of China:
Inventors and Inventions, 74 CHINA Q. 334, 334–35 (1978) (analyzing Chinese Marxist view
towards intellectual property).
15
See, e.g., XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (China), translated in Constitution of the People’s
Republic
of
China,
PEOPLE’S
DAILY
ONLINE,
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited May 15, 2013)
(“After the founding of the People’s Republic, the transition of Chinese society from a
newly-democratic to a socialist society was effected step by step. The socialist
transformation of the private ownership of the means of production was completed, the
system of exploitation of man by man eliminated, and the socialist system established. The
people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of
workers and peasants, which is in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been
consolidated and developed.”).
16
“Indeed, since political power is in the hands of the working class, since this political
power owns all the means of production, the only task, indeed, that remains for us is to
organize the population in co-operative societies.” VLADIMIR I. LENIN, On Co-Operation, in
WHAT IS SOVIET POWER? 91 (1973).
17
“It is important to understand that Marx defines the word property in two senses, as
personal property and as productive property . . . . By productive property, Marx means
objects people owned privately which did produce social wealth, such as oil wells, coal
mines or steel mills.” GYÖRGY LUKÁCS, THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION 8 (Dennis J.
Schmidt ed., Susanne Bernhardt & Norman Levine trans., 1991).
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needs of the people. Conversely, productive property owned or controlled
by individuals, especially where that ownership is not under state control or
direction, could be understood as a challenge to the unity of the people and
a political threat. Vesting political or economic power in institutions
through the aggregation of property in the hands of private individuals, such
as the shareholders of a corporation, is viewed as a challenge. Like the
organization of political power, which is assumed to be necessarily centered
on the state as the sole embodiment of collective power, the organization of
economic power is understood to be centered on the state apparatus as the
sole embodiment of economic power. Corporations could be organized as a
form for the aggregation of capital and be considered separate legal entities,
but such enterprises remain instrumentalities of the state.18
The relationship of property to the individual (the proletariat) and the
state has been at the center of revolutions in Marxist-Leninist theory for the
last generation. But the last several decades have seen an ideological split
about the relationship of the ownership of productive property to the state
within the Marxist-Leninist community of states. Led by changes in China
that accelerated in the years after the late-1970s, China has abandoned the
traditional notion of the state’s monopoly on productive property and the
necessity of aggregating for the apparatus of the state all power to direct
and manage productive assets and the people through which productivity is
extracted.19 Central planning has been abandoned in favor of centralized
control of key sectors and central direction of the rest, with control
conforming generally to Marxist-Leninist principles as continuously
developed within the Chinese Communist Party. In effect, China has been
moving from micro to macro management, with exceptions for key
economic sectors. Yet, as its critics argue, this is still a Marxist approach to
property and its relationship to individuals and collective ownership.20 The
process has not been without deep division within the Chinese Communist
Party at times, as different groups advance distinct visions of the future

18
A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Relevance of Public International Law in Arbitrations
concerning International Economic Developments, J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 263, 281 (2005).
Maniruzzaman notes: “As far as we are concerned here . . . it is quite likely that in most
countries the separation between a State and a State enterprise as parties may be disregarded
and the presence of the State itself through its State Enterprise can be attributed as such.” Id.
at 279.
19
See PITMAN B. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL
LEGAL CULTURE (David S.G. Goodman ed., 2001); Mathew S. Erie, China’s (Post-)Socialist
Property Rights Regime: Assessing the Impact of the Property Law on Illegal Land Takings,
37 H.K.L.J. 919 (2007) (explaining the tension between reformers and orthodox Chinese
Marxists).
20
See, e.g., Ryan Van Steenis, From Mao to Madison and Back: An Examination of
China’s National Property Law and Its Diminished Potential, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
35, 58–63 (2009).
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course of development of Marxist-Leninist economies.21
Cuba, however, is an entirely different story.22 Under the leadership of
Fidel Castro from 1959 to 2006, Cuba remained deeply committed to the
central planning model.23 Though Cuba has been moving away from an old
Soviet-style model under the leadership of Raúl Castro,24 it has retained
both the state apparatus and communist party ideology to support the idea
that substantially all control of significant economic activity must be
directed, as a political matter, by party loyalties according to communist
principles but as ordered directly through a large state bureaucracy.
Productive property, for all intents and purposes, retains its direct
connection to the state along with a strong commitment to the direct
ownership and management role of the state in economic activity.25 In this
respect, Cuba retains the strongest loyalty to the Soviet model of state
organization, which all but disappeared after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union nearly half a generation ago.26 Though Cuba remains very much in
21
See generally JOSEPH FEWSMITH, DILEMMAS OF REFORM IN CHINA: POLITICAL
CONFLICT AND ECONOMIC DEBATE (Mark Selden ed., 1994).
22
See FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, Cuba’s Revolutions in Economy and Defense, in FIDEL
CASTRO: SPEECHES 1984–85: WAR AND CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS 57, 57–81 (Michael Taber
ed., Pathfinder Press 1st ed. 1985) (documenting Castro’s speech delivered December 28,
1984 at the close of the seventh session of the National Assembly of People’s Power in
Havana, Cuba).
23
Daniel P. Erikson, The Future of American Business in Cuba: Realities, Risks, and
Rewards, 14 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 691, 694–95 (2004).
24
Some in the West have described this as a move away from Marxism toward
capitalism. See, e.g., Revolution in Retreat, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2012, at S.3 (“Raúl
Castro, who formally took over as Cuba’s president in February 2008 and as first secretary
of the Communist Party in April 2011, is trying to revive the island’s moribund economy by
transferring a substantial chunk of it from state to private hands, with profound social and
political implications.”).
25
As one commentator notes:

In communist countries, the state repealed or emasculated private law in
employment relations, land ownership, antitrust, consumer products liability, and
worker safety. Once the legal impediments were removed, officials ruled by
decree. So, central planning is a way of making law as well as commodities.
Central planning produced remarkably similar results in vastly different countries,
such as Poland, Vietnam, and Cuba. Specifically, central planning emphasized
economic growth through forced savings and expansion of the capital stock in
heavy industry. Everywhere, central planning failed to produce consumer goods in
abundant quantity or high quality.
Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of Market Modernization of Law, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
141, 146 (1996); cf. George Philip, The Political Economy of Development, 38 POL. STUD.
485, 486 (1990).
26
Edward Yates, Central Planning Meets the Neighborhood: Land Use Law and
Environmental Impact Assessment in Cuba, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 653, 653–54 (2003)
(discussing Cuba’s alignment with the former Soviet Union).
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the Soviet orbit long after its center disappeared,27 Cuba’s ideological
foundations remain perhaps more aggressively Marxist-Leninist than even
the Soviet model.28
Yet, modern realities have produced a strong pull against this form of
economic organization.29 Globalization has substantially changed the rules
through which global production of goods is organized,30 though not
without criticism.31 Liberalized trade regimes have made the movement of
goods, capital, enterprises, and to some extent people, easier, while
permitting local diversity that complements global tastes in variety.32
Cuba’s poor economic performance and its difficulty in providing for its
people has been exacerbated for many years by a state and administrative
apparatus that seemed oblivious and jealous of its power33 and a U.S. policy
of isolating Cuba from globalization.34
Cuba has both recognized and resisted these realities.35 On the one
hand, over the past decade Cuba has sought to internationalize a countermodel to that offered by conventional globalization, forming for that
purpose the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas) (ALBA).36 On the
other hand, Cuba has also embarked on what was a potentially far-reaching
project of internal self-reflection and change within the parameters of the

27
See Jorge Pérez López, Coveting Beijing, but Imitating Moscow: Cuba’s Economic
Reforms in a Comparative Perspective, 5 CUBA TRANSITION 11, 11–20 (1995),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume5/pdfs/FILE04.pdf.
28
“In Castro’s ideal socialist world the worker identifies totally with the society, the
state, and the means of production and covets complete harmony between his work and
himself.” SHELDON B. LISS, FIDEL!: CASTRO’S POLITICAL AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 61 (1994).
29
Cf. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE (1999) (discussing how
the modern realities of globalization clash with local culture and efforts to preserve ancient
traditions).
30
Cf. JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004) (arguing that
globalization has the capacity to be a powerful tool to further social goods).
31
See, e.g., JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JOSEPH
STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006).
32
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Globalizations, 23 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 393, 396–
97 (2006).
33
See generally SERGIO DÍAZ-BRIQUETS & JORGE PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, CORRUPTION IN CUBA:
CASTRO AND BEYOND (2006).
34
See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 §§
301–302, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–6082 (2006).
35
See, e.g., FIDEL CASTRO, La globalización neoliberal conduce al mundo al desastre
[Neoliberal Globalization is Leading the World to Disaster], in DE SEATTLE AL 11 DE
SEPTIEMBRE [FROM SEATTLE TO SEPTEMBER 11] 175, 175–79 (2002).
36
Larry Catá Backer & Augusto Molina, Cuba and the Construction of Alternative
Global Trade Systems: ALBA and Free Trade in the Americas, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 679
(2010).
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current political structure of the Cuban state.37 This project produced a
potentially far-ranging set of economic reforms, undertaken through the
Cuban Communist Party (CCP), with the objective of establishing a new
direction in CCP policy to be followed by changes to Cuban law through
appropriate legislation undertaken by the Cuban government.38 The broad
structures of economic reform policies were memorialized in a set of
Guidelines, the Lineamientos de la política económica y social del partido
y la Revolución (Lineamientos),39 which were approved at the Sixth Party
Congress in 2011. Subsequently, these Guidelines were expected to be
taken up by the government and transposed into legislation and ministerial
regulations.40
As a consequence, what has been emerging—especially since 2009
and accelerating with the adoption of the Lineamientos—is what appears to
be significant efforts by Cuba’s leaders to embark on a peculiarly Cuban
version of economic experimentation.41 That experimentation has been

37

Heather E. Shreve, Note, Harmonization, but Not Homogenization: The Case for
Cuban Autonomy in Globalizing Economic Reforms, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 365,
378–81 (2012).
38
Lina Forero-Niño, The Cuban Government Approves Guidelines to Reform Cuba’s
Economic Model and Develops an Implementation Strategy, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 761
(2011); Marc Frank, In Cuba, Reforms Bring Cheers but also Jeers, REUTERS (July 13,
2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/13/us-cuba-reformidUSTRE76C4MF20110713.
39
LINEAMIENTOS DE LA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL DEL PARTIDO Y LA REVOLUCIÓN
[GUIDELINES ON THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ECONOMY OF THE PARTY AND THE REVOLUTION],
VI CONGRESO DEL PARIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA [SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CUBA] (adopted Apr. 18, 2011) (Cuba) [hereinafter LINEAMIENTOS], available at
http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/secciones/6to-congresopcc/Folleto%20Lineamientos%20VI%20Cong.pdf
(translation
available
at
http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/documentos/2011/ing/l160711i.html); see also infra note 56
and accompanying text for the state-apparatus implementing measures.
40
See Resolución sobre los Lineamientos de la Política Económica y Social del Partido
y la Revolución [Resolution on the Guidelines on the Political and Social Economy and of
the Party and the Revolution], CUBA DEBATE (Apr. 18, 2011), http://
www.cubadebate.cu/especiales/2011/04/18/resolucion-sobre-los-lineamientos-de-la-politicaeconomica-y-social-del-partido-y-la-revolucion/.
Among other things, the resolution
adopting the Lineamientos suggested the creation of a governmental commission to
implement and further the project of the Lineamientos. The National Assembly then ratified
the Lineamientos and committed to move them to implementation through appropriate law
making. See Archibald Ritter, El VI Congreso Del Partido Y Los Lineamientos: ¿Un Punto
De Viraje Para Cuba? [The Sixth Congress of the Party and the Guidelines: A Turning Point
for Cuba?] ESPACIO LAÏCAL SUPLEMENTO DIGITAL [LAY SPACE DIGITAL SUPPLEMENT], No.
132, June 2011, http://espaciolaical.org/contens/esp/sd_132.pdf translated in CUBAN
ECONOMY (June 17, 2011), http://thecubaneconomy.com/articles/2011/06/a-ritter-espaciolaical-the-sixth-party-congress-and-%E2%80%9Clineamientos%E2%80%9D-a-turningpoint-for-cuba/.
41
See generally John Cairncross, Raúl’s Plan: Examining the 2010 Cuban Reform
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carefully circumscribed within the CCP’s sense of its Marxist-Leninist
organizational principles. Cuba continues to re-affirm its fundamental
commitment to some of the ideals of Soviet state organization: strong and
direct state ownership and control of the principal levers of economic
activity and a deep suspicion of the allocation and aggregation of
productive property in the hands of private individuals. But some key
factions within the CCP—the intellectuals that support it and state
officials—are also trying to create spaces beyond a centrally-planned
control economy, both in the state sector and within what is hoped to be an
important (although small) non-state sector.42 Both are reflected in the
thrust of the conceptual basis of ALBA and of the Lineamientos, and to
some extent in the first tentative steps toward regulatory implementation.
The resulting approach, being slowly and unevenly incorporated into
the legal structures of Cuban economic regulation,43 is grounded in the
division of economic activity regulation around four distinct spheres. The
first is public and centered on the reorganization of state-managed
economic activity; the second is private and centered on the production and
delivery of consumer goods and services; the third is national and centered
on the development of an integrated economy grounded in direct and
indirect state ownership and management; and the fourth is regional and
centered on the development of state-to-state economic activity under the
ALBA model. Integrating these approaches requires a careful balancing of
the logic of a centrally-planned and publicly-oriented Marxist-Leninist
approach to economic control and the logic of the framework of a marketsbased system of economic globalization. But that balancing produces the
potential for an important contradiction. At the heart of this contradiction is
the tension between the norms and forms of economic globalization,
grounded in the free movement of capital through market transactions, and
the current conventional framework of Cuba’s Marxist-Leninist state
organization, grounded in state control and management of economic
activity.
Some of the elements of this experimentation have been widely
discussed and criticized44—from the efforts to produce a rigidly controlled

Initiative,
21
CUBA
TRANSITION
265
(2011),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/cairncross.pdf.
42
Stephen Wilkinson, Cuba Lay-offs Reveal Evolving Communism, BBC NEWS (Sept.
14, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11302430.
43
See Manuel Barcia, Cuba’s Slow Path to the Future, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 11, 2012),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/01/20121883342630706.html.
44
For an excellent analysis of this economic experimentation, see Carmelo Mesa-Lago,
Will the VI Communist Party Congress Solve Cuba’s Economic and Social Problems?, 21
CUBA
TRANSITION
292
(2011),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/mesalago.pdf.
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class of proprietorship businesses,45 to the limited and highly regulated
efforts to open agricultural cultivation to farmers.46 The institutional forms
in which economic development is to be undertaken are less developed.
The Lineamientos strictly limited the availability of the corporate form to
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and enterprises involving the state and
foreigners.47 The rationale is that the Marxist-Leninist foundation of the
state would be undermined if the corporate form were made available to
individuals or others without the direct oversight of the CCP and operated
as an instrumentality of the state apparatus. That rationale, in turn, is
founded on the idea that only the state may aggregate the ownership of
property and that the corporate form, in effect, is a manifestation of political
rather than economic or property power. The foundational principle is that
under Cuba’s Marxist-Leninist economic organization, only the people,
organized through the state sector and directed by the CCP, can aggregate
the means of production and engage in collective activities for social rather
than individual profit. To permit collective activities outside the state
sector would be understood as a threat to the principal authority of the state
and its apparatus as the vanguard of popular action. For those brought up
under Soviet Socialist theory, this approach sounds familiar. However, it
has, to some extent, been abandoned virtually everywhere outside of Cuba,
at least in the form that the CCP seeks to preserve.48 In its place, other,
more limited vehicles for aggregating productive activity in private ventures
have been suggested.
If corporations are prohibited as a means of engaging in private market
based activities, and reducing private economic activity to prescribed

45
For an analysis from within Cuba by one of its most prominent independent
economists, see Oscar Espinosa Chepe, Situación económica, política y social de Cuba
[Economic, Political, and Social Development of Cuba], 21 CUBA TRANSITION 18 (2011),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/chepe.pdf.
46
See G. B. Hagelberg, If It Were Just the Marabú. . . Cuba’s Agriculture 2009–10, 20
CUBA
TRANSITION
32
(2010),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/hagelberg.pdf.
47
LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, at 11 (“En las Formas de gestión no estatales no se
permitirá la concentración de la propiedad en personas jurídicas o naturales.”).
48
In China, for example, the government has developed a sophisticated regulatory
framework for corporations, including enterprises owned by non-state parties and has sought
to develop a socialist approach to the regulation of corporations and corporate governance
that furthers the governing state ideology while permitting private access to the corporate
form and the development of robust securities markets in the shares of such enterprises. See,
e.g., The Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm.
Nat’l
People’s
Cong.,
Dec.
29,
1993),
available
at
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207344.htm. For an example of Chinese
corporate governance standards, see Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in
China (promulgated by the Sec. Regulatory Comm’n & the State Econ. & Trade Comm’n,
Jan. 7, 2001), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf.
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simple sole proprietorships may not produce the sort of positive economic
growth necessary to avoid economic stagnation, then the question of finding
an alternative form of economic activity that permits private aggregations of
economic activity becomes critical to the forward movement of Cuban
economic reforms, constrained by its governing ideology. To be palatable,
these vehicles cannot be understood as a means of aggregating capital for
absent owners. Instead, they must provide a basis for pooling labor or other
direct contributions by the participants in the enterprise.
These
aggregations of activity must permit the use of capital while remaining
grounded in principles of participant control and operation. And, for Cuba,
they must be compatible with the organization of the national economy,
within which only a small place is available for individual activity that must
be licensed and controlled by the state.
Among the most important of these alternatives are cooperatives.49
The cooperative device is not new. It has become an important element in
the aggregation of efforts around the world.50 Since the 1990s, new models
have emerged that “appear to be not only a reaction to the exogenous
environmental influences of globalization, industrialization, consolidation,
technological advances, institutional uniqueness of the country to legal
environment, and overcapacity in the food sector but also to the intrafirm
coordination challenges of redirecting strategy.”51 Indeed, cooperatives

49

Int’l Labor Org. [ILO], Promotion of Cooperatives Recommendation, art. 2, R193,
(June
20,
2002),
available
at
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:31
2531 (“[T]he term ‘cooperative’ means an autonomous association of persons united
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations
through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise.”); Co-operative Identity,
Values & Principles, INT’L CO-OPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://ica.coop/en/what-co-op/cooperative-identity-values-principles (last visited Feb. 7, 2013) (“[A] cooperative is an
autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic,
social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democraticallycontrolled enterprise.”). The International Co-operative Alliance (“ICA”) was established in
1895 and serves as a representative of cooperatives worldwide. See The ICA, INT’L COOPERATIVE ALLIANCE, http://2012.coop/en/ica (last visited Feb. 7, 2012). Cooperatives come
in a large variety of forms, including producer, agricultural, and marketing cooperatives. In
some of the literature, cooperatives are more broadly defined to include partnerships and
non-profit organizations. See John P. Bonin et al., Theoretical and Empirical Studies of
Producer Cooperatives: Will Ever the Twain Meet?, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1290, 1292 (1993)
(“The theory of the PC focuses on the changes resulting from replacing the profitmaximizing objective of the neo-classical firm with some other maxim and reflecting both
workers’ participation in the decision-making process and workers’ sharing in the residual
surplus.”).
50
Co-operative Identity, Values & Principles, supra note 49.
51
Michael L. Cook & Brad Plunkett, Collective Entrepreneurship: An Emerging
Phenomenon in Producer-Owned Organizations, 38 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 421, 423
(2006), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/43777/2/421.pdf.
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“represent a substantial share of the economy in most developed market
economies. . . . [and are] larger in advanced market economies than it is in
less developed economies.”52 But these traditional models tend to be based
on the property rights being restricted to members-patrons.53
Since the 1959 revolution in Cuba, the cooperative has served
principally as a device for managing agricultural production. But the
continuing economic crisis in Cuba now may be spurring new and
potentially more radical economic organization based on the cooperative
form. The steps being taken are both tentative and circumscribed by the
realities of Cuban politics.54 Indeed, the Cuban authorities were slow to
deliver a set of regulations implementing the Lineamientos, promising55 and
then announcing their enactment only at the end of 2012.56 Despite this, the
theoretical premises underlying this movement suggest the possibility of the
development of a theory for aggregations of productive capacity in which
capital is not privileged—a theory identified here as a “proletarian
corporation.”
52
Henry Hansmann, Cooperative Firms in Theory and Practice. 4 LIIKETALOUDELLINEN
AIKAKAUSKIRJA
[LTA]
387,
387
(1999)
(Fin.),
available
at
http://lta.hse.fi/1999/4/lta_1999_04_a2.pdf.
53
See F.R. Chaddad & Michael L. Cook, Understanding New Cooperative Models: An
Ownership-Control Rights Typology, 26 REV. AGRIC. ECON. 348, 348–60 (2004).
54
See Patricia Grogg, Cubans Want Faster Economic Reforms, INTER PRESS SERVICE
(May 8, 2012), http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/05/cubans-want-faster-economic-reforms/
(“Among non-state forms of production, Cuban authorities are prioritising cooperatives,
although new legislation announced for that sector is still being studied. ‘One of the aspects
that apparently is being discussed is the scope or degree of autonomy that this type of
association should have,’ said a source who asked to remain anonymous.”).
55
See Peter Orsi, Associated Press, Cuba Economy Czar Says Cooperatives By Year
End, BIG STORY (July 23, 2012), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/cuba-economy-czar-sayscooperatives-year-end.
56
These include two decree-laws of the Council of State, one decree from the Council of
Ministers, and two ministerial regulations. See Consejo de Estado Decreto-Ley Número 305
[Council of State Decree-Law Number 305] (GACETA OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53,
Dec. 11, 2012, at 249) (Cuba) [hereinafter Decreto-Ley No. 305]; Consejo de Estado
Decreto-Ley Número 306 [Council of State Decree-Law Number 306] (GACETA OFICIAL
EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53, Dec. 11, 2012, at 254) (Cuba) [hereinafter Decreto-Ley No. 306];
Consejo de Ministros Decreto No. 309 [Council of Ministers Decree No. 309] (GACETA
OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53, Dec. 11, 2012, at 260) (Cuba) [hereinafter Decreto No.
309]; Ministerio de Económica y Planificación Resolución No. 570/12 [Minister of
Economics and Planning Resolution No. 570/12] (GACETA OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO.
53, Dec. 11, 2012, at 270) (Cuba) [hereinafter Ministerio de Económica y Planificación
Resolución No. 570/12]; Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No. 427/12 [Minister
of Finances and Pricing Resolution No. 427/12] (GACETA OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 53,
Dec. 11, 2012, at 273) (Cuba) [hereinafter Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No.
427/12]. For a discussion of the above regulations, see O. Fonticoba Gener, Cambio a la
actualización del modelo económico [Updating Changes to the Economic Model], GRANMA
(Dec. 11, 2012) (Cuba), http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/2012/12/11/nacional/artic01.html.
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This Article examines the potential consequences of the current
approach to the creation and management of economic enterprises within
Cuba. The examination is structured around the work of academics
organized by Camila Piñeiro Harnecker of the University of Havana’s
Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubana.57 The new policies that have
emerged from this work have had practical consequences on the legal
regulation and management of economic enterprises can be seen in recent
actions of the CCP, both in the construction of an internal governance order
and in the exportation of that order in the construction of multilateral trade
relations.58 The principal insight of this work is that by constraining the
ability of individuals to aggregate capital, the Cubans may have stumbled
onto the key to the development of a proletarian corporation. A proletarian
corporation can be constructed on the structures of the cooperative by
emphasizing the contribution of labor, rather than capital, to the firm.
Following this Introduction, Part II examines the development of the
new Cuban economic model. This new structure of economic organization
in Cuba reveals a limited space for individual economic activity in the
shadow of but not directly managed by the state. To operationalize that
structure, the Lineamientos provides a framework that allocates permitted
forms of economic activities and specifies their limits: private individual
enterprise, corporate organization for some state enterprises, and the
possibility of individual labor aggregation through cooperatives. Part III
then considers the cooperative in more depth. It examines the way in which
the structures of the agricultural cooperative—a peasant socialization
technique with roots in Leninist theory—was redeployed as a vehicle for
the aggregation of productive forces without displacing state ownership and
management of capital.
Thus re-purposed, the cooperative was
transformed. From theoretical transformation, Part III then considers the
transposition of cooperative theory first the Lineamientos, and then as
written into law through the measures adopted on December 11, 2012. The
analysis reveals the way in which the move toward acceptance of the
cooperative as a means of aggregating economic activity in the small nonstate sector has opened potentially deep ideological fissures within the CCP.
Within that context, the analysis also suggests the benefits and limitations
of this peculiarly Cuban innovation within the confines of Cuban political
ideology, as well as what the turn to the cooperative form in private
enterprise may mean for the future course of the development of Cuba’s

57

See generally COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO: UNA MIRADA DESDE CUBA [COOPERATIVES
AND SOCIALISM: A CUBAN PERSPECTIVE] (Camila Piñeiro Harnecker ed., 2011) [hereinafter
COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO].
58
See Grogg, supra note 54 (“The [policy] changes should be sped up in some economic
sectors . . . . [and the] best candidates for obtaining immediate significant results’ through
the new policies appear to be non-state forms of organising small-scale production . . . .”).
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state-party ideology.
Part IV analyzes Cuba’s approach within the structures of its regional
economic engagements. The cooperative is an important element for the
development of an integrated approach to regional trade grounded in stateto-state economic transactions. The focus is the internationalization of the
Cuban model through the structure of the socialist trade organization,
ALBA . The problem of the cooperative highlights a fundamental
conundrum of Cuban economic development: can Cuba develop a
conceptually useful vehicle, like the cooperative, that enhances individual
autonomy, and not hobble it for fear that it will undermine the socialist
character of the 1959 Revolution? Cuba’s solution to that problem will
determine the course of its future.
II. ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN CUBA: LIMITING POWER OF
INDIVIDUALS TO AGGREGATE CAPITAL OR LABOR WITHOUT
DIRECT STATE CONTROL
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of its program of
subsidized state-to-state trade,59 the Cuban economy has suffered a series of
severe shocks.60 From the early-1990s until the end of Fidel Castro’s direct
control of both the state and Party apparatus in 2006,61 the State had tried a
variety of different programs. Each was viewed as temporary and
exceptional during this “Special Period,”62 and was meant to reposition the
economy so that it might revert to “normal”: an economy driven by central
planning management, and control rather than either by frameworks control
or by markets.63 Markets were viewed as the aggregation of efforts to
59

See Cole Blasier, The End of the Soviet-Cuban Partnership, in CUBA AFTER THE COLD
WAR 59, 87 (Carmelo Mesa-Lago ed., 1993) (“Beginning in the late 1980s, Soviet leaders
began to accept a reality that neither party had been willing to articulate publicly and the
Cubans have not admitted even to themselves: the Cuban economy is not viable at
established levels, and with its then partners, without extensive foreign aid.”).
60
See, e.g., Carmelo Mesa-Lago & Pavel Vidal-Alejandro, The Impact of the Global
Crisis on Cuba’s Economy and Social Welfare, 42 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 689 (2010)
(discussing the most recent financial crisis).
61
Fidel Castro Quit as Cuba Communist Party Chief in 2006, BBC NEWS (Mar. 22,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-12818651.
62
See, e.g., Archibald Ritter, Cuba’s Economy During the Special Period, 1990–2010,
in 1 CUBA: PEOPLE, CULTURE, HISTORY 232 (Alan West-Durán ed., 2011) (“In a speech in
1997, President Fidel Castro lamented the pro-market policy moves and implied that they
were temporary only–possibly only for the duration of the ‘Special Period.’”); see also CUBA
IN THE SPECIAL PERIOD: CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY IN THE 1990S (Ariana Hernandez-Reguant
ed., 2009).
63
Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Introduction: Cuba, the Last Communist Warrior, in CUBA
AFTER THE COLD WAR, supra note 59, at 3, 4–7; Mesa-Lago & Vidal-Alejandro, supra note
60, at 710 (“Until 2010, the government’s economic response had fundamentally relied on
centrally implemented expenditure cuts.”).
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manipulate consumers as part of a complex system of global economics
designed to maintain the economic and political hegemony of developed
states.64 The transfer of control over the state and Party machinery from
Fidel Castro to his brother Raúl after Fidel’s hospitalization65 and the
shocks of the global economic crisis that began in 200766 produced further
stress on the viability of the Cuban economy as it operated,67 and
diminished the taste of the elite for maintaining the status quo.68
It is in this context that the State commenced what would eventually
result in a somewhat tentative, though from their perspective somewhat
profound, effort to re-set Cuba’s economic model. That process of
attempting the development of a new(er) model of Cuban economics
catalyzed the development of a new theory of cooperatives and their role in
the economy. Cooperatives, which had been a backwater of Cuban
economic planning for some time, suddenly assumed a central role in the
development of a vibrant, though small and tightly controlled, non-state
sector that would be permitted to develop in response to market forces.
This Part sets the context for the more detailed examination of
cooperatives that follows in Part III. It first describes the context in which
economic change was effectuated. It then considers the form of the
proposed transformation, one grounded in the division of economic activity
into separate but highly regulated state and non-state sectors.
A. Resetting the Regulatory Context: From Command to Lineamientos
Over the last decade, two great factions within the Cuban governing
elite have been debating the future course of Cuban economic development.
On the one side stood the governing apparatus of traditionalists tied to the
old Soviet model of development. This group assumed there was no flaw in
the Soviet model and were determined to show that they could succeed
where the Soviet sphere failed. On the other side stood a group that might
64
Larry Catá Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba and the
IMF, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 497, 517–33 (2006); Larry Catá Backer, Odious Debt Wears
Two Faces: Systemic Illegitimacy, Problems, and Opportunities in Traditional Odious Debt
Conceptions in Globalized Economic Regimes, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2007, at 1,
16–24.
65
Peter Whoriskey, Cubans in Miami Cheer Castro Illness, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2006,
at A08.
66
See Lorenzo L. P rez, The Impact of the Global Financial and Economic Crisis on
Cuba,
19
CUBA
TRANSITION
116,
116–23
(2009),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume19/pdfs/perez.pdf.
67
See Mesa-Lago & Vidal–Alejandro, supra note 60.
68
See Nick Miroff, Cuba Examines Asian Model for Economic Reforms, NPR (Aug. 21,
2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/08/21/159466378/cuba-views-china-vietnam-as-economichope; cf. Julie M. Bunck, Market Oriented Marxism: Post-Cold War Transition in Cuba and
Vietnam, in CUBAN COMMUNISM 182 (Irving Louis Horowitz & Jaime Suchlicki eds., 2001).
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be identified as “progressives,” with significant elements in the Cuban
military (the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias)69 “that increasingly looked
to East Asian models of development as a means of preserving the political
system while modifying the economic system to preserve political stability
and the legitimacy of the leadership role of the [CCP].”70 Traditionalists
grounded their opposition to change on the ideology developed by Fidel
Castro; the other side was supported if only tacitly by Raúl Castro.71
The battle between the two sectors of the governing elite appeared to
tip in favor of the progressives at the beginning of September, 2010, when,
in a carefully staged interview with a U.S. journalist, Fidel Castro appeared
to concede the point. “It was a casual remark over a lunch of salad, fish and
red wine but future historians are likely to parse and ponder every word:
‘The Cuban model doesn’t even work for us any more.’”72
The interview, of course, produced a bit of misdirection in the west,
where analysts would predictably misread the meaning and effect of the

69
See Terry L. Maris, Revolutionary Management: The Role of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias in the Cuban Economy, MILITARY REV., Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 63, 66. The
Cuban military has a significant stake in the national economy, providing a substantial
amount of industrial capacity. Its website, Industria Militar, notes somewhat critically that
military deploys a part of its industrial activity toward meeting the needs of the national
economy. This is possible because the military’s industrial capacity exceeds its needs and
the needs of the State have increased. See Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Reconverción
iIndustrial [Revolutionary Armed Forces, Industrial Reconstructuring], INDUSTRIA MILITAR
[MILITARY
INDUSTRY],
http://www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/minfar/industria/industria_militar.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2013).
70
Larry Catá Backer, Cuba Responds to Globalization and Reorganizes Its Political
Economy: Revolution, Retrenchment or Small Steps Towards Market Engagement Within a
Marxist Framework Under the Leadership of a Vanguard Party Apparatus, LAW END DAY
(Sep. 24, 2010, 7:09 PM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/cuba-respondes-toglobalization-opening.html; see also Pin Zuo, A Survey of the Relationship Between Cuba
and China: A Chinese Perspective, 20 CUBA TRANSITION 193, 199 (2010),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/pinzuo.pdf (“ ith Ra l
Castro’s takeover of the presidency from his brother, Cuba has entered a period of
adjustment of its policies and potential reconsideration of the Chinese path. Cuba is now
very interested in the Chinese reform. This would be a good point of confluence for building
a positive relationship between Cuba and China.”).
71
See PHILIP PETERS, LEXINGTON INST., A VIEWER’S GUIDE TO CUBA’S ECONOMIC
REFORMS
4–6
(2012),
available
at
http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Cuba/ResearchProducts/View
ersGuide.pdf.
72
Rory Carroll, Fidel Castro Says His Economic System Is Failing, GUARDIAN (Sept. 9,
2010, 5:31 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/09/fidel-castro-cuba-economicmodel (“Towards the end of a long, relaxed lunch in Havana, Jeffrey Goldberg, a national
correspondent for the Atlantic magazine, asked Castro if Cuba’s economic system was still
worth exporting. The reply left him dumbfounded. ‘Did the leader of the revolution just say,
in essence, Never mind?’ Goldberg wrote on his blog.”).
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“admission.”73 Westerners and the enemies of the regime found it too
difficult to resist the urge to over-read into the statement their own hopes,
desires, and long term perspectives.74 Yet, the evidence of its effect within
Cuban conversations about the future of economic organization was not
hidden. In fact, “Raúl Castro has been saying the same thing in public and
private since succeeding his older brother two years ago.”75 Stephen
Wilkinson, a Cuba expert at London Metropolitan University, better
contextualized the remark:
The remark should not, however, be interpreted as a condemnation
of socialism, added Wilkinson. “That is clearly not what he means,
but it is an acknowledgement that the way in which the Cuban
system is organised has to change. It is an implicit indication also
that he has abdicated governing entirely to Raúl, who has argued this
position for some time. We can now expect a lot more changes and
perhaps more rapid changes as a consequence.”76

Yet, a directional shift was clearly anticipated by Raúl Castro. And so it is
important to ask, at this point, what the Cuban elite is permitting to be said
about this change.
Reports published in Granma in 2010 suggested indirectly that over
the last several years, it is Raúl and not Fidel who has been asserting the
leadership role with respect to economic issues.77 Rather than referring to
Fidel’s observation, the author starts with Raúl’s address to the National
Assembly in early August, a month before the carefully staged interview
with Fidel, describing the plans to reduce public employment.78 Raúl

73

See id. (“Fidel Castro’s nine-word confession, dropped into conversation with a
visiting US journalist and policy analyst, undercuts half a century of thundering
revolutionary certitude about Cuban socialism.”).
74
See, e.g., Jim Wyss & Luisa Yanez, Fidel Castro: Cuba’s Economic Model Is Broken,
MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 9, 2010, at A1 (“‘He is either crazy or senile. This certainly does not
sound like something Castro would say,’ said Jaime Suchlicki, a long-time Castro observer
and head of the University of Miami’s Research Institute for Cuban Studies. ‘But if he was
quoted accurately, then I guess he’s come to the realization, like everyone else, that MarxistLeninist governments do not function. So the real question is, what is he going to do about it
now? Is he going to bring about change in Cuba since the Cuba model doesn’t work?’”).
75
Carroll, supra note 72.
76
Id. (quoting Stephen Wilkinson).
77
See Leticia Martínez Hernández, Mucho más que una alternative [Much More Than
an
Alternative],
GRANMA
(Sept.
24,
2010)
(Cuba),
http://www.granma.cu/espanol/cuba/24sept-trabajo.html. Granma is the official publication
of the Central Committee of the CCP.
It is circulated online at
http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/.
78
In 2010, Raúl Castro announced the State’s decision to increase the availability of
opportunities to work for one’s own account, which will serve as an alternative means of
employment for dismissed state workers. Martínez Hernández, supra note 77 (“El
pasado
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Castro also indicated a substantial revision to the legal impediments to
private economic activity, at least at the lowest levels of such activity.79
The western press reported that he also indicated that any such opening up
would be limited and controlled: “Cuban President Raul Castro has ruled
out large-scale market reforms to revive the communist island’s struggling
economy. But Mr. Castro said the role of the state would be reduced in
some areas, with more workers allowed to be self-employed or to set up
small businesses.”80 Thus, at least in the public discussions within Cuba, it
was clear that there would be no revolutionary opening up, even when
judged by the Chinese or Vietnamese standards.81
Instead, the public discussion and hint-dropping served as the
foundation for small incremental steps away from the model of almost
complete state control in economic planning and decision-making. The
most important comment was made in late-2010 in an address by Raúl
Castro in which he “admitted: ‘We have to erase forever the notion that
Cuba is the only country in the world in which people can live without
working.’ He further admitted that the decades old US embargo—’a
crippling, punitive measure’—could no longer be blamed for all the island’s
woes.”82 The reforms opened a very small space for private economic
activity, but that opening came with limits.83 It was restricted to a set of
very specific occupations or services, each of which required a separate
permit, and all of which were confined to the lowest level in the retail
sector.84 These were made necessary by the previous announcement of
primero de agosto el General de Ejército Raúl Castro Ruz anunció en la Asamblea Nacional
la decisión de ampliar el ejercicio del trabajo por cuenta propia, y utilizarlo como una
alternativa más de empleo para los trabajadores que queden disponibles luego del proceso de
reducción de plantillas infladas que deberá asumir el país.”).
79
Id. (“En la reunión parlamentaria se conoció, además, que se eliminarían varias de las
prohibiciones vigentes para el otorgamiento de nuevas licencias y la comercialización de
algunos productos, además de flexibilizar la posibilidad de contratar fuerza de trabajo en
determinadas actividades.”).
80
Raúl Castro: No Reform but Cuba Economy Control to Ease, BBC NEWS (Aug. 2,
2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10834192.
81
See Enrique Pumar, The Arduous Paths of Political Transitions: A Comparison of
Cuba,
China
and
Vietnam,
19
CUBA
TRANSITION
56
(2009),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/ volume19/pdfs/pumar.pdf.
82
Michael Kline, Economic Reforms in Cuba?, AM. DIPL. (Oct. 2010),
http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2010/0912/comm/kline_cuba.html.
83
See Martínez Hernández, supra note 77.
84
Kline, supra note 82. As Kline notes:
The plan does little more than to encourage laid off workers to start “small
businesses,” or form cooperatives for farming, construction, taxi services, auto
repairs, etc. On 24 September, Granma printed the entire list of 178 approved
private activities, only seven of which are entirely new—including accountants,
bathroom attendants, tutors and fruit vendors. The remaining 171 approved
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potentially large mass terminations of state workers and the intention to
impose a substantial tax reform to support the government’s social welfare
programs.85
These efforts were followed by a much more substantial effort at
systemic reform. That effort was sanctioned by Raúl Castro, who “kicked
off a national ‘discussion’ to reinvent socialism . . . . The aim was
straightforward enough: shake up the dysfunctional Cuban economy in
order to save the revolution.”86 The process was meant to produce the
guidelines (Lineamientos) toward economic reform. The Lineamientos
were the product of what for Cuba was a fairly open process, directed by
the CCP, to seek popular input for a framework of reform that would move
toward resolving Cuba’s economic crisis without changing its political
system or the foundations of its economic system.
The origins of the Lineamientos, at least in its broad outline, are well
known.87 It was circulated widely in a draft form88 and there was an effort,
significant in the historical context of post-Revolutionary Cuba, to promote
greater circulation and consultation of the draft version in and outside of
Cuba.89 The Lineamientos were considered, modified, and approved at the

activities include such everyday jobs as bricklayer, garbage collector, automobile
mechanic, hairdresser, etc.
Id.
85

See Elisabeth Malkin, Cuba Details New Policies on Budding Entrepreneurs, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at A7.
86
Mac Margolis, Cuba’s Leaders Talk of Reform, but It Doesn’t Add Up to Much,
DAILY BEAST (Oct. 26, 2012, 10:30 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2012/10/26/no-country-for-old-dictators.html (“He encouraged Cubans to ‘discuss
openly and without worry’ how to ‘upgrade the national economy.’”).
87
Larry Catá Backer, “Order, Discipline and Exigency”: Cuba’s VIth Party Congress,
the Lineamientos (Guidelines) and Structural Change In Education, Sport and Culture?, 21
CUBA
TRANSITION
148
(2011),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/backer.pdf.
88
PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA [COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA], PROYECTO DE
LINEAMIENTOS DE LA POLITICA ECONOMICA Y SOCIAL DEL PARTIDO [DRAFT GUIDELINES OF
THE ECONMIC
AND SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY]
(2010), available at
http://lapupilainsomne.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/proyecto-lineamientos-pcc.pdf.
89
As one commentator notes:
Perhaps the most important early initiative of Raúl Castro was the call for a
consulta (consultation) with the Cuban people. Barrio committees, factory
workers, local party organizations, and others were encouraged to meet and
register their thoughts and complaints. By August 2009, 5.1 million people out of a
total Cuban population of 11.2 million had participated in the consultation. There
were 3.3 million registered comments of which almost half were critical.
Roger Burbach, Cubans Seek Change, Not End to Revolution, NEW AM. MEDIA (June 26,
2012), http://newamericamedia.org/2012/06/cubans-seek-change-not-end-to-revolution.php.
Whatever one believes about the legitimacy of the consultation process, and whatever
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Sixth Congress of the CCP. In its final version, 313 sections of the
Lineamientos suggest action affecting nearly every aspect of Cuban
economic life.90 A companion booklet summarizes the changes made to the
draft Lineamientos and the official reasons for the changes.91
The Lineamientos now serve as a basis for reordering the failing
economic framework within Cuban socialism. They also suggest a change
in the internal politics of Cuba, though this change suggests the extent of
the caution among Cuban leaders that appears to slow down the pace and
scope of reform. That the Lineamientos were modified at all, and in some
respects in significant fashion, suggests deep changes in the relationship
between the CCP, as a body, and the leadership, which can no longer count
on unquestioning approval of its programs. It also indicates a deep strain of
suspicion behind the wisdom of substantive reform, which was grudgingly
adopted in the Lineamientos,92 and appears to be even more narrowly
implemented in the regulations.93
There is little dispute that the Lineamientos arose from a recognition
that the system of managing the Cuban economy at that time was not
working.94 More importantly, that economic model was unsustainable even
in the short run. The Lineamientos were not undertaken in a vacuum. Nor
did they emerge without foundation. The State had been moving for years
to develop public sector enterprises, at the national and transnational level,
one thinks of its real effectiveness, the call for such a process of consultation, and its use,
even marginally, marks a very different culture of governance from that in effect in the
decades before. But it also raised the stakes. If the Cuban population is engaged in the
process and buys into it, there is a greater expectation of success and follow-through and a
greater penalty to be paid in the event of failure. See Marcelo Vieta, Cuba’s Coming CoOperative Economy? Reflections From Two Recent Field Trips, GLOBAL RES. (July 18,
2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=31966 (“The release of the
‘Draft Guidelines’ of the economic reforms in the fall of 2010, and the promising public
consultations that were had between December 2010 and February 2011 with over 1 million
Cubans in the process of developing the lineamientos, has, most certainly, committed Cuba
to a massive reform of the economy such as it has never seen before. Cuba is, in a word, at a
crossroads right now.”).
90
See LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39.
91
VI CONGRESO PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE CUBA [SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF CUBA], INFORMACIÓN SOBRE EL RESULTADO DEL DEBATE DE LOS LINEAMIENTOS DE
LA POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA Y SOCIAL DEL PARTIDO Y LA REVOLUCIÓN [INFORMATION ON THE
OUTCOME OF THE DEBATE OF THE POLICY GUIDELINES OF THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
ECONOMY OF THE PARTY AND THE REVOLUTION] (2011) (Cuba), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/55084978/Tabloide-Debate-Lineamientos-VI-Congreso-PartidoComunista-de-Cuba [hereinafter TABLOIDE].
92
See infra Part III.C.1.
93
See infra Part III.C.2.
94
See, e.g., Oscar Echevarría, Cuba—A Glance at the Future: Challenges and
Opportunities,
21
CUBA
TRANSITION
143
(2011),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume21/pdfs/oa_echevarria.pdf.
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as vehicles through which it could engage in economic activities, especially
with foreign partners. In the year preceding their introduction, the State had
moved dramatically in attempt to open up private sector activity.95 That
opening, such as the development of state sector corporations, reflected a
deep suspicion of autonomous economic activity, and a presumption that
opening up had to be tightly regulated and supervised. As is typical in
Marxist-Leninist states, the ideas behind these efforts originated in the CCP
and were then implemented through the state apparatus. But the
Lineamientos also suggest that Raúl Castro’s reform efforts have generated
opposition within the CCP and state sector leaders. That opposition was
most evident in the success that the Sixth Party Congress achieved in
significantly narrowing the reforms proposed by Raúl Castro, especially in
the opening and management of the non-state sector.96 This is both good
and bad news—good news for those seeking to strengthen an
institutionalized CCP apparatus to preserve stability in government,97 bad
news because the price of that stability appears to be a significant
conservatism in political views of the appropriate implementation of
Marxist-Leninist statecraft.
The Lineamientos start from a presumption that they are directed
toward the preservation of the fundamental character of the 1959
Revolution, and effectuated to preserve its gains. But within this
framework, the Lineamientos appear to nod in the direction of the realities
of the economic situation that has brought the CCP to the reevaluation of its
values. Thus, the Lineamientos sought to guarantee changes to the system
by which services are provided, but to limit those promised changes to
those possible under existing economic circumstances.
At a 2011 Conference in New York, Cuban economists from the
University of Havana’s Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy
(Centro de Estudios de la Economía Cubano) addressed these tensions and
provided a window on the way in which these issues are approached within
Cuba.98 First, and perhaps the most important conceptually, was a point
raised by Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, who forcefully argued that
95

See PETERS, supra note 71.
See infra Part III.C.1.
97
The need to strengthen the institutional party is an important one. See Arturo López
Levy, Change in Post-Fidel Cuba: The Challenges of Political Liberalization and Economic
Reform,
21
CUBA
TRANSITION
374,
382–86
(2011),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/ volume21/pdfs/lopezlevy.pdf.
98
For an overview of the programming, see Symposium, Cuba Futures: Past and
Present, BILDNER CTR. FOR W. HEMISPHERE STUDIES (2011), available at
http://cubasymposium.org/Cuba%20Futures%20Final%20Program%20With%20Updates.pd
f; see also, Larry Catá Backer, The State of the Cuban Economy: Divergent Views of
Economists
from
Inside
Cuba,
LAW
END
DAY
(Aug.
3,
2010),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2010/08/state-of-cuban-economy-divergent-views.html.
96
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Cuban economists, political theorists, and government officials should
embrace the construction of internal markets in which individual small and
medium sized enterprises might play a role that would aid in the
development of the Cuban economy without doing damage to its political
framework.99 His review of the willingness of China and Vietnam to
embrace a vigorous internal market, even as they preserved their Marxist
social and political framework,100 provided strong evidence that, though
capitalism used markets in accordance with the logic of its ideology, there
is a place for markets within socialism.101 Indeed, the move toward
pragmatism suggested that it might be possible to take a fresh and more
sophisticated approach to socialist markets both within Cuba and as a
means of Cuban engagement with global markets in which “the state should
study a future role for itself regulating enterprises rather than directly
administering them.”102 This move toward pragmatism was based on the
utility of opening internal markets to small and medium sized enterprises as
well as to cooperatives that both reflected global trends,103 and that
furthered the Cuban Marxist project of socializing the economy.104
A second point was the recognition that, even if markets were to be a
means of reform, the private sector markets envisioned would remain small
and effectively dependent on the public sector markets and enterprises.105
99
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, La Actualización del Modelo Económico Cubano
[The Updated Cuban Economic Model], in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHANGE IN CUBA 1, 2–3
(2011), http://web.gc.cuny.edu/dept/bildn/cuba/PEchangeCuba.pdf (“Pero el tiempo
transcurrido en el decursar del proyecto socialista, más el análisis de las experiencias de
otros países socialistas asiáticos, colocan al estado cubano ante la imperiosa necesidad de
actualizar su modelo económico, donde el mercado deba tener un papel cada vez más
creciente en la economía cubana, aunque se manifieste que revalecerá la planificación y no
el mercado.”).
100
Id. 15–18; see also CAROLYN L. HSU, CREATING MARKET SOCIALISM (2007).
101
Villanueva, supra note 99, at 3–4 (“Y ya se reconoce que el estado puede ceder
actividades que no le son estratégicas, y que sean capaces de absorber la gran cantidad de
trabajadores que quedarán disponibles en los próximos años, en la nueva reorganización en
curso en las empresas y en las unidades presupuestadas.”).
102
Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, The Cuban Economy: A Current Evaluation and
Proposals for Necessary Policy Changes (Japan Trade Org., Inst. of Developing Econs.
Discussion
Papers,
Paper
No.
217,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/217.pdf.
103
Villanueva, supra note 99, at 14 (“Lo interesante es que ese término no es derivado de
la coyuntura que atraviesa la economía cubana, es una tendencia mundial que se está
imponiendo de estructurar la producción sobre la base de pequeñas y medianas empresa.”).
104
Id. at 14–15 (“Es cierto que en la actualidad se analiza por parte del gobierno cubano
la necesidad de implementar algunas de las variantes de las llamadas PYMES, especialmente
las llamadas cooperativas por la socialización de la producción y los beneficios que la misma
trae consigo.”).
105
Pavel Vidal Alejandro, Las restricciones de divisas en la economía cubana al
terminar el 2010: crisis, ajuste y salida paulatina [Currency Restrictions in the Cuban
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There were two parts to this point. The first was that the private enterprise
would remain small because of the inability of the state to provide capital.
That inability was both structural and functional. Structurally, Cuba has no
system for easily providing access to capital for individuals. Functionally,
even if it had such a system, there are few funds available for that purpose,
and little use for the funds with a wholesale market still essentially
undeveloped.106 Second, the solution to this approach of state control of
finance coupled with its inability to provide financing was to
internationalize micro financing.107
The last point, raised by Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, is also telling.108
Among the reforms contemplated in the Lineamientos is permitting
individuals to hire others in their small businesses.109 This reform reflects a
substantial change in the Cuban economic system in which only selfemployment and employment by the state were possible. Piñeiro
Harnecker, however, suggested that this new form of an employment
relationship might be tightly controlled by the state.110 She suggested that
Cuba was considering, for these private enterprise employees, creating a
state-sponsored union that would have substantial authority to determine the
terms and conditions of employment available in the private sector.111
These might well mimic the state enterprises that now determine both the
conditions of employment and the wages of Cuban workers hired by foreign
enterprises. The reforms, then, do not contemplate the creation of
independent or private labor markets. Nor do they contemplate vesting
individuals with authority over the control of capital. Rather, to emphasize
the limited nature of the market opening, the reforms reinforce the limits of
aggregated economic activity outside the state sector by emphasizing
aggregation of labor rather than of capital.112 This is a framework that is
Economy at the End of 2010: Crisis, Adjustment and Gradual Solution], in POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CHANGE IN CUBA, supra note 99, at 19, 43.
106
Id. at 61–63.
107
Id. at 63 (“[E]ro si se promueve el microcrédito con colaboración internacional, ello
significaría una entrada de divisas al país que posibilitarían abrir la importación para los
uentapropistas, microempresarios y cooperativistas.”).
108
See Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, New Forms of Enterprise in Cuba’s Changing
Economy, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHANGE IN CUBA, supra note 99, at 43, 67.
109
See infra notes 360–362 and accompanying paragraph (discussing provisions of
Lineamientos governing cooperative authority to hire labor).
110
Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 108, at 67–68.
111
Id. at 74–75.
112
See Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, Las cooperativas en el Nuevo modelo económico
cubano [The Cooperatives in the New Cuban Economic Model], in MIRADAS A LA EC N M A
CUBANA: EL PROCESO DE ACTUALI ACI N [LOOKS TO THE CUBAN ECONOMY: THE UPGRADE
PROCESS] 73, 86 (2009) (“Esto refle a la preocupaci n redistributiva y la despreocupaci n
por la naturaleza de las relaciones sociales de los sujetos que construyen, o no, la sociedad
post-capitalista; enfoque este que ha marcado las experiencias socialistas y lleva a desestimar
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replicated at the inter-governmental level. For example, the only corporate
enterprises the ALBA framework calls for are state-owned or state-based
joint ventures (empresas grannacionales).113 And, indeed, there was a
suggestion made that Cuba expected to hire these proprietors in a sort of
state-supported privatized sector.
Taken together, these insights help explain the role of the
Lineamientos not just in reshaping the Cuban economy through limited
privatization, but also in the re-organization of the economy as well. This
was an important objective, with significant regulatory consequences, as
Cuba moves from a monolithic central planning model to one in which the
economy is divided between a state and a non-state sector, and where both
may be affected by internal and external trade. To understand the scope and
direction of approaches to cooperatives in the non-state sector, it is
necessary to understand the premises of the framework within which the
organization and division of the economy is structured under the
Lineamientos.
The Lineamientos allocate distinct forms of economic organization
between two spheres of economic activities: the small-scale local and
regional/national activity. This is a division that is then carried forward in
the construction of Cuba’s form of global engagement through socialist
regional trade organizations, principally ALBA.114 Small-scale activities
are to be open to individuals, but remain limited and target local retail
sectors.115 The private sector is allocated a precise set of activities that may
be undertaken as sole proprietorships or through collectives. In either case,
the focus is on the aggregation and utilization of labor, and avoiding the
means of aggregating and allocating capital in economic activities outside
the control of the state. Property remains firmly attached to the state under
the direction of the CCP. In contrast, the bulk of economic activity is to be
organized at the national/regional level.116 This activity is to remain an
instrument to national control and marked by direct micro state planning or
organization into well-controlled juridical persons (mostly in corporate
forms). The state sector dictates the overall direction of economic activity
and includes enterprises understood to have national impact. These are
organized by sectors and may be run via direct state control or devolution of

las potencialidades productivas y transformadoras de las cooperativas y otras formas
autogestionarias.”).
113
Conceptualización de Proyecto y Empresa Grannacional en el Marco del ALBA
[Conceptualization of Company and Project Grannacionals under ALBA], ALBA-TCP,
http://www.alba-tcp.org/contenido/conceptualizacion-de-los-grannacional (last visited Mar.
29, 2013) [hereinafter ALBA Grannacional].
114
See Backer & Molina, supra note 36.
115
See infra Part II.B.2.
116
See infra Part II.B.1.
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SOEs. Their use is also bound by the conceptualization of globalization
within the ideological parameters of ALBA. It is to this re-organization of
the economic sector of Cuban state activity that the Article turns to next.
B. Economic Organization After the Lineamientos
The development of the new Cuban economic model suggests a
pattern of both tight control of the means and substance of economic
activity and a tentative willingness to tolerate a small space in which
control is devolved to individuals. In return for this greater autonomy, the
State eliminates a need to support individuals and individuals are viewed as
sources of funds, in the form of taxes and fees that might then subsidize
other public activities. But the limits of the devolution from tight state
control are severe. While individuals may now engage in economic activity
in the non-state sector, the forms of permitted economic activity are tightly
controlled. Licensing makes supervision and control more powerful. And
this oversight substantially constrains individual autonomy and flexibility in
meeting demands. The State remains in direct control of the economy and
reserves for itself any form of economic activity that implicates ownership
of productive property. Loosening comes only at the very bottom of the
retail and service sector. The regulatory ideal117 of great state enterprises
and a small army of small proprietors satisfies the specific needs of
consumers for everyday items.
1. The Omnipresent State Sector
Corporations constitute property in the hands of their owners, but they
also constitute collective persons.118 As great autonomous collectives of
people and resources, operating in accordance with their own constitution
and serving the needs of their own constituents, corporations are institutions
that exercise significant social, political, and economic power. In the latter

117
The regulatory ideal describes the normative conception of a thing that then serves to
determine the rules used to ensure the coherence of that normative conception. See JUDITH
BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 1 (1993) (“The
category of ‘sex’ is, from the start, normative; it is what Foucault called a ‘regulatory ideal.’
In this sense, then, ‘sex’ not only functions as a norm, but it is part of a regulatory practice
that produces the bodies it governs.”). In this case, the regulatory ideal of the economy
serves not merely as a norm (Marxist-Leninist economic organization), but also as its
regulatory practice (SOEs and individual-cooperatives) that creates a self-referencing loop
where each reinforces the other through constant invocation. It thus produces what it names.
See id. at 7–8 (“The naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated
inculcation of a norm.”). This is a powerful and stable (if contextual) relationship that
makes the rejection of the norm unlikely merely by suggesting a distinct regulatory ideal—
for example, U.S. style-free market regulatory normativity.
118
See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality
Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583, 583 (1999).
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respect, their organization and operations tend to mirror those of the state.119
This close connection between corporate and state forms created a
conceptual problem for European Marxist Leninist states, and for the Cuban
Communist Party as well.
Marxist-Leninist “socialist” states are grounded in the fundamental
notion of state monopoly over the social, political, and economic
organization. Collectives of people and things, operating independent of
the state, even if subject to state regulation, deprive the state of its
monopoly position, and, if they can amass enough power, threaten the
fundamental ordering principles of state organization. Retaining an
organizational form based on the suppression of all collectives other than
those “owned” by the state provides the simplest and most effective form
for safeguarding the Marxist-Socialist character of the state. Even when
organizations, like corporations, are permitted to mimic the state, they serve
as convenient means to allocate resources within the state apparatus and
divide authority for its use.
The Lineamientos do little to change this basic set of premise that have
guided Cuban economic policy since the 1959 Revolution. The corporation
remains an instrument of state policy. The socialist system continues to
frame economic organization, and for that purpose socialist state enterprises
are formed.120 These constitute the principal form of national economic
activity.121 Cuba allows additional forms of economic organizations to be
recognized—mixed enterprises, cooperatives, individuals operating as sole
proprietorships, and various agricultural ventures—aimed at improving
economic efficiency.122
However, individuals are not permitted to
aggregate property in juridical or natural persons.123
While the
Lineamientos seek to separate administrative from economic activity, since
the original version, the Sixth Party Congress inserted a provision ensuring
that the process of separation will be gradual and ordered.124 Under the
Lineamientos, corporations are viewed as ways to efficiently organize the
economic sector on productive rather than competitive lines.125 Thus,
119

It is replication, in part, that suggests the premises underlying recent efforts at the
international level to impose state obligations directly on multinational corporations. See
Backer, supra note 13; Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations
and International Law: Where from Here?, 19 CONN. J. INTL L. 1 (2003).
120
LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 1.
121
Id. ¶ 2.
122
Id.
123
Id. ¶ 3.
124
Id. ¶ 6.
125
Id. ¶ 7 (“Lograr ue el sistema empresarial del pa s est constituido por empresas
eficientes, bien organizadas y eficaces, y ser n creadas las nuevas organizaciones superiores
de direcci n empresarial. Se desarrollar la cooperaci n entre las empresas para garantizar
mayor eficiencia y calidad. Se elaborar la norma ur dica ue regule todos estos
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cooperation rather than competition is privileged. This represents a retreat
from the provision as originally proposed that spoke of strong and wellorganized enterprises, but did not speak to any sort of enforced cooperation
among them.126 That was added during the course of debate, again
suggesting the difficulty of control for those who sought to put forward
more aggressively progressive structural reforms.
Central planning remains the heart of the economic system;127 and
state sector planning is meant to take into account the management of
emerging market sectors as well.128 While the form of planning may
change to meet the realities of new forms of activities, the object remains
the effective control and integration of all aspects of economic activity in
Cuba by bringing them all under the political direction of the state.129
However, the opening of a private space for economic activity and the
recognition of the need to deal with foreigners also requires the elaboration
of a system to regulate and enforce agreements between these enterprises.130
It also contemplates the organization of wholesale markets to service both
state sector corporations and participants in private sector activities,131
including cooperatives.132 The focus on reorganizing at least part of the
state sector through state enterprises continues, refining a slow-developing
process dating back to the efforts at enterprise optimization of 1998,133 but
is now more clearly tied to the preservation of state control of economic
activity.
Since the 1990s, Cuba has revised its Constitution and laws to permit
joint ventures between state enterprises and foreign corporations, and to

aspectos.”).
126
See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 7, col. original ( “Ser necesario lograr ue el sistema
empresarial del pa s est constituido por empresas fuertes y bien organizadas, y creadas las
nuevas organizaciones superiores de direcci n empresarial. Se elaborar el Reglamento
General para estas organizaciones.”).
127
LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 1 (“El sistema de planificaci n socialista continuar
siendo la v a principal para la direcci n de la econom a nacional, y debe transformarse en sus
aspectos metodol gicos, organizativos y de control.”).
128
Id. (“La planificaci n tendr en cuenta el mercado, influyendo sobre el mismo y
considerando sus caracter sticas.”).
129
Id. ¶ 5 (“La planificaci n abarcar el sistema empresarial estatal, la actividad
presupuestada, las asociaciones econ micas internacionales, y regular otras formas de
gesti n no estatales ue se apli uen y ser m s ob etiva en todos los niveles. Los nuevos
m todos de planificaci n cambiar n las formas de control sobre la econom a. La
planificaci n territorial tendr en cuenta tambi n estas transformaciones.”).
130
Id. ¶ 10.
131
Id. ¶ 9.
132
TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 9.
133
See generally Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Cuba’s Perfeccionamiento Empresarial Law:
A Step Towards Privatization?, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 119 (2002).
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provide for the operation of foreign corporations within Cuba.134 “Cuba
further increased this flexibility in October 1994, when it officially
declare[d] that all sectors of the economy, with the exception of public
health, education, and the armed forces, were open to foreign
investment.”135 Notwithstanding these permissive revisions, the internal
Cuban economy is substantially insulated from the activities of these
enterprises, and Cuban individuals are substantially prohibited from
forming or investing in these export-oriented enterprises.136 The difficulty
lies in the arbitrariness built into the approval process, one that is
multilayered and substantially opaque.137 In other respects, Cuba retains a
commercial code, which is not much different from the Spanish colonial
law it inherited at the end of the nineteenth century, and the primitive and
largely outdated codification of corporations law.138
Cuban foreign investment is governed by Decreto-Ley No. 77,139
which permits inbound foreign investment and the establishment of joint
ventures, but only with Cuban state enterprises and subject to a fairly
complicated system of approvals under the direction of the Ministry of
Foreign Investments and Economic Cooperation.140 Moreover, foreign
ventures may take a majority stake in joint enterprises, but may not invest
in domestic corporations in Cuba.141 Though Decreto-Ley No. 77 “allows
for 100 percent foreign ownership . . . only six such wholly foreign-owned
firms exist today: three in petroleum and energy, two in maritime transport,
134
Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Armando A. Musa, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof: The Status of
Current Foreign Investors in a Post-Transition Cuba, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 885, 887
(2005).
135
Id.
136
See RICHARD E. FEINBERG, THE NEW CUBAN ECONOMY: WHAT ROLES FOR FOREIGN
INVESTMENT?
10
(2012),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/12/cuba%20economy%20fei
nberg/cuba%20economy%20feinberg%209.pdf?_lang=en (“The more orthodox factions
within the government and Communist Party seem to have gained the upper hand in drafting
the section on foreign investment. The conservatives inserted language revealing their
enduring distrust of foreign capital and underscored the need to carefully screen projects, as
well as to monitor closely those projects that are allowed to proceed.”).
137
Id. at 12–13.
138
See Backer, supra note 5, at 365–75.
139
See Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular Ley No. 77: Ley de la Inversion Extranjera
[National Assembly of the People’s Power Law No. 77: Foreign Investment Law] (GACETA
OFICIAL EXTRAORDINARIA NO. 3, Sept. 6, 1995, at 5) arts. 1.1, 3 (Cuba).
140
Kathleen Claussen, Engaging Closed Societies Through International Arbitration:
Lessons From the Cuban Experience, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 11, 15–18 (2011).
141
Feinberg notes that “whereas in the 1990s the government often granted the foreign
partner majority control, now it is seeking to revert 51 percent or more of the voting shares
to the SOE partner.” FEINBERG, supra note 136, at 13. For the earlier framework, see Joy
Gordon, Cuba’s Entrepreneurial Socialism, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1997, at 18, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97jan/cuba/cuba.htm.
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and one in the financial sector.”142 There is nothing that would prevent
Cuban state enterprises operating in a corporate form from taking a
minority stake in a foreign corporation operating abroad. Individual
authorization is required for every foreign entity.143 Scholars outside of
Cuba have criticized Cuban foreign investment law.144 Some have argued
that the system is highly inefficient.145 The areas set aside for investments
are limited and designed more like quarantine zones than economic zones.
They are meant to prevent all but the most controlled contact between
Cubans and foreigners. Moreover, the underlying law of contract through
which business and investment relationships must be effectuated within
Cuba remains primitive by global standards. Lastly, recent Cuban
government anti-corruption efforts have negatively impacted investment.146
Cubans have generally rejected the Chinese approach to economic reorganization, especially in the matter of permitting individuals to use the
corporate form.147 Such a variant of Marxist-Leninist structuring permits
too much individual autonomy for Cuban tastes. Moreover, the resulting
disparities of wealth that arise, as has been the case in China, are still
unacceptable in Cuba, especially as between individuals.
These
observations are usually deployed to support a basic line—that the Chinese
model does not work. Indeed, from the perspective of some, any sort of
hybridity would invariably create the conditions for a return to
capitalism.148
There are other arguments that have been made to resist the Chinese
approach and in defense of substantially greater state direction of economic
activity.149 First, neither Maoism nor Stalinism has overcome the
contradictions of Marxist-Leninism and the autonomous private economic
142

FEINBERG, supra note 136, at 13.
See María C. Werlau, Foreign Investment in Cuba: The Limits of Commercial
Engagement,
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456,
474–75
(1996),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf.
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See FEINBERG, supra note 136, at 12–17; Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Charles P.
Trumbull IV, Foreign Investment in Cuba: Prospects and Perils, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L.
REV. 903, 908–09 (2003).
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See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 136.
146
Marc Frank, Cuba Crackdown Sees Foreign Companies Exit, FIN. TIMES (May 21,
2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e76f3952-a34b-11e1-8f34-00144feabdc0.html (“It
was hoped that sweeping reforms adopted by the Communist party last year would open the
way for significant foreign investment. But the government has instead re-examined existing
agreements and stalled new projects, foreign business sources said.”).
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See LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 3 (prohibiting individuals from holding
aggregations of property for non-state purposes).
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Helen Yaffe, El Ché Guevara: las cooperativas y la economía política de la
transición al socialism [Ché Guevara: Cooperatives and the Political Economy of the
Transition to Socialism], in COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 132.
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See generally Backer, supra note 5.
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collective. Second, Cuban Stalinism is fundamentally incompatible with
Deng Xiaoping-style Marxist-Leninism and the evolving Chinese model.
Third, the Chinese model is impossible to implement because Cuba remains
isolated from global capital flows, both by design and because of Cuba’s
poor record of paying its debts.150 Fourth, the U.S. embargo and aggressive
American policies makes adoption of the Chinese model impossible.,
principally because it makes access to markets more costly and because any
global engagement might provide an opening for U.S. inspired regime
change efforts While the U.S. facilitated Chinese economic reform even as
they remained critical of its political system, they would hinder similar
moves by Cuba precisely because it remains U.S. policy to destabilize and
aid in the overthrow of the current Cuban government. That leads into the
last argument—that Cuba may not be yet able to compete in the global
marketplace, because of its size, its lack of infrastructure, and its inability to
access capital through global institutions, most notably the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
2. The Role of Private Enterprise
Large-scale, capital-intensive, and nationally significant economic
activity remains the sole province of the state in Cuba. That does not
preclude the possibility of opening a sector of the economy to private
activity. The structures of these new regulatory structures center on the
scope and objectives of efforts to privatize economic activities, the role of
the state in that revised system, and the extent of autonomy of privatized
occupations from state control. The issue is where to draw the line between
state control and private initiative. The real danger for Cuba is that these
reforms, like the lukewarm reforms of the 1990s—which also followed the
familiar pattern of opening at the bottom to a limited number of individual
entrepreneurs—will not produce the self-sustaining local economic marketoriented enterprises at the core of Chinese-style progress.151
Though the pieces of this puzzle are messy, the basic parameters
developed since 2006 are becoming clearer. Private enterprise is to be
limited to the non-state sector. Though undefined, it is structured along the
lines of specific occupations and services that are made lawful to deliver by
individuals for their own account. State control and management remains
paramount and pervasive: licenses are needed for each listed occupation,
the state continues to control all markets for goods and distribution channels
not otherwise covered by a licensed activity, pricing of materials remains
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See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Ideologies of Globalization and Sovereign Debt: Cuba
and the IMF, 24 PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 497-561 (2006).
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Roger Betancourt, Cuba’s Economic ‘Reforms’: Waiting for Fidel on the Eve of the
Twenty-First Century, 9 CUBA TRANSITION 276, 278 (1999).
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essentially driven by state planning rather than by demand or supply, and
the state aggressively taxes all activities in the non-state sector.
The central focus of privatization is centered on individual economic
activity, grounded on the sole proprietorship connected to local small-scale
production or service delivery. The idea, effectively, is that it might be
more efficient to permit some individual autonomy at the lowest and
smallest levels of economic activity because the cost of state supervision at
this level far exceeds its value. The issue remains, though, the extent to
which even in this privatized space, the state ought to assert a more or less
aggressive regulatory or supervisory presence.
Control is most effectively exercised by strictly limiting the kinds of
activity that might qualify for privatization. The State has carefully and
perhaps over-precisely limited the sorts of occupations or economic
activities to which liberalization applies. Each of the 178 occupations listed
requires a separate license. The types of occupations listed are not capitalintensive activities. Nor do they directly challenge the state’s control of the
non-retail sector. This suggests a focus on the lowest level of economic
activity, that is, on activity with respect to which aggregation of labor or
capital is not required. The official account, as elaborated in Granma,152
suggested that the privatization of a small retail sector was meant to
respond to popular demand for a wider variety of goods and services and
the need for the State to reduce its support for goods already made available
through state enterprises, especially in difficult financial times.153 Despite
the limitations, many Cubans have sought to apply for licenses—some
regularizing current unregulated private activity, and others seeking entry
into the non-state sector for the first time.154
The small, local sole entrepreneur is, therefore, the model that is to be
cultivated at the heart of the reformation of the political economy of
Cuba.155 One can view this either as bottom up development or as the
necessary bifurcation of the economy, with a market-based local sector and
a state sector for everything else. Privatization was characterized as a
means of revamping the political economy of Cuba to increase productivity
and efficiency, to increase a collective sense of worker self-worth, and to
move away from the consequences of a communist party line in the 1990s
that seemed to condemn private enterprise legitimately permitted (and
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Martínez Hernández, supra note 77.
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Nick Miroff, Cuba Issues Thousands of Self-Employment Licenses, NPR (Jan. 18,
2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/01/18/133020988/cuba-issues-thousands-of-selfemployment-licenses (reporting the issuance of over 75,000 licenses by January 2011).
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Cf. Tracy Wilkinson, Cuba Opening to Private Enterprise Spurs Service Sector Startups, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), http:// www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fgcuba-entrepreneurs-20110807,0,7604565.story.
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regulated) by the state.156
Even before the process of formulating the Lineamientos moved to
center stage, the strategy of dumping state workers into a newly opened
non-state sector of sole proprietors and simple cooperatives was taking
shape. This was confirmed by internal Cuban state documents that surfaced
in late 2010157 and suggested that a limited amount of aggregation would be
permitted: cooperatives of individuals but not corporations.158 That
document appeared to premise privatization on the willingness of
individuals to take advantage of a new form of cooperative in ordering their
economic activities, but only economic activities within professions
identified and permitted by the State and subject to appropriate licensure,
regulation, monitoring, and the like. But it was also anticipated that “many
of the fledgling businesses won’t get off the ground because laid-off
workers often lack the experience, skill or initiative to make it on their
own.”159
While one of the objectives is to reduce the State’s obligation to
support its working age population through public sector jobs, another
equally significant objective was to use non-state sector activity to generate
what was hoped to be significant tax revenue to fund Cuban social services,
which are under stress.160 All signs, therefore, indicate that the principal
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Martínez Hernández, supra note 77. The need to expand the availability of selfemployment was appropriate in light of official efforts to redesign the political economy of
the state, and to do so in a way that contributes to the sense of worker self-worth. More
importantly, in a way that signalled the scope of the change of the CCP line, Martínez
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Paul Haven & Andrea Rodriguez, Document Charts Cuba’s Path to Economic
Reform, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 14, 2010, reprinted in JAM. OBSERVER (Sept. 15, 2010),
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It was reported that the intent of the government was both to push individuals into the
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Id.
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objective of the State is to convert workers from cost items to revenue
generators. The hope is that as a result people will have a larger assortment
of goods and services available to them and the State will not be burdened
with the subsidies necessary to provide these items. Work flexibility is
taken to redesign the political economy of Cuba to increase individual
productivity and efficiency as well as to provide a means through which
workers can feel more useful, change popular conceptions of work, and
reduce the country’s stigma. Furthermore, the revenue generated is not
merely available to the producers, but also to the State in the form of
taxes.161 This income is meant to fund state activity in ways not currently
available.162 And so these private operators of commercial activity will be
taxed if they mean to enjoy all of the social benefits provided by the
State.163
A further review of the government’s presentation of these changes
also provides evidence of objectives and approaches.164 The government
suggested that, in addition to strict controls on the sorts of occupations
subject to liberalization, it will tightly control economic activities only for
some of which private markets will be permitted.165 Market control is
indirect—it is focused not on the markets for permitted activities, but rather
on markets for materials necessary to conduct business in a wide variety of
activities that might otherwise have been permitted. Access to these
markets will be carefully controlled and changes made slowly over the
course of 2011 and beyond.166 At its base, these secondary markets will be
more than ever our principal task.’” Id. at 71 (quoting Raúl Castro, Closing Remarks at the
Ninth Congress of the Young Communist League in Havana, Cuba (Apr. 4, 2010)).
161
The initial Granma report explained the State’s intent to tax private activity and the
anticipation that such activity would be both profitable and generate tax revenue that could
serve to redistribute wealth and maintain a socialist character. Martinez Hernández, supra
note 77.
162
See Mesa-Lago, supra note 160.
163
Martinez Hernández, supra note 77 (noting obligation to pay taxes to extend to
personal income, services rendered, for hired labor and in addition to contribute to the state
social security system).
164
Thus, the reliance, in the next several paragraphs, is on the report prepared by
Martínez Hernández. See id.
165
Martínez Hernández notes that new forms of permitted private economic activity
would be limited because of the lack of legitimate product markets necessary to carry on
such activities. Id.
166
Martínez Hernández quotes Marino Murillo Jorge, vice president of the Council of
Ministers, who suggested the need for additional planning to meet the need for infrastructure
to support even the small private sector contemplated by the Lineamientos reforms.
Particularly important was the need to develop a wholesale market, without which even the
limited private sector contemplated would struggle. But such a development, Murillo Jorge
warned, would take years to develop. See id. (“[E]stamos diseñando en el plan de la
economía del año próximo qué debemos incorporar teniendo en cuenta las nuevas
transformaciones que demandarán ferreterías, exigirán de equipamientos gastronómicos que
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treated as part of the controlled sector. And space for private market
activities—especially in foodstuffs—will be expanded a little.167
These changes are treated not so much as a deviation from prior
practice as a return to the practices of the early post-revolutionary period.
The fig leaf for this opening of economic activity is the regulations that
grandfathered professionals in the practice of their profession entered into
before 1964; but it is a fig leaf that also drew the outer boundaries of
reform. The State characterized its reforms largely as a ratification of more
fundamental policy first articulated in the grandfathering provisions of 1964
and as building on the premises on which this grandfathering was
structured.168 It was made quite clear that the framework for opening a
private enterprise sector would be the connection between the need to
identify a narrow band of professions as the only permitted basis for private
activities and the conversion of a visible portion of currently illegal and
underground activities into regulated ones.169
This additional benefit has important ramifications beyond the small
opening of the retail sector at the heart of the Lineamientos project.170 This
is especially the case with respect to markets in real estate.171 With
appropriate licenses from the State, a limited market in rentals will be
tolerated, available for the most part to those who receive permission to
leave the country for a certain amount of time.172 The difficulty, though,
hoy no se venden. Tenemos que conducir el plan para lograr coherencia con lo hecho. Lo
óptimo es un mercado mayorista con precios diferentes para ellos. Pero eso no lo vamos a
poder hacer en los próximos años. Ahora tenemos que lograr un mercado donde ellos puedan
comprar lo necesario aunque sin diferenciar los precios minoristas.”). During that time, of
course, the development of socialist private markets contemplated in the Lineamientos
would be vulnerable to the still-considerable power of the CCP’s conservative elements,
which opposed any deviation from a wholly state directed economy.
167
The efforts represent an expansion of current practices rather than a transformative
opening up. The suggestion focused on increasing the room for private activity already
permitted, and even this opening would be highly managed at a level of detail that might
effectively transform what appears to be opening up into little more than indirect state
regulation. See id. (“Valhuerdi comentó que, cuando entre en vigor la resolución, podrán
utilizarse hasta 20 plazas en las “paladares”, donde antes se podían tener 12; que se permitirá
comercializar en ellas productos alimenticios elaborados a base de papa, mariscos y carne de
res.”).
168
Martínez Hernández, supra note 77 (suggesting the grandfathering as a ratification but
one justified because the few number of people involved makes such an exception tolerable).
169
Id. (explaining that in opening the private sector there was taken into account its
potential to reduce the scope of underground and illegal market activities).
170
Id.
171
Id. (“Igualmente, y para apoyar el trabajo por cuenta propia, se concede la posibilidad
de alquilar viviendas, habitaciones y espacios para su ejercicio.”).
172
Id. Yet these markets, like those to be developed around cooperatives, remain highly
regulated, at least indirectly—in this case principally through the retention by state
authorities of the power to review and approve these transactions and to do so in a way that
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remains formidable. Such a transformation requires an equivalent change
in the institutional structures of administration that have been notorious for
cronyism, arbitrariness, and lack of accountability.173
A careful review thus suggests that the great changes to the Cuban
political economy assume a coherent shape that is hardly revolutionary or
that otherwise point to a rejection of its current framework. This is change
at the margins, even if understood as significant within the framework of
Cuban political thinking. As such, control remains the key, and the
avoidance of the creation of potential challengers to state-party power is
critical. The State controls private economic activity in three ways: first, it
does not permit aggregations of economic power by individuals; second, it
limits the occupations with respect to which private activity is permitted;
and third, it tightly controls markets open to private activity however it is
described.
The great opening, so emotively received in the West, in actuality
provides a very tightly regulated set of activities within sectors that would
not compete with the State for financial power, or otherwise threaten to
open society to the possibility of aggregations by private individuals other
than through state-approved (and -controlled) organs. And, indeed,
Martínez Hernández ends with an explicit reminder of the framework
within which these changes are made. The government clearly intends to
tolerate a small non-state sector at the level of individual basic needs. The
State will also manage this non-state sector to ensure that it does not
otherwise interfere with the power of the state to command the economy at
the macro-level and in its dealings with global actors.174
For all of that, it is not clear that those who continue to defend the
traditional control economy model have given up. The newspapers in
Miami reinforce this point. There, both the scope of the attempted reform
(at least by the internal measure of these changes within Cuban politics) and
the strongly voiced expectations of failures (and thus of reversion to
traditional models) were acknowledged. They were described as “a cold
dose of reality for those who think reforming one of the last bastions of

may leave applicants little recourse against arbitrary decisions. Id. (“Es oportuno señalar
que el dueño de la vivienda puede designar a un representante para pedir una licencia de
arrendamiento, lo cual viabilizará la gestión a quienes no estén en el país y deseen alquilar su
domicilio. La aprobación será, en todos los casos, del director municipal de Vivienda.”). As
such, the costs of licensing will likely be seen both as an impediment to an exuberant market
and as a source of revenue to the State—and sadly, possibly also a source of graft for front
line officials.
173
See generally SERGIO DIAZ-BRIQUETS & JORGE F. PÉREZ-LÓPEZ, CORRUPTION IN CUBA:
CASTRO AND BEYOND (2006).
174
According to Martínez Hernández, the object is to defend, maintain, and continue to
perfect socialism, not to destroy it. See Martínez Hernández, supra note 77 (“[E]l fin es
defender, mantener y continuar perfeccionando el socialismo, no destruirlo.”).
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Soviet-style communism will be easy: It warns that many of the new
businesses will be shuttered within a year.”175
There is a tension here between the State’s carefully crafted,
ideologically harmonious efforts to manage a small, potentially lucrative
opening and the reality that, once open, the State will not be able to control
the non-state sector in the way that it controls the rest of the economy. 176
This is a frightening prospect within orthodox circles of the CCP, especially
where foreign states, and particularly the United States, can substantially
impact Cuban state control of wholesale markets, including supplies and
pricing, merely by the expedient of permitting Cuban émigrés the right to
travel more freely to Cuba.177 But as Roger Betancourt explains, the
tension is more complex, grounded in the relationship between political and
economic control in Cuba:
This outcome is not an accident, but the result of a conscious attempt
by the Cuban leadership to maintain absolute political control. It
seems to have two basic policies in the economic realm. One is
adopting economic mechanisms that yield control of foreign
exchange for the leadership, which allows them to buy the support of
the elite that makes up its power base and throw some crumbs to the
rest (in dissident circles the crumbs are known as la jabita, la
merienda and la propina). The other one is rejecting mechanisms
that provide permanent and independent access to wealth creation for
anyone who is not a member of the nomenklatura, and even to some
who think they are members.178

What economic reform has produced, then, is an extension of what
Javier Corrales described as the development, between 1989 and 2002, of a
gatekeeper state.179 The object of economic reform consists of a strong
rejection of privatization. But it also opens, if somewhat timidly, a door for
devolution of control. That devolution is substantially focused on the state
sector. There, the State might consider a form of organization in which
economic planning is shifted from the ministries to SOEs. These are
understood as functional centers of planning, now more autonomous and
also expected to function more efficiently (as that term is generally
understood) but that may still be obliged to take their overall direction from

175

Haven & Rodriguez, supra note 157.
See, e.g., Sean Goforth, Cuba’s Economic Desperation, NAT’L INT. (July 31, 2012),
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/cuba%27s-economic-desperation-7269.
177
Id.
178
Betancourt, supra note 151, at 280–81. The terms la jabita, la merienda and la
propina are derogatory slang terms for “official graft.”
179
See Javier Corrales, The Gatekeeper State: Limited Economic Reforms and Regime
Survival in Cuba, 1989–2002, 39 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 35 (2004).
176

563

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:527 (2013)

the ministries. Yet, devolution also recognizes a space for non-state sector
activity. These are more tightly regulated—the particular activities that
might be undertaken are specified quite precisely. The system of licensing
provides a mechanism for substantial control, surveillance, and monitoring
of private activity. Sadly, it also permits the development of corruption
among low-level CCP cadres and state officials charged with permits, tax,
form filling, and the like.
III. IDEAL AND REALITY: FROM AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE
TO PROLETARIAN CORPORATION
The possibility of aggregating effort for economic activity is severely
curtailed in Cuba. Individuals may not aggregate capital. Nor may they
join together to form corporate entities—that is a privilege left to the State,
and such entities must remain organs of state power. Yet, if the non-state
sector is to survive, some measure of aggregation must be permitted. To
that end, the CCP has chosen to focus not on the aggregation of capital, but
of labor, goods, and services. For that purpose, Cuban intellectuals, now
joined institutionally by the CCP and the State, ironically revive and revise
a form of collectivization developed by Lenin and enforced under Stalin
from the 1920s for the solution to the problem of agricultural production
and to eliminate capitalist tendencies among peasants,180 most notable for
its failures. But in revised form, Cuban authorities believe they can turn to
the old agricultural cooperative to provide the structural bones of something
related but quite different, to expand productive capacity without losing
control of markets. No longer merely a means for organizing agricultural
production, cooperatives now are meant to serve as the framework for the
aggregation of economic forces for mutual production that would not divert
ownership or control of capital away from the State but which might shift
the focus of production from the dictates of central planners to the demands
of consumers, while retaining an obligation to operate for the benefit of its
members and also of the broader social good.181 This is a tall order
demanded of a system in which there is no consensus about the extent to
which economic activity might escape, even in small measure, the control
of management of the State.
180

LENIN, supra note 16; LYNNE VIOLA, PEASANT REBELS UNDER STALIN:
COLLECTIVIZATION AND THE CULTURE OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (Oxford University Press,
1996) (“Although the Communist party publicly proclaimed collectivization to be the
‘socialist transformation’ of the countryside, it was in reality a war of cultures” id., at 3);
SHIELA FITZPATRICK. STALIN’S PEASANTS: RESISTANCE AND SURVIVAL IN THE RUSSIAN
VILLAGE AFTER COLLECTIVIZATION. 7-13, 16-18 (Oxford University Press.1994).
181
“Under our present system, cooperative enterprises differ from private capitalist
enterprises because they are collective enterprises, but do not differ from socialist enterprises
if the land on which they are situated and means of production belong to the state, i.e., the
working-class.” Id. ch. II.
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For cooperatives to work as an acceptable alternative under the current
regime’s assumptions about the corporate form, it would be necessary to
distinguish between the autonomous governance form at the foundation of
the corporate form and a cooperative form more amenable to state
supervision and control. It is to the transformation of the Cuban
agricultural cooperative from a vestigial form of collectivism to something
akin to a proletarian corporation that this Article turns to next. This Part
considers the cooperative as a mediating device between the state-sector
corporation and the sole proprietorship as the basic building block of
private economic activity in Cuba. It suggests the political and cultural 182
as well as the economic dimension of the project of theorizing a proletarian
corporation.
A. Structural Template: The Agricultural Cooperative in Cuba Post-1959
The Cuban government has sought to follow, in some respects, the
Leninist pattern of collectivization through agricultural cooperatives.183
That framework, developed over the first half-century of the current
government, emphasized aggregation of labor, control of pricing, state
ownership of means of production, and some degree of autonomy in the
actual production of crops.184 Agricultural cooperatives also have served as
a venue for experimenting autonomous collective activities.185 Though
these models of cooperatives have been criticized recently as fatally
flawed,186 orthodox and experimental structures have provided a framework
for broader application since 2010.187 The development of cooperatives in
Cuban agriculture is based on the first and second laws of the agrarian
reform in May 1959 and 1963.188 With the enactment of the two laws, more
182

See generally Iñaki Gil de San Vicente, Cooperativismo socialista y emancipación
humana: El legado de Lenin [Socialist Cooperative and Human Emancipation: Lenin’s
Legacy], in COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 103.
183
See LENIN, supra note 16.
184
See José L. Rodriguez, Agricultural Policy and Development in Cuba, 15 WORLD
DEV. 23 (1987).
185
See José Alvarez, Independent Agricultural Cooperatives in Cuba?, 9 CUBA
TRANSITION
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(1999),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume9/pdfs/alvarez.pdf;
Cuba
Envisages Greater Role for Farm Cooperatives in Economic Development, XINHUA NEWS
(Apr. 26, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/business/2012-04/26/c_131553022.htm.
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Daisey Valera, The Cooperatives We Cubans Want, HAVANA TIMES (July 13, 2012)
(Cuba), http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=74307.
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See Cooperativas en Cuba podrían extenderse a transporte, gastronomía y servicios
[Cooperatives in Cuba Could Extend to Transporation, Dining and Services], CUBA DEBATE
(July 9, 2012), http://www.cubadebate.cu/noticias/2012/07/09/cooperativas-en-cubapodrian-extenderse-a-transporte-gastronomia-y-servicios/ [hereinafter Cooperatives in
Cuba].
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than seventy percent of farmland was expropriated by the Cuban
government, creating the state agricultural sector in Cuba.189
Collectivization followed, along with a growing exodus of people to the
cities and intermittent agricultural crises.190
The first cooperatives created in the revolutionary period were known
as peasant associations.191 These were embryos of the latter cooperatives.
With the exit of financial institutions that provided credits to cooperatives
from Cuba, the Credit and Services Cooperative (CCS) was founded in
1960.192 The CCS was voluntarily formed by peasants that benefitted from
the agrarian law reforms.193 The sugar cane cooperatives were created after
much of the land which was nationalized or retaken in 1959 was harvested
in 1960.194 The first sugar cane cooperatives were organized by peasants,
who did not own the land they worked on, and later transformed into sugar
cane collectives.195
To respond to the strain placed on agricultural production after 1975,
the Agricultural Production Cooperatives (Cooperativa de Producción
Agropecuaria) (CAP) were created. They were formed voluntarily by
peasants who owned land and means of production. Unlike members of the
CCS, members of the CAP who sold their properties to the cooperatives
were paid, and became owners and collective workers.196 The Cuban
agricultural model was characterized by the state-owned business with large
scale of production and elevated centralization. It was an industrial
agricultural model, with a high rate of consumption of its inputs and
immense investment and equipment per area. With the collapse of the
socialist nations, the Cuban agricultural sector was hit by an economic
crisis.197 The basic units of cooperative production were created in 1993,
[Agricultural Cooperatives in Cuba: 1959–present], in COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra
note 57, at 321.
189
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176
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and it was established that these units were going to be owners of their
production and that they would sell their production to the state through a
business venture or any other way the State chose.198
The Cuban agriculture sector is an integration of five types of
productive entities:199 Basic Unit of Cooperative Production (Unidad
Básica de Producción Cooperativa) (UBPC), CAP, CCS, private, and the
state. The first three are considered cooperatives. The forms that are most
efficient are the CCS and private peasants.200 The UBPC has been offered
as a model for a generalized form of cooperative structure outside the
agricultural sector.201 In addition, Cuban farmers have sought to develop an
independent cooperative movement, which was effectively discouraged by
the state about a decade ago.202 The restructuring that produced the
Lineamientos has not left agricultural cooperatives untouched. In 2011, the
government announced a review and a consolidation plan for agricultural
cooperatives.203
The regulatory forms of these cooperatives were similar. Private
activity was tolerated, but highly managed. State approvals and review
were required at critical points in cooperative formation, operation, and
production. The state controlled productive property but made it available
to cooperative members. Cooperatives were viewed as cash generators
from which the state would take the first, and to the extent possible, a
substantial cut. The state reserved to itself the right to modify and direct
operations of cooperatives when necessary, and the objectives of
cooperatives tended to privilege their social obligations.
But the
Lineamientos framework has exerted pressure to allow some autonomy for
farm cooperatives as well,204 reorganizing UBPCs, liquidating some of their
SITUATION
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2008),
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http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/cuba/cubasituation0308.pdf.
198
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See González, supra note 187, at 329.
200
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201
Emilio Rodriguez Membrado & Alcides Lopez Labrada, La UBPC: forma de
rediseñar la propiedad estatal con gestión cooperativa [The UBPC: How to Redesign State
Ownership with Cooperative Management], in COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57,
at 337, 355.
202
Alvarez, supra note 184, at 161.
203
See Cuba to Dissolve Inefficient Farming Cooperatives—Cuba Headlines,
COOPERATIVE NEWS (Sept. 15, 2011, 12:57 PM), http://www.thenews.coop/node/5117
(“The President of the National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP) Orlando Lugo Fonte
announced Cuba will reorganize cooperatives to strengthen those that are profitable and
strike off the ones that are not.”).
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See Dimas Castellanos, Why the UBPC Cooperatives Failed, DIMAS’S BLOG (Dec. 20,
2012),http://dimasblogen.wordpress.com/2012/12/20/why-the-ubpc-cooperatives-failed/
(providing English translation of El Blog de Dimas, a blog by Cuban scholar Dimas
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debt, and granting them greater autonomy from the state control.205 By the
early-twenty-first century, cooperatives had become a backwater. But the
economic crisis of the first decade of the twenty-first century provided an
impetus to rethink about economic relationships. That rethinking moved
from capital-privileged form of conventional corporation to labor-privileged
forms of cooperatives. These structural characteristics would serve as the
foundation for the regulatory structure of non-agricultural cooperatives,206
even when the intellectual movement seeking the expansion of cooperatives
into the non-state sector focused on the socialist character of economic
aggregations of productive power, which de-centered capital and
shareholders from construction of viable economic enterprises. 207
B. The Cooperative as a Proletarian Corporation: the Debate Within Cuba
With ideological barriers against the use of corporate form in the nonstate sector of Cuba, its intellectual elites have been exploring cooperative
as the socialist form of individually aggregated enterprise. Much of the
theoretical justifications and arguments supporting this form as an
acceptable alternative for organizing private economic activity have been
recently explored in a collection of important essays assembled by Camila
Piñeiro Harnecker.208 The Cuban intellects assembled around this problem
have attempted to develop a theoretical framework within which the
cooperative form can be legitimated and applied to meet the objectives of
the state in its retail sector privatization efforts. These efforts are worth
considering in some detail both to examine the difficulties of translating
theoretical advances into law, and to understand the tight conceptual
connection between the internal and external economic policies of Cuba,
faced with internal financial difficulties and the challenge of contesting
globalization in Cuba’s relations abroad.
One of the problems for them is the looseness in the current
application of the term “cooperative.” It currently serves as the name for
various enterprises with little in common other than that they are neither
sole proprietorships nor corporations.209 Indeed, cooperatives have evolved
to include formed that are compatible within the normative frameworks of
anarchists,210 Marxists,211 capitalists,212 and non-governmental organizations
205
Cuba Announces Steps to Save Agricultural Cooperatives, NEWS TRACK INDIA (Sept.
12, 2012), http://newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/2012/09/12/35—Cuba-announces-steps-tosave-agricultural-cooperatives-.html.
206
See infra Part III.B.
207
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209
Jesús Cruz Reyes & Camila Piñeiro Harnecker, Una Introducción a las Cooperativas
[An Introduction to Cooperatives], in COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 31.
210
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in globalization.213 Piñeiro Harnecker also notes the predominance of
cooperatives in the agricultural sector, a characteristic of cooperatives that
she, like Henry Hansmann,214 believes is not necessarily inevitable.215
Perhaps a bigger problem is the close connection or convergence
between the cooperative and corporation. Hansmann notes that there are
few functional differences between a consumer cooperative (owned by its
customers), a producer cooperative (owned by individuals selling a factor of
production to the firm), and a business corporation.216 As he notes, “the
same is true of the standard business corporation, which is a firm that is
owned by persons who supply capital to the firm. In fact, the conventional
investor-owned business corporation is nothing more than a special type of
producer cooperative—namely a lenders’ cooperative or a capital
cooperative.”217 Enterprise organization, then, can be understood in terms
of factors of its respective organization, as a function of the way in which it
is built on a particular set of factors of production. Hansmann thus suggests
a basis for separating these organization forms in ways that address the
political economy of states: “A business corporation is different from a
dairy cooperative or a wheat cooperative or a workers’ cooperative only
with respect to the particular factor of production that the owners supply the
firm.”218
And that insight may be the key to the development of a proletarian
corporation using the cooperative structure. A proletarian corporation can
be constructed by emphasizing the contribution of labor rather than capital
to the firm. It may be possible to offer a labor cooperative in place of a
capital cooperative (the corporation), but one tied to the mass politics and
solidarity norms of classical Marxist-Leninist theory within which such
labor privileging enterprises remain subject to the political requirements of
the state identified by the party in power.219 Thus, Piñeiro Harnecker and
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her colleagues suggest there is a way of emphasizing the solidarity aspects
of cooperative organization and from the start, better merging its form and
operation with the basic tenets of Marxist-Leninist state organization as
practiced in Cuba.220 In contrast to the work of western economists, then,
this is as much a political enterprise as it is an economic one, but one in
which labor, rather than capital, serves as the organizing foundation of
economic enterprises.221
Piñeiro Harnecker, for example,222 starts with the ICA’s seven
principles of cooperative practice: (1) voluntary and open membership; (2)
democratic member control; (3) members’ autonomy and independence in
economic participation; (4) education, training, and information; (5)
cooperation among cooperatives; (6) concern for community; and (7) the
proletarian element.223 Emphasizing the political element of choice of
organizational form, she suggests that cooperatives are inherently socialist
precisely because they reject the fundamental organizing principal of
capitalism—the privileging of capital in the formation of enterprises.224
Just as it is natural for the political objectives of capitalism to treat the
capital cooperative as a unique entity and fashion its law around its
development, so it may be natural of socialist states to do the same for labor
cooperatives, in which the emphasis is on labor contribution in determining
ownership and rights to direct the productive factors of joint or aggregate
enterprises. For Cruz Reyes and Piñeiro Harnecker, the labor cooperative is
essentially anti-capitalist because it does not build on the premise of an
inevitable connection between capital and ownership.225 They thus argue
against the corporation as a special type of producer cooperative, tied to the
values and hierarchies of capitalism, and for the labor cooperative (referred
to as the proletarian corporation in this article), which is a special type of
producer cooperative tied to the values and hierarchies of Marxist-Leninist
states.
For this to work, at least at the retail service level, a strong
governmental hand is required to suppress the usual determinants of
demand—markets and price. The proletarian corporation operates in a
world in which demand is measured internally by the decision making and
planning functions of the associates of the cooperative, rather than
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220
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externally through market and price mechanisms.226 This is not as strange
as it may sound, especially to western ears. Hansmann notes that one of the
strengths of cooperatives was their ability to measure success in terms
beyond wealth production in the form of dividends. He links the need for
strong member control in cooperatives to the “benefits that the members of
a cooperative receive . . . in the form of higher quality goods or services.”227
This is the suggestion made by Piñeiro Harnecker as well.228 And it makes
sense from an economic perspective: if “ownership need not be, and
frequently is not, associated with investment of capital,” then neither
organizational form nor assessment of welfare maximization need follow
corporate models, and an approach more compatible with Marxist-Leninist
ideals might be reached.229
But in the Cuban context, this may not be possible. Cuban
cooperatives do not operate autonomously; their operations are substantially
constrained indirectly through regulation that has the effect of vesting the
state with substantial control over the kind, amount and pricing of good
produced or services provided. Thus, the State is interposed between labor
and the cooperative. The State, which continues to operate on the basis of
capital and as the monopoly capitalist within the national economy. The
cooperative necessarily takes on the control and decisional characteristics of
the enterprises that control capital. These are anchored in large state
corporations and state control of capital, guided by the ideals of welfare
maximization based on that ownership in the public sector.. It follows that
the move from price and market to socially privileged production appears to
lead inevitably back to the state. The proletarian corporation, then,
becomes a vehicle through which state planning mechanisms and the
incorporation of the political sensibilities (expressed as policy and
economic choices) of CCP and state officials can be exported and
outsourced. In the absence of price and market structures, cooperative
associates must engage in the same patterns of planning and production as
state functionaries for production in the national economy. Indeed, Avelino
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228
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Fernández Peiso has suggested that Cuban cooperatives have been seen in
great measure as state businesses rather than as self-managed groups of
people.230
In this respect, the autonomy of the private sector is meant to be
constrained by a normative structure that requires each enterprise to act as if
it were an instrumentality of the state, even as these enterprises are
encouraged to develop closer connections with the small subpart of the
population they are meant to serve. The effect is privatization in
appearance, but with the retention of the structures of state control in a way
that parallels control-economy planning mentality now applied at the
cooperative level. This approach can give rise to problems of sustainability
similar to those that required the Cuban government to privatize in the first
place. To resolve that problem, Piñeiro Harnecker suggests that state
institutions should not demand that cooperatives provide services at prices
that do not generate sufficient revenues to sustain the cooperatives as going
concerns.231 To increase the likelihood of success, state intervention is
required. Piñeiro Harnecker suggests that the issue is to design regulatory
mechanisms and coordinated spaces that permit cooperatives to internalize
social interests.232
The solution to privatized central planning offered through the
cooperative, then, might be more indirect planning at the state level.
Indeed, the consequence is that the cooperative becomes dependent on state
pricing policy; since enterprise inputs are not market-driven as to
availability and price, market distortions in inputs markets will be reflected
in the viability of cooperatives. That is not encouraging and might require
substantially more development. If the object is to embrace the upsides of
cooperatives, even in the form of proletarian corporations, then the
operationalization of the cooperative framework ought not to impose those
structures and norms that led to privatization in the first place. Yet, this
may be precisely the result sought by the Lineamientos, which insists that
all sectors of the economy, including the non-state sectors, are to be
managed by the state. New methods of planning may change the form of
control, but autonomy of the private sector is not to be undertaken outside
the premises of the central planning model at the heart of the conventional
Cuban economic system.233 Indeed, Piñeiro Harnecker also emphasizes

230
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institutional intervention. For example, she suggests that when it is
necessary for the state to manage cooperative decision-making, the state
could include necessary terms within leases, concessions and franchises
obtained from or through the state, or when direct intervention is required,
by placing a government official as a member of the cooperative itself.234
For that purpose, the ICA principles235 are necessary but not sufficient.
They suggest additional principles of organization that emphasize the
privileging of labor and the marginalization of capital ownership in the
organization of the proletarian corporation.236 These include what Piñeiro
Harnecker identifies as redistributive solidarity and social transformation.237
But as an instrument of political and social goals, the traditional markers of
enterprise success (based perhaps on the logic of the corporation as a capital
cooperative) become problematic—in lieu of risk and profit, they favor
solidarity and risk aversion.238 Cooperatives must be differentiated from
capitalist corporations in a substantive manner. Table 1 shows the
fundamental differences between the capitalist corporations and
cooperatives.239
TABLE 1
ATTRIBUTE

CAPITALIST
CORPORATIONS

Control of decision-making

Rests in stock holders, who
are not necessarily workers
Decided by the stock holders
Decided by the stock holders
Workers might have a say
through a union, but they do
not have a vote
Maximize the revenue of the
stock holders
Individual benefits

Destiny of the enterprise
Workers’ income
Democratic rights of the
workers
Main objective
Primary motivation of the
proprietors

COOPERATIVES
The collective of the
associates, i.e. all workers
Decided by the associates
Decided by the associates
Each worker has both a
voice and vote
Satisfy the needs of the
associates
Collective benefits, material
and spiritual
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Because proletarian corporations favor labor rather than capital, Piñeiro
Harnecker suggests such enterprises may define efficiency differently—not
grounded in the minimization of labor for the production of profit, but the
minimization of capital for the production of worker satisfaction.240
This proletarian corporation would operate within a limited field of
production—one that parallels the Cuban retail sector liberalization
policies. In those areas, such a model of economic activity could be
understood as socially productive. The targets are those activities where
economies of scale are absent (and with respect to which the state, through
its corporate enterprises would be expected to operate alone). Another
advantage of cooperatives in the retail and small production sector241 is their
ability to adapt quickly to local needs without the need to reduce their
workforce (and thus meet the government’s objective of keeping people
employed). Small and medium businesses have their fundamental strength
in the capacities of their workers and not so much on technology; they have
more flexibility to modify or add new lines of production, and thus offer
new products that satisfy the variables and different preferences of the
consumers. This focus suggests the tendency to criticize efforts—like those
on Mondragon, the Basque cooperative242—that appear to leverage labor
(for example, by permitting the hiring of labor that is not part of the
management structure); the fear is that bureaucratization and
institutionalization will cause a cooperative to move away from a labor to a
capital privileging model.243
Yet, the lessons of cooperative organization can also have potential for
challenging the cultural norms that currently exist in Cuba in the operation
of state enterprises.244 Drawing heavily from Istvan M sz ros,245 Novaes
argues that Marx’s vision of a post-capitalist society corresponds to a selfmanaged socialism that is not concerned only in distributing material
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wealth under certain criteria of equality, but instead is focused on the
production of wealth in a superior form.246 That form replaces material
with intangible markers—one that focuses on human dignity rather than
wealth accumulation, that is what he refers to as a society beyond capital.247
Cooperatives can overcome the alienation that is present in the private
corporation but also in the state corporation managed in an authoritarian
manner where the participation of the workers is just a formality. He
proposes democratic management of the corporation, even the SOE, as a
way around the socialist conundrum of worker collectives in which labor
has no voice in the operation of the enterprise. Others take this notion
farther, suggesting that cooperatives are a central element in the
construction of a solidarity economy248—one whose principles become
closely intertwined with the organizational paradigms of ALBA.
An emerging enterprise-like culture of cooperative management might
have an effect on the operation of the state sector, even as the state sector
appears to mold cooperative organization in its own image.249 Within Cuba,
that dialogue would have profound possibilities if not suppressed. And
indeed, the possibility of cooperative autonomy and its effects on state
enterprises concerns Cuban theorists. Yet, the idea of increasing the
autonomy of labor in cooperatives beyond the direct control of the State is
also viewed by traditionalists as a dangerous adventure that will destabilize
the Cuban economic system.250 Thus, rather than suggesting greater
autonomy for non-state sector enterprises, like cooperatives, some call for
closer control of these entities along the lines already in place for SOEs.
Ironically, Hansmann’s notion of the fundamental similarity of the
cooperative and the corporation tends to serve as a brake on the possibility
of creating a class of private enterprises outside the control of the State,
where the State has all control of productive activity.
The potential to challenge economic cultural norms through
cooperatives is limited by ideological divisions within the CCP that have
been transposed into a set of structural constraints on cooperative activity.
Ideological constraints are grounded in the reluctance to open up even a
very limited space for private activity. This approach is based on a very
conservative perspective of the requirements of Marxist-Leninist economic

246

Novaes, supra note 244.
Id. at 174–78.
248
Claudio Alberto Rivera Rodríguez, Odalys Labrador Machín & Juan Luis Alfonso
Alemán, Retos del cooperativismo como alternativa de desarrollo ante la crisis global. Su
papel en el modelo económico cubano [Challenges of Development Cooperation as an
Alternative to the Global Crisis: Cooperatives’ Role in the Cuban Economic Model], in
COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO, supra note 57, at 397–415.
249
Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 112.
250
Gil de San Vicente, supra note 181, at XX.
247

575

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:527 (2013)

organization, one at variance with the official positions in other MarxistLeninist states but consistent with the majority view within the CCP
leadership before 2006.251 The strength of this perspective is evidenced by
the finalization of the Lineamientos provisions on cooperatives. But there
is also growing support among cadres and CCP leadership for an approach
grounded in state direction, and ultimate control, but with a larger space
within which economic activity can be devolved to individuals, either in a
private sector or through the operation of state enterprises. However, the
state-directed model, rather than state-control model, has not yet been
accepted among a majority of CCP leaders.
As a consequence, cooperatives (and SOEs) remain subject to a
number of structural constraints. In addition to the formal constraints
described in the Lineamientos, the rules are grounded on a premise of
cooperation, rather than competition, with the state sector.
One
consequence is that the operation of the private sector is understood as
functioning for the production of income first for the state and then for the
participants. Additionally, the cooperation premise serves as a justification
for retaining the regime of tightly constrained and licensed private sector
vocations and the control of basic goods and products necessary for
cooperative activity. Limited to the contribution of goods (usually retail
ready) and labor (for direct service provision), the cooperative operations
are limited by the availability of goods and the scope of permitted
occupations, both of which are controlled by the State. Even if
cooperatives could be structured for the contribution of unfinished goods or
components for assembly and sale through the cooperative, something
contemplated for second-level cooperatives in the proposed Lineamientos
but perhaps eliminated in the final version, the State would still control
cooperatives’ sizes and operations through control of the provision of goods
and the approval of activity to which those goods are directed. As a
consequence, cooperatives are structured to remain small and contribute to
the residual economy, something in line with the general re-organization of
the Cuban economy, but they remain dependent on state planning because
there is no access to goods markets and the scope of activities are tightly
controlled. The State remains very much in control—but now that control
is indirect, something contemplated in the Lineamientos.252
Piñeiro Harnecker understands the challenges. She acknowledges that
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new cooperative theory is criticized by some as merely utopian.253 Others
criticize it for being unrealistic within the context of the regulation of the
Cuban economy by the State—cooperatives will never have sufficient
autonomy to be effective. Still others fear cooperatives; even labor
cooperatives are a threat to the state precisely because they will be too
autonomous and fracture the unity of proletarian power on which the
ideology of the organization of the state rests.254 These were the themes
raised in the essays Piñeiro Harnecker assembled.255 More broadly, those
difficulties also continue to make the form of corporate organization
(whether as a capital cooperative or in the new labor cooperatives form)
particularly troublesome for regimes like Cuba, which view juridical or
legal persons that constitute the aggregation of popular power as a threat to
the state unless the state owns or controls these organizations.256
Cooperatives are viewed as a means of economic aggregation that
avoids the problems of corporations in their relationship to the state and
society—shareholder wealth maximization, avoidance of corporate social
responsibility principles, and labor exploitation.257 Yet, like the corporate
form that remains the sole province of the state, the problem of autonomy
253
254
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tries to take account of all these concerns, though there is no doubt that more space
would be required to address them adequately.
Cameron, supra note 215 (translating Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 215 (“Cuando en Cuba
se propone a la cooperativa de producción como una —no la única— forma de organización
empresarial, es común encontrarse sobre todo con tres preocupaciones: unos la conside- ran
demasiado “utópica” y por tanto ineficiente; otros, a partir de las formas que ha tomado en
Cuba, sospechan que será insuficientemente autónoma o “demasiado parecida a la empresa
estatal”; y otros, habituados a un control de la actividad empresarial por un Estado que
interviene de manera directa y excesiva en la gestión, la rechazan como demasiado autónoma
y por tanto un “germen del capitalismo”. Este libro intenta tener en cuenta todas estas
inquie- tudes, aunque sin dudas se requiere de más espacio para tratarlas adecuadamente.”)).
255
Id.
256
See Backer, supra note 5, at 384.
257
See Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 214, at 28 (“Asimismo, para evitar la concentración
de riqueza que explica los altos impuestos aplicados a los cuentapropistas, debería sobre todo
promoverse que el nuevo sector no estatal adopte preferentemente el modelo de gestión
cooperativo, donde los beneficios son distribuidos de forma equitativa entre sus miembros y
que favorezcan en alguna medida las comunidades aledañas.”).
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remains a key issue in the academic debates in ways that mirror the political
debate of the Sixth Party Congress. It is the issue that raises, for the Cuban
political economy, the ideological question of the extent of the role of the
state in planning economic decisions: should the state set the general goals
and objectives of economic activity, or should it direct more precisely the
economic choices of individuals and cooperatives at an operational level?
The framework of analysis is quite clearly tailored to Cuban circumstances:
The managerial autonomy of the collective that makes up the
cooperative—the ability of this group of people to make decisions
independently—is the key reason why the historical experiences of
socialist construction have rejected their relevance to the building of
socialism and have relegated them to agriculture or marginal
economic spaces. Some see in autonomy a disconnection from, or a
wanting to have nothing to do with, social interests and the strategic
objectives embodied in the socialist economic plan, and ask the
following questions: Is it possible to “hitch” an autonomous
enterprise to a planned economy? Can a cooperative respond not
only to the interests of its members but also to wider social interests?
When one thinks in terms of absolute autonomy and authoritarian
(i.e. undemocratic) planning, if the interests of collectives (groups)
are considered a priori to be indifferent to social interests, then the
answer is obviously negative. The authors of this book are
motivated by the certainty that the answer is affirmative. We argue
the case here, though we are unable to respond to all of the questions
about how this can be achieved in practice.258

Piñeiro Harnecker highlights both the peculiarities of the Cuban
discussion about economic reform and engagement in global economic
movements, and its distance from the path followed by the Chinese
Communist Party since the 1980s. Cuba is seeking to forge a third path
between the market oriented economic model of the West and the pattern of
economic control developed by the great Asian Marxist–Leninist states. It
remains committed to a significant degree of central planning, and
suspicious of autonomous aggregations of capital or individuals not directly
controlled or managed by the State. It has sought to build these notions into
its international and regional economic planning to the same extent it seeks
to base its internal economic model on those principles.259 But Piñeiro
Harnecker may not be fully considering the institutional challenges of
creating the rule system contemplated in the Lineamientos—founded on
contract law that is viewed as legitimate and fairly enforced, the absence of
which substantially raises the risks and costs of forming these enterprises as

258
259
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Cameron, supra note 215 (translating Piñeiro Harnecker, supra note 214).
Backer & Molina, supra note 36, at 687–89.
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going concerns.
The case of the Cabildo nightclub260 is quite telling in this respect, both
for the difficulties of drawing entrepreneurs out of the so-called black
market (unregulated) sector and for what it portends for creating rule-of-law
based (that is, non-arbitrary) regulatory systems managing cooperatives:
El Cabildo is the product of one man’s moxie and of changes in
government policy aimed at improving Cuba’s struggling economy.
Ulises Aquino, a 50-year-old opera singer who founded Opera in the
Street in 2006, was looking for a home for the company, so when
President Castro announced a series of reforms two years ago
promoting private businesses he decided to seize the
opportunity . . . . In 2011, Aquino, whose performers were
accustomed to playing in rudimentary conditions, including in the
street, convinced authorities in Havana’s upscale Playa district to let
him use the remnants of one of the city’s many collapsed
buildings.261

By July 2012, the enterprise had about 130 employees operating a 150seat venue. However, to get to this size, Aquino had to deal with the
complex system of rules governing the licensing of private activity in the
non-state sector.262
His solution illustrated the objective of those
regulations—to ensure that private enterprises remain small and local, to
avoid a threat to the economic dominance of the state sector. No sooner
had the Cabildo nightclub garnered international attention than it was
closed by state authorities:
A week ago[,] government inspectors burst into the El Cabildo
cultural center to the shock of patrons, artists and staff attending
musical performed by its theater company, the “Opera in the Street.”
The local authorities, citing a recent Reuter’s story on the center that
mentioned a cover charge for customers, took away El Cabildo’s
license on the grounds of “illicit enrichment.” The vast majority of
El Cabildo’s clients were Cuban, paying a 50-peso cover charge, the
equivalent of $2, while foreigners paid more. The inspectors
searched El Cabildo for hours and interrogated its young artists and
260
Marc Frank, In Cuba an Opera Singer Builds an Empire, REUTERS (July 11, 2012,
5:08
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/11/us-cuba-theater-reformidUSBRE86A1B620120711.
261
Id.
262
Id. (“The new entrepreneurs had to get a license for their business and private
restaurants were limited to a maximum of 50 seats. Aquino got around the limit by taking
out three restaurant licenses, which enabled him to put in 150 seats, and then another as an
‘organizer of events and other activities.’ Using the latter, he plans to expand the business by
offering boat rides on the Almendares River, which flows beside El Cabildo just before
opening into the Straits of Florida.”).
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restaurant staff, but found nothing more amiss than two cooks
working on a trial basis without proper papers, employees said.263

The original international news story piqued the interest of state
bureaucrats, who called Aquino to discuss his operations.264 What he
described suggested a cooperative, in which all workers shared in the
revenues of the enterprise.265 There was a sense that the operations were
allowed to continue in the absence of publicity, but were shut down when
news stories revealed not merely the extent of the operation, but more
significantly, that the workers in that enterprise were able to make
substantially more money than in the state sector, even after the payment of
all state tax and other obligations. Rather than seeing this as a challenge for
the state sector to do better, the bureaucracy appeared to take the operations
as a challenge to the system itself. If success is interpreted as a threat, then
it is unlikely, at least with this generation of CCP and state cadres, that the
reforms developed at the elite level will be successfully implemented on the
ground. The decision to shut down the operations rather than to fine it and
the lack of the appearance of process, suggested the possibility of
arbitrariness that will impede other risk-takers seeking to take the State up
on its offer to invigorate the non-state sector. As a solution, the government
announced that it would allow the presentation of the artistic part of the
operation as a state-subsidized activity.266 It seems that, here, the
consequence of private sector success is incorporation into the state sector.
In this story, the scope of the challenges facing Cuba can be seen: a
bureaucracy that may be resisting changes proposed at the top of the state
263

Marc Frank, Cuban Opera Singer Challenges “Jealous” Bureaucrats Over Closed
Theater, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2012, 6:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/uscuba-theater-reform-idUSBRE8701R120120801 (“A Cuban economist said El Cabildo’s
cover charge may have fallen into a gray area in Cuban law. Though private establishments
were not prohibited from having cover charges, establishments associated with the Culture
Ministry, such as such as El Cabildo, might be more restricted in what they can charge.”).
264
Id.
265
Id. (“Reuters also had reported that El Cabildo’s proceeds were shared after expenses,
taxes, and investments, resulting in monthly wages four times greater than the country’s 450
pesos average, or around $19. ‘The earnings of the Opera of the Street are divided among
everyone . . . including me . . . . All the artists perform with a subsidy from the Culture
Ministry, but as our president has said, salaries do not correspond with the cost of living,’
Aquino said in his letter.”).
266
El Gobierno prefiere subvencionar la Ópera de la Calle antes que permitir su gestión
privada [The Government Prefers to Subsidize Street Opera Before Allowing Private
Management],
DIARIO
DE
CUBA
(Aug.
2,
2012,
6:12
PM),
http://www.diariodecuba.com/cultura/12378-el-gobierno-prefiere-subvencionar-la-opera-dela-calle-antes-que-permitir-su-gestion-p [hereinafter The Government Prefers] (“Un
comunicado del Consejo Nacional de las Artes Escénicas, dependiente del Ministerio de
Cultura, señala que la Compañía de Teatro Lírico y Espectáculos Ópera de la Calle
‘mantiene sus actividades como proyecto cultural comunitario subvencionado.’”).
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and CCP hierarchies; limited ability to manage implementation of economic
reforms for lack of deep cultures of non-state sector management; limited
rule structures for determining conformity to the new economic model; and
the lack of a set of procedures for challenging government action. In a
sense, the closure is as much a challenge to senior CCP leaders as it is to the
emerging non-state sector.267 It also illustrates the determination of Cuban
authorities to maintain the division of economic activities within which the
private sector always occupies a small part. It is clear that, whatever the
shape of the reforms, the state sector will not be challenged, and challenge,
for the moment appears to be quite broadly construed.268 But the Cabildo
affair also suggests the power of Raúl Castro’s efforts to move from a statecontrolled to a state-directed economic model. These enterprises can
operate successfully as cooperatives; Mr. Aquino was creating a sort of
proletarian corporation whose success suggests that reform might have been
on the right path. The Cabildo appeared to provide a substantial boost to
the Cuban economy. It did so on a cooperative basis whereby the members
contributed labor to provide a local service through an enterprise in which
the workers shared in the governance and the proceeds while meeting local
needs. The Cabildo paid its taxes and generated income for the State. It
operated in a sector that posed little danger to the integrity of the national
economy. If the Cabildo can be considered to pose a threat to the
organization of the Cuban economy, then it is not clear that there will be
much space for the non-state sector or that effective reform will be possible
soon.269 The cooperative, like the rest of the reform agenda, will remain an
elegant theory with powerful insights into the operation of a Marxist–

267

Nick Miroff, Opera Unfolds When a Cuban Cabaret Is Closed Down, NPR (Jul. 31,
2012, 4:13 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/31/157656452/opera-unfolds-when-a-cubancaberat-is-shut-down (“Raul Castro himself told Cubans in a recent speech that bureaucrats
who stand in the way of change will be swept aside. He’s laid out plans to resuscitate
Cuba’s state-run economy by creating millions of jobs in new small businesses and
cooperatives. But the process is dragging. Closing El Cabildo has eliminated 130 of the
jobs created for Cubans like Angel Basterrechea, who fears he may have lost the highestpaying job he’ll ever have.”).
268
The Government Prefers, supra note 266.
269
Indeed, among Cuban intellectuals committed to the regime, this affair has been
reported as revealing the real intent of the government with respect to reforms. See El
Gobierno cierra un centro cultural considerado la mayor empresa privada de Cuba [The
Government Closed a Cultural Center Considered the Largest Privately Cuba],
EUROPAPRESS (Aug. 3, 3012) (Sp.), http://www.europapress.es/latam/cultura/noticia-cubagobierno-cierra-centro-cultural-considerado-mayor-empresa-privada-cuba20120803154826.html (“El destino del centro cultural El Cabildo está en el centro de
atención de intelectuales y artistas de la isla, y se ha convertido en una prueba de fuego en
los esfuerzos impulsados por Castro para expandir el sector privado mientras reduce
drásticamente la burocracia estatal.”).
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Leninist economy without any possibility of effective implementation.270
Additionally, the cooperative structure envisioned in Cuba, with its
focus on the possibilities of producer–labor cooperatives but dependent on
the state apparatus as the holder of productive capital, presents a more
fundamental challenge. That challenge suggests the extent to which Cuba
may be missing an opportunity for change in line with the basic tenets of its
system. Many of those focusing on labor issues tend to overlook a
potentially powerful form of labor organization that might tilt the balance of
power away from capital on the capital’s home turf. When labor controls
labor through the mechanics of power that operate within a dominant
system of institutionalized power, labor will be able to meet capital on its
own terms: domiciled within the network of nation states but free to move
globally and to take advantage of disjunctions in capital markets. It might
be worth thinking through the possibilities of a global system in which
labor controls labor, and in which the individual laborer is no longer
arrayed against aggregations of capital, but is able to aggregate itself within
markets in which labor and capital both engage in markets on a amore equal
basis.
Yet, this requires labor to lose its dependence on the state by taking the
step that capital took two centuries ago when it effected what would be an
increasing independence from the state. When labor begins to use the state
in the way that capital has learned; when labor ceases to organize itself like
an element of civil society and becomes more like a value–optimizing
factor of production, then perhaps the global conversation about labor may
take on a different hue. However, this is not possible under a construct in
which cooperatives are constituted formally as autonomous and labor–
driven while organized as little more than privatized centers of central
planning that reinforce traditional (and now clearly failed) approaches to
economic governance even within Marxist–Leninist premises.
Within this environment, cooperatives—so benign in China and
Vietnam—assume a more problematic place in the Cuban political
economy. Whether the experiment will succeed remains to be seen.
However, the search for forms of economic organization that are not
necessarily grounded in shareholder–wealth maximization, and that serve
social goals (even those controlled by the state apparatus) may provide
insights and models that can be used elsewhere for other purposes. Indeed,
it is precisely this model that underlies an important element of Cuban

270

Frank, supra note 263 (“A staunch advocate of socialism, Aquino charged in his letter
that the forces behind the closing of his center were ‘jealous’ of its success. ‘Those who fear
that the worker, the intellectual and the artist might find their own productive road are not
revolutionaries, they are conservatives,’ he wrote. ‘They enjoy the benefits of power that
gives them the ability, as in this case, to decide the destiny of human works, not to help them
flourish, but to destroy them,’ Aquino charged.”).
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foreign policy as it seeks to develop a counter-approach to regional trade
that challenges the norms and structures of conventional economic
globalization. In the face of continued governmental policy incoherence
evidenced by the Cabildo affair, the transposition of the theoretical
developments of a cooperative model, first into policy guidelines (the
Lineamientos) and then into a coherent regulatory system, suggests the
power of theory and the substantial limits of politics, even in the face of
economic crisis. It is to that transposition that this Article turns to next.
C. The Cooperative in the Lineamientos and Regulation—From Political
Guidelines to Regulatory Program
It is clear that the determination to limit the private sector to
cooperatives, preserving the corporate form to the state, is not essential to
preserve the socialist character of the state, and might make little sense
from the perspective of increasing the efficiency and scope of the private
sector.271 The Chinese have shown how a Marxist–Leninist state can
extend the corporate franchise to individuals and still retain overall control
over the direction of the economy and the Marxist basis of state
organization. They have moved from a system of direct command of all
facets of productivity to an objectives-based system of regulation for the
private sector and a more closely monitored control of the state sector. If
the object was merely to foster productivity and increase wealth, the
division does no more than impede progress while retaining the need for a
bloated public sector of managers who would substitute themselves for
pricing and market mechanisms for productivity and wealth creation.
But, the Lineamientos suggest that economic efficiency and wealth
production are not the only, or even perhaps the most important, objectives
of privatization. Equally important in the ideological debates about
economic reform are the social role of economic collectives—whether
organized around capital, labor, production, or otherwise—and the role of
the state in the management of economic activities (up to and including the
role of the state as a substitute for the market). It is ultimately the central
role of the state in economic affairs and the mistrust of the market on
political grounds that reinforce Cuba’s unwillingness to follow the Chinese

271
This is a view shared within and outside Cuba by people sympathetic to the current
government:

Cuba’s economic model has suffered from excessive concentration in decision
making and ownership of the means of production, as well as lack of incentives
and low efficiency. These problems have impaired output and productivity and
have worsened during the last decade due to structural weaknesses in the pattern of
growth.
Mesa-Lago & Alejandro, supra note 60, at 714.
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model. Markets shift power over economic planning from the state to
producers and consumers. It shifts the power to set prices and allocate
resources from central planners to those involved in production,
manufacturing, sales, and consumption. It changes the role of the state
from serving as the nexus point of demand and supply to the manager of
economic goals. There is a struggle over the role of the state, even within
the very limited space reserved to the non-state sector. Debates over the
form of the cooperative that took place in the development of the final form
of the Lineamientos, one characterized by the tension between the necessity
of permitting autonomous economic activity and the desire to retain strong
and direct state control of all economic activity, is much in evidence in the
structure of the new cooperatives law. It is a tension that remains
unresolved in either Lineamientos or law.
1. The Lineamientos
At first glance, the Lineamientos cooperative provisions appear fairly
straightforward and liberal. First-level (primer grado) cooperatives are
recognized as an economic organization with a legal personality that
aggregates goods and labor.272 Interests in cooperatives have the character
of social property that may not be negotiated (in contrast to shares). 273
They may enter into contracts with other entities and natural persons. They
may also determine the distribution of funds to participants.274 Secondlevel (segundo grado) cooperatives are collections of first-level
cooperatives.275 They can be formed as separate juridical persons and their
objective is to facilitate the business of the associated cooperatives.276
272

LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (“Se crearán las cooperativas de primer grado
como una forma socialista de propiedad colectiva, en diferentes sectores, las que constituyen
una organización econó-mica con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio, integradas por
personas que seasocian aportando bienes o trabajo, con la unalidad de producir y prestar
serviciosútiles a la sociedad y asumen todos sus gastos con sus ingresos.”).
273
Id. ¶ 26 (“La norma jurídica sobre cooperativas deberá garantizar que éstas, como
propiedadsocial, no sean vendidas, ni trasmitida su posesión a otras cooperativas, a formas
de gestión no estatal o a personas naturales.”).
274
Id. ¶ 27 (“Las cooperativas mantienen relaciones contractuales con otras cooperativas,
em-presas, unidades presupuestadas y otras formas no estatales, y después de cumplido el
compromiso con el Estado, podrán realizar ventas libremente sin interme-diarios, de acuerdo
con la actividad económica que se les autorice.”).
275
Id. ¶ 29 (“Se crearán cooperativas de segundo grado, cuyos socios son cooperativas de
pri-mer grado, las que tendrán personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio y se formancon el
objetivo de organizar actividades complementarias afnes o que agreguenvalor a los
productos y servicios de sus socios (de producción, servicios y comer-cialización), o realizar
compras y ventas conjuntas con vistas a lograr mayor eficienci.”).
276
Id. ¶ 28 (“Las cooperativas, sobre la base de lo establecido en la norma jurídica
correspon-diente, después de pagar los impuestos y contribuciones establecidos,
determinanlos ingresos de los trabajadores y la distribución de las utilidades.”).
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But, a closer reading of the Lineamientos suggests both the tensions
within the CCP over liberalization and a clear tilt in favor of state control.
The final version of the cooperative form in the Lineamientos contains
certain significant changes from the initial version, which suggest a
conservative pushback from elements in the CCP that viewed the
liberalization of economic activity, even in this small space, as potentially
threatening to the core values of the Revolution. Thus, for example, the
Lineamientos originally provided for a broader conceptualization of the
cooperative, grounded in the basic premise that workers were free to join
together in cooperative enterprises.277 This power of association for
cooperative economic activity extended to ownership, lease, and use of the
means of production in permanent usufruct278—echoing the idea of usufruct
being developed for the lease of non-productive agricultural land.279 As
modified, the emphasis was distinctly directed away from a focus on the
right of association for the exploitation of productive capacity to an
emphasis on the character of these enterprises as the instrument through
which economic activity is devolved from the state and incorporated within
a system of state-centralized control.280
277
See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 25, col. original (“Estarán basadas en la libre
disposición de los trabajadores a asociarse en ellas. Pueden ser propietarias de los medios de
producción, arrendarlos o emplearlos en usufructo permanente.”).
278
Usufruct is a civil law concept that describes a cluster of rights of an individual to
enjoy the use of property either titled to another or held in common as long as the property is
neither damaged nor destroyed. Usufruct is a legal concept that was in place at the time of
Cuban Independence and survived into the post-Revolutionary period after 1959. See CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] tit. VI, ch. 1, art. 467 (1899) (Cuba) translated in U.S. War Department,
Division of Customs and Insular Affairs, I LAW OF CUBA, PUERTO RICO AND THE PHILIPPINES
69
(1899),
available
at
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=rySvAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=r
eader&authuser=0&hl=en&pg=GBS.PP1.
279
Marc Frank, Cuba Grants Land to Thousands of Farmers, REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2009,
9:59 AM), http:// www.reuters.com/article/globalNews/idUSTRE5113IY20090202. On
usufruct in the agricultural sector, see Laura Enríquez, Economic Reform and
Repeasantization in Post 1990 Cuba, 38 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 202–18 (2003). According to
Pujol:

To stimulate the domestic production of foodstuffs and substitute imports, the
government started to allow the leasing of small plots of State owned land in
usufruct by private individuals and corporate bodies. To this end, landless
individuals could obtain up to 13.42 hectares and existing landholders could bring
their total up to 40.26 hectares under licenses valid for up to 10 years, with the
possibility of being renewed.
Joaquín P. Pujol, The Cuban Economy in 2010 as Seen by Economists Within the Island and
Other
Observers,
20
CUBA
TRANSITION
1,
8
(2010),
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume20/pdfs/pujol.pdf.
280
LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (“Se crearán las cooperativas de primer grado
como una forma socialista de propiedad colectiva en diferentes sectores, las que constituyen
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Rather than promote free association of workers with control in
usufruct over the means of production, the final version of the Lineamientos
emphasizes the socialist collective nature of the cooperative and its
property. It underscores the power of the State to manage the scope of the
economic sectors within which it can operate. Significantly, it also limits
the forms of contributions to the enterprise specifically to goods or labor
and only for the production or offer of socially useful services. For that
privilege, these collectives would assume their own expenses. The
explanation for the change was quite clear: uneasiness with the idea of
private aggregation or collectivization outside the direct control of the
State.281 One can understand this as a means of privatizing central planning
and exploiting operation costs.
Likewise, the limitations on the power of cooperatives to negotiate
cooperative assets to other private enterprises was strengthened to
emphasize that cooperative property was public property (propriedad
social) devolved to the use of the cooperative participants.282 The scope of
cooperative activity was also subtly restricted, permitting private
transactions but strengthening the direct power of the State to manage those
relations. The original provision permitted economic activity in the nonstate sector as long as these conformed to pre-approved social objectives.283
As revised, the provision imposes a requirement that cooperatives first
satisfy whatever economic needs the State imposes before it can engage in
private economic activities in the non-state sector.284 The provision also
reinforces the limits of private activity as authorized for individual
proprietorships.285 This last imposition represents a significant effort to

una organización económica con personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio, integradas por
personas que se asocian aportando bie- nes o trabajo, con la finalidad de producir y prestar
servicios útiles a la sociedad y asu- men todos sus gastos con sus ingresos.”). For the
original version of paragraph 25, see TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 25, col. original.
281
See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 25, col. fundamentación del cambio (“Aclara y
especifica el concepto de cooperativas de primer grado, 1 13 dudas en todo el pa s. Agrega
que la cooperativa es una forma socialista de propiedad colectiva, por 29 opiniones en 9
provincias.”).
282
See id. ¶ 26, col. original (providing original draft language of paragraph 26 of the
Lineamientos: “El Reglamento eneral de las Cooperativas deber garantizar ue la
propiedad cooperativa no sea vendida, alquilada o arrenda- da a otras cooperativas o formas
no estatales de producci n”).
283
Id. ¶ 27, col. original (“Las cooperativas mantienen relaciones contractuales con otras
cooperativas, empresas, unidades presupuestadas y otras formas no estatales, y realizan
ventas di- rectas a la poblaci n de acuerdo con el objeto social aprobado.”).
284
Paragraph 27 of the revised, final version of the Lineamientos provides, in part that
the cooperative may engage in private economic activity only after satisfying their
commitment to the State. LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, pt. I, ¶ 27.
285
For the full version of the final revised paragraph, see id. (“Las cooperativas
mantienen relaciones contractuales con otras cooperativas, empresas, unidades
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bring the cooperative back into the state sector. Cooperatives will have to
service the State before they can engage in private activities; state ministries
can effectively devolve state sector obligations to the cooperatives.
Rather than create an autonomous private sector that responds to local
needs, the cooperative appears to run the danger of becoming a vehicle for
privatizing the state sector without a loss of state control. The commentary
made clear that the presumption for cooperatives must be to service and
supplement the state sector—non-state sector transactions must be
understood, from that perspective, as the exception rather than the rule, and
possible only after all of the needs of the state sector have been satisfied.286
The resulting narrowing of the activities of cooperatives could be
significant.
The provisions on the tax obligations of cooperatives287 reinforce the
Lineamientos’ focus on expense and fiscal responsibility in the
Lineamientos.288. As originally proposed, Paragraph 28 provided that
cooperatives, within the requirements of any enabling rules, would set the
income allocation for its workers, provide for additional distributions, make
public contributions, and pay taxes.289 As adopted, the primary obligation
of the cooperative is to pay its taxes and other contributions to the State,
then to determine worker income, and then to make additional
distributions.290 The change is subtle but telling. The initial focus was on
the wealth creation possibilities of the cooperative—the benefits of private
sector activity. The final focus was on the utility of the cooperative for the
production of wealth for the State—to be distributed as the state apparatus
determines. It reduces the scope of the autonomy of the cooperative and
ties it more closely to the state sector by re-focusing the purpose from one
centered on the activities of the workers to one centered on the production
of income for the State.
presupuestadas y otras formas no estatales y despu s de cumplido el compromiso con el
Estado, podr n realizar ventas libremente sin intermediarios, de acuerdo con la actividad
econ mica ue se les autorice.”).
286
That, perhaps, explains the somewhat curious explanation for the change from
paragraph 27’s original draft version to its final version. See TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 27,
col. fundamentación del cambio (“Agrega la posibilidad de venta sin intermediario y se
mejora la redacción. Responde a 438 opiniones en 14 provincias.”).
287
Id. ¶ 28.
288
LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25.
289
TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 28, col. original (“Las cooperativas, sobre la base de lo establecido en su Reglamento eneral de la cooperativa, definen los ingresos de los
traba adores y la distribuci n de las utilidades, y li uidan al Estado los impuestos y las
contribuciones establecidas.”).
290
LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 28 (“Las cooperativas, sobre la base de lo establecido en la norma ur dica correspondiente, despu s de pagar los impuestos y
contribuciones establecidos, determinan los ingresos de los traba adores y la distribuci n de
las uti lidades.”).
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The last provision deals with second-level cooperatives, which are
meant to be aggregations of first-level cooperatives. As originally
conceived, second-level cooperatives had the object of organizing common
processes of production or services among cooperatives or the aggregation
of cooperatives to buy and sell goods with greater efficiency.291 As
adopted, the objectives of second-level cooperatives changed in some
respects: their principal objective is now described as organizing similar or
complementary activities that add value to products and services of their
partners (production and marketing services), or joint purchases and sales in
order to achieve greater efficiency.292
The proposed formal changes in the Lineamientos, of course, suggest
only half of the challenge for the State and CCP. Beyond the formal
aspects of economic reorganization lies the potentially more intractable
problem of suppressing, or at least managing, the so-called black market,
better known as the informal sector system within Cuba.293 That, in turn,
will require a substantial movement toward popular confidence in the
ability of the State to fairly and consistently enforce the rules it has formally
imposed, and to enforce them through appropriate public organs. The
informality of the current legal system in Cuba reflects, in part, earlier
generation Marxist-Leninist notions of the convergence between law and
politics, in which systems of rules consistently applied were understood as
contingent on the needs of the State as determined by the CCP.294 But a
move toward state-directed economic activity necessarily requires a rulesbased system of managing that enterprise, and a system for the enforcement
of those rules that may be distinct from the traditional approaches of a
centrally directed economic model.
The CCP recognized, in limited ways, this need for a system of rules
and enforcement. Lineamientos Paragraphs 2 and 27 speak to the need to
arrange relations among state and non-state sector enterprises, including
291
TABLOIDE, supra note 91, ¶ 29, col. original (“Las cooperativas de primer grado, de
forma voluntaria, pueden acordar entre ellas la constituci n de cooperativas de segun- do
grado, con personalidad ur dica y patrimonio propio, con el ob etivo de organizar procesos
comunes (de producci n y servi- cios), realizar compras y ventas conjuntas con vista a lograr
mayor eficiencia.”).
292
LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25 (“Se crear n cooperativas de segundo grado,
cuyos socios son cooperativas de primer grado, las ue tendr n personalidad ur dica y
patrimonio propio y se forman con el objetivo de organizar actividades complementarias
afines o que agreguen valor a los productos y servicios de sus socios (de producci n,
servicios y comercializaci n), o realizar compras y ventas con untas con vistas a lograr
mayor eficiencia.”). The change was justified on grounds of producing greater clarity but it
also noted a large number of questions about second level cooperatives. See TABLOIDE,
supra note 91, pt. I, ¶ 25, col. fundamentación del cambio.
293
See JORGE F. PÉREZ LÓPEZ, CUBA’S SECOND ECONOMY: FROM BEHIND THE SCENES TO
CENTER STAGE (1995).
294
Cf. PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 185 (3rd ed. 2006).
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cooperatives, which Paragraph 22 emphasizes are to be implemented
through contracts.295 Lineamientos Paragraph 16 includes a provision for
the liquidation of SOEs that fail to meet their contractual obligations. 296
Linemientos Paragraph 73 expresses the ideal that the State will increase its
international credibility through strict compliance with its obligations.297
Lineamientos Paragraph 181 emphasizes the need to arrange contracts in a
form that encourages compliance with their terms.298 This suggests both the
increasing importance of systems of contract rules, but also the absence of
such a system in Cuba today. It also suggests that the rules for the
enforcement of obligations among individuals remains informal and
customary—and is situated well below the structures of state enforcement
vehicles. Lastly, it points to the absence of certain and consistently applied
practices at the state level. The result may be a fear of arbitrariness in the
management of economic activity, especially economic activity in the nonstate sector. That fear might be fed by the very public narrowing of the
scope of cooperative activity. The consequence is a likelihood that, for
small operators, the risks of investing and doing business will increase.
Increased risk substantially increases the transactions costs of operation.
This may make transactions uneconomic in general. But more importantly,
it may substantially impede the value of forming cooperatives.
In 2012, Cuba announced that it was moving from theory and intent to
practice. It announced that Mafrino Murillo, the Vice President of the
Counsel of Ministers, had confirmed the preparation of new rules for the
operation of cooperatives outside the agricultural sector299 to include
services, transport, and restaurants.300 The announcement was timed to
coincide with the visit of Pope Benedict XVI and was meant to suggest
sustained movement to implement the previously approved Lineamientos,
295

See LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 22 (“El contrato constituir una herramienta de
traba o en la planificaci n y control de todas las etapas del proceso inversionista, asegurando
el resultado final de la inversi n, con la calidad re uerida y dentro de los plazos previstos en
el cronograma de e ecuci n.”).
296
Id. ¶ 16.
297
Id. ¶ 73 (“Traba ar con el m ximo rigor para aumentar la credibilidad del pa s en sus
relaciones econ micas internacionales, mediante el estricto cumplimiento de los
compromisos contra dos.”); see also id. ¶¶ 90, 98.
298
Id. ¶ 181 (“Adecuar la producci n agroalimentaria a la demanda y la transformaci n
de la comercializaci n, elevando la calidad y exigencia en los contratos, para ue las partes
cumplan sus obligaciones; limitando la circulaci n centralizada a a uellos renglones
vinculados a los balances nacionales; otorgando un papel m s activo a los mecanismos de
libre concurrencia para el resto de las producciones.”).
299
Cuba priorizará sector cooperative [Cuba Prioritizes Cooperative Industry], INTER
PRESS
SERVICE
(Mar.
27,
2012),
http://www.ipscuba.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3773%3Acubapriorizar%C3%A1-sector-cooperativo&Itemid=42.
300
Cooperatives in Cuba, supra note 186.
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without encouraging political reform.301 The priority was to be given
principally to the reorganization of the most important posts of the state
sector—agriculture, mining, tourism, and the biotech industry—followed
by a review of the public health and education sectors. But the most
important tasks were the reorganization of the SOEs to make them more
efficient, and the need to stimulate economic productivity in the non-state
sector.302 It is this move from theory to guideline to statute that this Article
turns to next.
2. The December 2012 Regulatory Framework
This Article has shown how the cooperative form is thought to hold
much potential for Cuba (and other developing states). For Cuba, the most
innovative part of this economic reconstruction project was the
development of a new governance framework for cooperatives. But this
experiment will not succeed if the regulatory framework used to manage it
seeks merely to replicate and privatize the system of state management—
the failures of which, acknowledged by the highest levels of the CCP, were
the very impetus for the reform reflected in the new socialist cooperative.
The regulatory policy reflected in the Lineamientos suggests that this
tension between potential and fear remains quite strong. The cooperative
regulations were announced only after a long period of gestation and with
the strong support for an innovative approach from influential Cuban
academics. On December 11, 2012, the Cuban government published the
long awaited regulations on cooperatives.303
The new cooperative
regulations comprise a cluster of related regulations, including two decreelaws of the Council of State,304 one decree form the Council of Ministers,305
and two ministerial resolutions.306 i. Consejo de Estado Decreto-Ley No.
305: the “Proletarian” Corporate Law of Cooperatives
The Council of State’s Decreto-Ley No. 305, which implements
portions of the Lineamientos, is preceded by a short preamble307 that

301

Cuba priorizará sector cooperative, supra note 299.
Id.
303
See supra note 56.
304
See Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56; Decreto-Ley No. 306, supra note 56.
305
See Decreto No. 309, supra note 56.
306
See Ministerio de Economía y Planificación Resolución No. 570/12, supra note 56
Ministerios de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No. 427/12, supra note 56.
307
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, pmbl (“POR CUANTO: La Ley número 59,
“Código Civil,” de 16 de julio de 1987, reconoce a las cooperativas como personas jurídicas,
y una for-ma de propiedad colectiva, que contribuye al desarrollo de la economía nacional.
POR CUANTO: En el proceso de actualiza-ción del modelo económico cubano es necesario
la creación, con carácter experimental, de coope-rativas en sectores no agropecuarios, lo que
302
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substantially restates the justifications for the development of nonagricultural cooperative regulations that were included in the
Lineamientos.308 But it also quite clearly suggests the tentative nature of
the reforms and the limited scope within which these regulations will be
given effect. It notes that since 1987, cooperatives have been recognized as
separate juridical persons and as a legitimate form of collective property
that contributes positively to the national economy. 309 More importantly it
reluctantly concedes that in order to develop the Cuban economic model, it
is necessary, but only as an experiment, to create a legal framework for
non-agricultural cooperatives.310 These conceptual constraints structure the
framework that guides the organization, powers, and authority of nonagricultural cooperatives elaborated in the decree-laws, decrees, and
resolutions that follow.
The regulations follow the Lineamientos,311 dividing cooperatives into
two classes—primer grado cooperatives and segundo grado
cooperatives.312 Primer grado cooperatives are the focus of Decreto-Ley
No. 305; segundo grado cooperatives are governed by the rules of this lawdecree unless the rules are incompatible with its operation.313 Beyond this
division, the Decreto-Ley is divided into thirty-two substantive articles
covering cooperative regulation from formation to dissolution and
liquidation.
Articles 1 through 10 of Decreto-Ley No. 305 focus on general
principles and provisions. Article 1 sets out the objectives of the
experimental decree-law: to establish the norms that regulate the
constitution, operation, and dissolution of cooperatives within nonagricultural sectors in the national economy. 314 The decree-law’s selfcharacterization as fundamentally experimental in nature is especially
troubling. It suggests the impermanent nature of the legal structure being
created, provides notice that the State might at any time end or change the
rules of the experiment, and that the legitimacy of the project within the
Cuban economic model is still unsettled. The importance of this
re-quiere de una norma jurídica que instrumente su creación y funcionamiento.”).
308
Id.; see also LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶ 25
309
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, pmbl.
310
Id.
311
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
312
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 5.1.
313
See id. at cuarta disposiciones especiale [fourth special provision]. It is likely that the
state ministries will have the discretion to make that determination and not the members of
the segundo grado cooperatives.
314
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 1 (“El presente Decreto-Ley tiene por objeto
establecer con carácter experimental las normas que regulan la constitución, funciona-miento
y extinción de cooperativas en sectores no agropecuarios de la economía nacional, en lo
sucesivo cooperativas.”).

591

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:527 (2013)

characterization cannot be understated—by signalling that the rules may not
survive, it serves to substantially increase the risk of forming and operating
a cooperative. It deprives people of legal certainty. This may well reduce
the number of people willing to take the risk of investing substantial effort
or resources into a cooperative form that may be yanked out from under
them at any time.
Article 2 emphasizes that cooperatives have economic and social
objectives—that they are invested with private and public obligations that
extend beyond the individuals involved.315 This reflects the debate in the
Sixth Party Congress about the social role of economic aggregations, such
as cooperatives, and their insistence that, whether public or private, such
enterprises must serve the State and its economic policy objectives even as
it serves to increase the well being of its operators. The principal objectives
of cooperatives are to serve the retail sector through the production of goods
and the offer of services, all of which must be compatible with social
objectives (managed by state organs and the CCP) and the interests of the
cooperative’s members. As long as it meets these objectives it may enjoy
autonomous juridical personality, use and distribute its property, meet its
expenses from its revenues, and otherwise comply with its obligations
(contract).316
Articles 3 and 4 deal with the internal organization of the cooperative.
Article 3 describes the universe of rules that define the regulatory universe
of cooperatives.317 These include the relevant law-decrees, decrees,
resolution of ministries, as well as its own internal organizational
documents. Article 4 sets out the core substantive premises that define the
fundamental characteristics of the cooperative and the standards under
which they are to be operated. More specifically, Article 4 articulates the
seven basic organizing principles of operation of cooperatives: (1)
cooperatives are voluntary organizations formed and dissolved by mutual
consent (Voluntariedad); (2) all members are expected to collaborate in the
work of the cooperative (Cooperación y ayuda mutual); (3) management
decisions are to be made by all members, each of whom have the same
participation rights; decision making is guided by democratic principles
315

Id. art. 2.1 (“La cooperativa es una organización con fines económicos y sociales, que
se constituye voluntariamente sobre la base del apor-te de bienes y derechos y se sustenta en
el trabajo de sus socios, cuyo objetivo general es la producción de bienes y la prestación de
servicios mediante la gestión colectiva, para la satisfacción del interés social y el de los
socios.”).
316
Id. art. 2.2 (“La cooperativa tiene personalidad jurídica y patrimonio propio; usa,
disfruta y dispone de los bienes de su propiedad; cubre sus gastos con sus ingresos y
responde de sus obligaciones con su patrimonio.”).
317
Id. art. 3 (“Las cooperativas se rigen por el presente Decreto-Ley, su Reglamento, las
disposiciones complementarias a estos, sus estatutos, y de forma supletoria las disposiciones
legales que les resulten aplicables.”).
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(Decisión colectiva e igualdad de derechos de socios); (4) cooperative
expenses must be paid out of its revenues, and after payment of taxes and
other impositions owing to the state, net revenues may be distributed to the
members but only in proportion to the members’ contribution (Autonomía y
sostenabilidad económica); (5) all members are to comply with their work
obligations in conformity to the terms of the agreements establishing the
cooperative and in conformity to the direction of those charged with its
administration (Disciplina cooperativista); (6) the social obligations of the
cooperative are to be emphasized in establishing and managing its
objectives, in addition to which cooperatives must in their operations
contribute to the economic and social development of the nation, protect the
environment, avoid speculation, and ensure compliance with law; the
members of the cooperative must work to promote cooperative culture and
to satisfy the material, training, social, cultural, moral, and spiritual needs
of its members and their families (Responsabilidad social, contribución al
desarrollo planificado de la economía y al bienestar de sus socios y
familiars); and (7) the cooperative will express its relations to other
enterprises through contract, collaboration agreements, exchanges, and
other lawful means (Colaboración y cooperación entre cooperativistas y
con otras entidades).318
These organizing principles are notable, at first blush, not merely for
their breadth and ambiguity. That is too easy a charge to lodge against
these provisions, and ultimately, a distraction. The principles are useful for
establishing the conceptual limits of cooperatives. It is clear that these
enterprises are meant to remain small and closely tied to the primary
contributions of its members. The efficiencies of corporate form have
denied this form of organization. Yet there is a hint of movement toward
conventional rule of law notions in the emphasis of the use of contract in
managing relationships among entities. That may well open the door to the
construction of state organs (judicial) for the vindication of these rights, and
might contribute in that way to the development of a body of private and
commercial law that may in turn contribute to the development of a more
robust commercial sector.
More important, though, is the emphasis on the social obligations of
cooperatives. This is not meant as mere rhetorical bluster. Rather, it is the
gateway through which state management of the business of cooperatives
may be effectuated. Because the State may control the meaning and
application of social obligations, it may also control the functioning of
cooperatives. It is in this way that the state ministries may still be able to
control cooperatives even as they appear to be directed by their members.
In effect, the State seeks to transfer the risk of the enterprise to the members

318

Id. art. 4.
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but retain substantial control over its operation, at least at a macro-level. It
remains to be seen how aggressively state organs, and functionaries seek to
use this power to interfere in the operations of cooperatives, and to what
ends. It will also be interesting to see if in these powers the law provides an
opening to corruption in the relations between cooperatives and the
functionaries responsible for their oversight.
But social objectives can be liberating principles as well. Free of
bureaucratic micro-management, and perhaps subject to review and
reporting on a periodic basis, requiring businesses to adopt something like a
broad stakeholder model and reject the traditional shareholder or investor
model of conventional enterprises can provide a values-based foundation.
This foundation can help in assessing the value of enterprise activity that
can much more efficiently produce socially useful objectives than the
traditional system of control and regulation managed by state bureaucrats.
The reason for this is simple: incorporating a stakeholder model as the
foundational basis of the assessment of the value of enterprise activity
internalizes the values and objectives of socially conscious activities. As a
consequence, monitoring and management costs (to the state) are reduced
substantially as the objective becomes internalized and self managed. That,
for example, is the objective of moves outside of Cuba to provide a
regulatory space for socially conscious enterprises.319 The difficulty of
traditional control policies is that it remains something that is exogenous to
the cultures of enterprises, is imposed and controlled by state actors who are
not intimately connected with enterprise activity and who may impose
transaction costs in the form of corruption.320
In effect, because the enterprise itself does not own its own obligation
to increase stakeholder (or social) value, and because it appears alien to the
operation—something imposed by an outside actor—it will not be easy to
internalize the values of social welfare within the cultures of enterprise
operation. The concern with the system created by Decreto-Ley No. 305,
then, is precisely this: it points to a system of internalizing the requirements
of stakeholder operations while retaining the inefficient structures created
by the specific implementation of social objectives through state
management and control. That is the potential tension between the general
operational principles of Article 2 and the impositions of the regulatory

319
See Larry Catá Backer & Edward Waitzer, Edward Waitzer on Fiduciary Duty and
Corporate Social Responsibility; Are Benefit Corporations a Step in the Right Direction?,
LAW END DAY (Mar. 6, 2012), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/edward-waitzeron-fiduciary-duty-and.html.
320
See Larry Catá Backer, Corruption in Cuba—The Cuban Communist Party Signals
Public Recognition and Party Obligation, LAW END DAY (July 16, 2011),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2011/07/corruption-in-cuba-cuban-communist.html.
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framework.321
Article 6 of Decreto-Ley No. 305 describes the lawful types of
contributions (only by natural persons) for the formation of primer grado
cooperatives. These include: (1) cash aggregated for collective activity;322
(2) the use of property or services contributed to the venture without
transferring ownership;323 (3) the use of the means of production owned by
the state, the right to which must be acquired lawfully (including state
enterprises whose operations might be privatized through leaseholds or
otherwise);324 and (4) any combination of these.325
The contribution of state assets under Article 6(c) is particularly
noteworthy. It suggests the possibility of privatizing state operations
through cooperatives under appropriate circumstances, none of which are
specified. That suggests, in turn, that the State might contribute or not
under standards that may be non-transparent, non-uniform, and arbitrarily
applied. The transfer of the rights to use state assets is treated further in
Articles 7 through 9, which focus on the use of state property. Article 7
limits lease transfer contributions of state assets to a maximum term of ten
years.326 Article 8 permits state entities to sell equipment and other goods
to cooperatives in accordance with the law.327 Article 9 permits
cooperatives (whether or not they are fully established in accordance with
the law) to bid for state property and to contest the award of property open
for bid.328
321
See generally Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 11; Decreto No. 309, supra
note 56 (the implementing regulations).
322
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 6(a) (“A partir del patrimonio integrado por
los aportes dinerarios de personas naturales que deciden voluntariamente asociarse entre sí
bajo el régimen de propiedad colectiva.”).
323
Id. art. 6(b) (“Por personas naturales que decidan voluntariamente asociarse entre sí,
solo con la finalidad de adquirir conjuntamente insumos y servicios, comercializar productos
y servicios, o emprender otras actividades económicas, conservando los socios la propiedad
sobre sus bienes.”).
324
Id. art. 6(c) (“A partir de medios de producción del patrimonio estatal, tales como
inmuebles y otros, que se decida gestionar de forma cooperativa y para ello puedan cederse
estos, por medio del arrendamiento, usufructo u otras formas legales que no impliquen la
transmisión de la propiedad.”).
325
Id. art. 6(d).
326
Id. art. 7 (“El término del arrendamiento, usufructo u otras formas legales que no
impliquen la transmisión de la propiedad a la cooperativa, a que se refiere el inciso c) del
artículo anterior será de hasta diez (10) años, prorrogables por igual término en períodos
sucesivos.”).
327
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 8 (“Las entidades estatales podrán vender a
las cooperativas que se constituyan, equipos, medios, implementos u otros bienes muebles
que se determinen, de acuerdo a lo legalmente establecido.”).
328
Id. art 9 (“[P]odrán participar en la licitación de arrendamientos de inmuebles y de la
venta de otros activos fijos de un establecimiento estatal . . . . podrán impugnar la decisión
firme en la vía judicial conforme a lo legalmente establecido.”).
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Cooperative formation is the subject of Articles 11 through 16,329 most
of which are supplemented by the implementary regulations of the Council
of Ministers.330 Article 10 specifies the mechanics of cooperative
formation. Members are limited to natural persons, at least eighteen years
of age, who are permanent residents of Cuba who are able to perform
productive work for the cooperative.331 Where state enterprises contributed,
the workers of those enterprises will have priority in becoming cooperative
members.332 Lastly, new members may be added in accordance with the
operating principles of Article 4.333 Articles 11 through 16 focus on the
governing documents for a cooperative and the process for obtaining state
consent for operation. They specify the appropriate review agency,334 the
type of review provided by local authorities and the Council of Ministers,335
the supervision and control responsibilities of state agencies authorizing
cooperative formation,336 the writing requirements for cooperative
constitutions,337 the authority of cooperatives to merge or modify,338 and the
sources of governing law.339
These provisions raise a number of interesting issues related to the
control, supervision, and ongoing relationships between the State and these
enterprises. The framework for formation and supervision highlights the
issues and choke points of the regulation. Article 11 specifies the
governmental unit from which approval must be obtained in order to form a
cooperative, distinguishing between cooperatives formed from private
contributions and those organized from privatized state enterprises.340 The
request must include the cooperative’s constitution, though it is not clear
what kind of review process is necessary or which forms must be filled out.
Article 14 lists the formalities required in the preparation of a cooperative
constitution.341 Article 12 indicates that the Council of Ministers and the
appropriate local regulatory bodies must review all applications for
cooperative formation.342 Article 13 provides that approval for cooperative
329

Chapter II of Decreto-Ley No. 305 is entitled “De la Constitución.” Id. arts. 11–16.
Decreto-Ley No. 309, supra note 56.
331
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 10.1.
332
Id. art. 10.2.
333
Id. art. 10.3. These principles include non-coercion, collective decision-making, and
equal rights for members. Id. arts. 4(a), 4(c), 4(f).
334
Id. art. 11.
335
Id. art. 12.
336
Id. art. 13.
337
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 14.
338
Id. art. 15.
339
Id. art. 16.
340
Id. art. 11.
341
Id. art. 14.
342
Id. art. 12.
330
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formation must contain, in some detail, the enterprise’s authorized activities
and any other obligations the approving agencies might deem
appropriate.343 Article 13 also notes that the approving agency remains
responsible for the control and evaluation of the cooperative’s operations.344
Indeed, under Article 15, a cooperative may not merge, dissolve, split up, or
modify its organization or operations without the approval of the state organ
that approved its constitution.345
What is clear is that even though anyone who meets the requirements
for cooperative formation may apply, the State has reserved the right to
refuse the formation of any cooperative, apparently for any reason. Those
reasons are likely to be based on an assessment that the cooperatives do not
appropriately meet the social or national objectives. This is a significant
method of control of both individuals and cooperative activity. The State
stands as the gatekeeper in a way that has no parallel in the West, where
most enterprise formations that comply with formal requirements are not
subject to particular review. It also substantially limits cooperatives in their
engagement with market changes. Any change in the operations, business,
or focus of the cooperative will require governmental review and approval.
This is another way by which the State retains substantial control over the
operations of cooperatives—it effectively serves as the ultimate controlling
entity with respect to changes in operations or scope of business. That
authority extends not just to consent rights for cooperative business
decisions that change its operations, but also to evaluation and control of
the cooperative.
The structure of corporate governance is the subject of Articles 17
through 19, which regulate the internal organization of cooperatives.
Article 17 provides that each cooperative has a General Assembly of its
members that serves as the supreme governance unit of the cooperative.346
The General Assembly elects a president, presidential alternate, and
secretary by direct and secret ballot.347 It also may appoint an administrator
or administrative committee,348 and elect a board of directors (Junta
Directiva) overseen by the cooperative’s president.349 These provisions are
similar to organizational provisions for private companies. Article 18
provides a waiver of these organizational requirements for small and less

343

Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 13.
Id.
345
Id. art. 15.
346
Id. art. 17.1 (“El rgano superior de direcci n de la cooperativa es su Asamblea
General, de la cual forman parte todos los socios.”).
347
Id. art. 17.2.
348
Id. art. 17.3.
349
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 17.4.
344
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complex cooperatives.350 Whatever their organizational form, Article 19
provides that all cooperatives must administer their financial affairs through
a specially designated member or through a Control and Audit Committee
(Comisión de Control y Fiscalización) appointed by the General
Assembly.351
Issues of cooperative finance are the focus of Articles 20 through 25.
Article 20 specifies the accounting standards to be applied by
cooperatives,352 while the Council of Ministers Regulations still define the
requisite accounting conventions. Article 21 specifies the initial capital of
the cooperative using a qualitative standard.353 The focus is on “work
capital” (capital del trabajo) rather than financial capital,354 which
constitutes the cooperative’s assets under Article 22.355 Article 23 provides
an important disciplinary element—it requires all members of a cooperative
to participate in the work of the enterprise.356 That, of course, is at the heart
of this form of economic organization—the notion that labor and
production rather than capital is at the heart of the organization and
operation of the enterprise.
Lastly, Article 24 deals with profit
distributions, providing for the development of rules for the distribution of
net revenues (utilidades or profits) to members in conformity with the
principles and other limitations of law.357 More importantly, and implied in
350
Id. art. 18. Cooperatives with twenty members or less may operate by appointing an
administrator. Cooperatives with more than twenty but no more than sixty members may
operate through an Administrative Council (Consejo Administrativo). Id. Cooperatives with
more than sixty members may elect both an administrative council and a board of directors.
Id.
351
Id. art. 19 (stating that the form of the financial oversight will vary by the number of
members and the complexity of the cooperative organization).
352
Id. art. 20. The type of accounting standards adopted is based on the organizational
characteristics of the cooperative. See id. (“Las cooperativas aplican normas espec ficas de
contabilidad y elaboran sus planes de ingresos y gastos en correspondencia con el nivel de
producci n y servicios proyectado, tomando en cuenta los v nculos contractuales ue
establezcan con las empresas, unidades presupuestadas y dem s formas de gesti n
econ mica.”).
353
Id. art. 21 (“[Q]ue le permita sostener sus operaciones al nivel previsto.”).
354
Id.
355
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 22 (providing that corporate assets include
work capital, other contributions, and any bank loans).
356
Id. art. 23 (“ E st n en la obligaci n de participar con su traba o.”).
357
Id. art. 24. The provision is ambiguous about the need to distribute profit. It is clear
that at year end the cooperative must determine the: profits to be distributed in each
cooperative. Id. art. 24.1 (“[U]tilidades a distribuir en cada cooperativa”). But it also
provides that the cooperative must establish rules for distribution from profits, subject to the
limitations of the Regulations (of Council of Ministers). Article 56 of the Regulation
provides for setting aside reserves for obligations to the state, as well as other reserves
established by the General Assembly, limiting distributions to net profits. Decreto No. 309,
supra note 56, art. 56.1.
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Article 24, distribution rules must also conform to the conditions for
approval imposed by the state agencies with regulatory and supervisory
authority over each cooperative under Articles 13 and 15.
Articles 25 and 26 deal with issues of cooperatives in markets. More
specifically, they deal with pricing authority and the authority to hire labor.
Article 25 regulates the particularly sensitive issue of pricing goods and
services.358 The provision nicely illustrates the conflicted nature of the
cooperative regulations—at once solicitous of a small market sector and
deeply suspicious of markets as a driver of economic activity. On the one
hand, its basic premise is that the cooperative may set prices for goods and
services in accordance with market conditions. Yet, the provision also
specifies that this rule may be altered by rules promulgated by competent
state authorities.359 In effect, the provision makes it possible for the State to
privatize its operations without loss of any power over the management of
pricing. Markets for goods and services may be tolerated only to the extent,
and for as long as, competent state agencies permit them. But clearly the
State has the discretion to step in at any time and regulate pricing. For
cooperatives seeking welfare maximization, and even ones sensitive to their
social obligations, this may work against the creation of robust enterprises
that might be able to survive. Worse, to the extent that pricing is not
centrally controlled, it is possible that pricing schemes for cooperative
goods and services may vary among regulatory regions, creating incentives
for strategic behavior and corruption.
Article 26 deals with the equally sensitive issue of labor hiring by
cooperatives.360 The provision represents a compromise between an
enterprise view of cooperatives that would treat them like other economic
enterprises able to hire capital and labor and a social view of cooperatives
that understands this form as grounded in the equality of labor participation.
Article 26.1 gives cooperatives a very limited power to hire labor:
individuals may be hired for no more than three months, and hiring is
permitted only when there are no members able to perform the task.361 The
object of this regulation, of course, is to create incentives to eventually
convert hired labor into cooperative members. In effect, the labor hire
358

Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 25 (“Los precios y tarifas de los productos y
servicios ue comercialicen las cooperativas se determinan por estas, seg n la oferta y la
demanda, excepto a uellos ue se establecen por los rganos estatales competentes.”).
359
Id.
360
Id. art. 26.1 (“Las cooperativas pueden contratar traba adores asalariados hasta tres
meses en el per odo fiscal, para las actividades y tareas ue no puedan asumir los socios en
determinado per odo de tiempo.”). The provision is sensitive because, at its limit, the ability
of hiring labor is fundamentally incompatible with an enterprise founded on the premise that
all labor will contribute to the production of revenue to be divided among the participants
articulated in Article 2.
361
Id.

599

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:527 (2013)

provision appears to be meant to serve as a means of creating something
like a probationary period for potential members.362
Conflict resolution among members is the subject of Articles 27
through 29. Article 27 urges negotiation as the first step to resolving
conflicts among members or between members and the cooperative.363
Negotiation is initially between the principals to the dispute. The provision
leaves open the possibility of setting up some sort of institutional
mechanism within the cooperative for mediating disputes. Article 28
provides that after sixty days without resolution, the dispute may be taken
to the administration of the cooperative, again under rules that may be
organized by the cooperative.364 If this does not resolve the dispute, it may
be taken to judicial bodies.365 Article 29 reminds all participants that
disputes are to be resolved in accordance with Decreto-Ley No. 305 (rather
than some other law or principle) along with the regulations developed to
implement it and the internal cooperative governance documents.366
The last articles of Decreto-Ley No. 305 provide a legal basis for
dissolution and liquidation. Articles 30 through 32 deal with dissolution
and its legal effects. As in conventional corporate law statutes, cooperative
extinction is a two-step process: dissolution and liquidation.367 Dissolution
is covered under Article 31,368 the legal effects of which are described in
Article 32.369
ii. Consejo de Estado Decreto-Ley No. 306: Governmental Impositions and
the Private Sector Contributions to the National Social Security System
A companion statute of Decreto-Ley No. 305, Decreto-Ley No. 306,
sets out an ambitious program for capturing revenues from the operations of
cooperatives.370 Yet, given the extent of state control and management of
both markets and entities in Decreto-Ley No. 305, it is hard to imagine
362

See id. art. 26.4.
See Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 27. The provisions apply not just to the
cooperative’s activities, but also to the interpretation of the application of the Decreto-Ley
No. 305 and the subsequent implementing regulation to the cooperative.
364
Id. art. 28 (“[P]odrá someterse al conocimiento de los órganos de dirección o
administración de la cooperativa; agotada esta vía, queda expedita la acción judicial, según
la naturaleza del conflicto.”).
365
Id.
366
Id. art. 29.
367
Id. art. 30.
368
Id. art. 31. It provides for dissolution triggers, including by operation of the
cooperative governance documents, by principles of impossibility of engaging in the work of
the cooperative or its operation, upon the loss of critical leases or use permits, by judicial
order, and for other lawful reasons. Id.
369
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 32.
370
Decreto-Ley No. 306, supra note 56.
363
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substantial market-derived revenues for cooperatives, the production of
which is the premise that animates the financial optimism of Decreto-Ley
No. 306. Beyond that, of course, the object of this provision is the same as
that of similar provisions in western welfare states: to tax economic
enterprises with the social costs of maintaining public support services for
individuals. But taxes are transaction costs to enterprises and these present
a substantial burden on new enterprises. Taken together with the potential
for substantial state control of cooperative activities and internal
organization and the possibility that the State could rescind the entire
experiment at its whim, the burden on the cooperative enterprises beyond
usual business risks becomes formidable indeed. Ironically, it is unlikely
that there would have been sufficient political will to undertake even this
anemic step toward a fundamentally sound Marxist-Leninist approach to
collective activity without these institutional hobbling mechanisms. Yet,
the tensions that result make it as likely that this experiment will fail as a
consequence of institutional impediments as it is likely that it can succeed
because it serves the public interest in robust markets to satisfy basic
consumer demands.
iii. Consejo de Ministros Decreto No. 309: the Implementing Regulations
The Council of Minister’s Decreto No. 309 forms an integral part of
the regulatory governance framework of the cooperative. Articles 1 and 2
set out the framework of the regulation. Article 1 reinforces the character
of the cooperative as a regulatory experiment and describes the objectives
of the regulation: to specify rules for the formation, registration, operation,
and dissolution of cooperatives.371 Article 2 emphasizes that, despite the
rhetoric about the coordination of cooperatives within markets for consumer
goods and services, cooperatives are subject to the supervision and
enforcement of tax, pricing, accounting, and other applicable regulations.372
Articles 3 through 6 regulate the constitutions of cooperatives. The
requirements are quite specific.
They mandate, for example, the
articulation of both the activities to be undertaken by the cooperative and
the expected territorial scope of the activity.373 Articles 3 through 5 detail
the approval path to be taken for the constitution. All cooperatives must be

371
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 1 (“El presente Reglamento esta-blece con
carácter experimental el procedimiento para la constitución, registro, funcionamiento y
extinción de las Cooperativas no Agropecuarias de primer grado.”).
372
Id. art. 2. This appears to set the time for the rest of the implementing regulation—
that this experiment in markets-based private enterprises will be closely monitored by the
State.
373
Id. art. 3.1. Cooperatives founded on privatized state operations are subject to a
special provision. Id. art. 4.
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reviewed and approved by the Council of Ministers.374 Of course,
depending on the volume of applications, this procedure requiring local and
national approvals may substantially slow down cooperative formation. As
a result, a less-than-optimal number of cooperatives may be formed, or
equally as likely, cooperatives will be formed outside of the process. The
possibilities for corruption may thereby also be increased.
As a further alternative, cooperatives “in formation” (en formación)
may be tolerated while they await approval from the Council of Ministers.
Those will only exist in a semi-official limbo, however, and as a result may
also increase the temptation of corruption, because officials will have
greater power to shut them down. The possibility of a large number of
cooperatives in formation is the object of Articles 7 through 10 of the
regulation. Article 7 contemplates the operation of cooperatives without
official approval by permitting these entities to operate with an indication of
their status.375 This permits the cooperative en formación to lawfully
engage in a limited number of transactions to further the development of its
internal organization.376 However, cooperatives en formación are not
deemed to have acquired juridical personality,377 so the individual members
remain personally liable during this formation period.
While the
cooperative is in formation, and pending final approval, the local approval
agency is empowered to negotiate the final form of the cooperative’s
constitution.378 Among the objects of negotiation are (1) the social
objective of the cooperative (posible objecto social); (2) the organization of
cooperative financial structures (diseño financiero); (3) the property to be
leased to acquired (inmuebles y otros bienes a arrendar);(4) goods or
services to be sold (medios, utensilios y herramientas a vender); (5) goods
or services to be utilized from the state sector (bienes o servicios que
constituyen el pedido estatal); (6) the pricing of goods and services to be
offered by the cooperative (los precios de bienes y servicios que se man
tendrán centralmente establecidos); (7) draft contracts or agreements (los
proyectos de contratos de arrendamiento, usufructo, compraventa y otros);
(8) if applicable deferments of lease payment provisions (si procede, la
determinación del período de exoneración del pago del arrendamiento); (9)
the materials (consumables) necessary for the production of goods or
services to be rendered (los insumos principales a suministrar); (10)

374

Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 5 (“La Comisión Permanente para la Implementación y Desarrollo evalúa las
solicitudes de creación de Cooperativas a que se refieren los artículos 3 y 4 del presente
Decreto y con sus consi-deraciones presenta al Consejo de Ministros la pro-puesta sobre su
incorporación o no a la experiencia.”).
376
Id. art. 8.
377
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 10
378
Id. art. 9.
375
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environmental impacts (el impacto ambiental); (11) the ways in which the
cooperative will comply with land use regulations (el cumplimiento de
normas y regulaciones so bre el ordenamiento territorial); (12) the
proposed governance framework (articles of association) (el proyecto de
estatutos); and (13) anything else considered appropriate (otros aspectos
que se consideran de interés).379 Some of these items appear better suited
for agricultural cooperatives (the prior establishment of which provided the
framework for these new regulations). Others might be evidence that the
State intends to treat these cooperatives substantially like any other state
enterprise within a highly centralized planned economy. If that is true, the
regulation considerably impedes all efforts to permit cooperatives to
develop to serve consumer demand. Instead, it appears that the planning
needs of the State take precedence over the ability of the cooperative to
adjust supply and price in the market. This is especially true with respect to
price and objects offered for sale or service. If these require state approval
before they can be changed, the ability of the cooperative to operate in
markets is substantially gutted because cooperatives will not be able to
adjust to fast-moving market conditions.
Articles 11 and 12 set out the details for setting up the cooperative.
The principal focus is on the content of the cooperative’s constitutional
documents,380 and the acquisition of property.381 Article 13 focuses on the
process of bidding for state assets. The process is also heavily managed by
the State, whose officials are given approval and supervisory authority.382
The foundational character of the cooperative—its social purpose383—
is fleshed out in Articles 14 and 15. Article 14 defines the social object
simply as the commercial activities of the cooperative.384 This is possible
because no cooperative can be licensed without approval of the State. It
stands to reason, then, that what the State approves must out of necessity
also include a sufficient social objective.
Articles 16 through 19 specify requirements for setting up the
constitution of a cooperative and the role of the general assembly. Articles
20 through 22 deal with the articles of association (estatutos). The
379

Id.
Id. art. 11. These include much of the basic information found in a corporate charter;
in addition, they are also meant to lock in pricing where pricing discretion is not permitted as
a condition of approval. Id. art. 11(h) (“[L]os precios de bienes y servicios que se mantendrán centralmente establecidos, cuando corresponda.”).
381
Id. art. 12.
382
Id. art. 13.1.
383
Decreto-Ley No. 305, supra note 56, art. 2.
384
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 14 (“El objeto social de la Cooperativa
comprende las producciones, prestaci n de servicios o la actividad de comercializaci n, a
ue se dedicar de acuerdo con lo ue se autorice.”). Article 15 provides the basis for the
use of trademarks and the like. Id. art. 15.
380
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constitution of the cooperative appears to function like a corporate charter
while the estatutos seems to have been assigned the function of corporate
bylaws, but with substantially more detail about the business to be
undertaken and substantially more limits on the flexibility of operations. A
notary (notario) prepares the constitution,385 the costs of which are borne by
the founding members.386 The constitution is filed with the Registro
Mercantil,387 and the estatutos must be approved by the General
Assembly.388 The estatutos include the fundamental regulations for the
operation of the cooperative and form part of the constitution.389 The
minimum content of the estatutos is prescribed in Article 21.390 These
include many of the items usually found in both corporate charters and
bylaws. Article 22 presents rules for the modification of the estatutos.
These include super-majority provisions for cooperatives with more than
twenty members.391 For smaller cooperatives, such rules can be made to
suit the members. Revisions to the estatutos must also be filed with the
Registro Mercantil.392
Chapter III of Decreto No. 309 is devoted to issues involving the
members of the cooperative,393 including the minimum rights of
members.394 These minimum rights include rights touching on labor
obligations of members as well as rights relating to their interests in the
cooperative. Article 29 focuses on member obligations, including the
obligation to provide the labor services that represent the “benefit of the
bargain,” in exchange for which the individual obtained an interest in the
cooperative.395 Article 30 lists the basis on which a person can lose his
status as a cooperative member (including, among other things, expulsion,
death, retirement, and incapacity).396 Articles 67 through 68 elaborate on
member discipline, which includes fines, suspension, or expulsion.397
Worker discipline is detailed in Article 69.
385

Id. art. 16.
Id. art. 19.
387
Id. art. 23.
388
Id. art. 18.
389
Id. art. 20.
390
Article 21 includes items such as the number of members in the cooperative, the
requirements of membership, banking information, distributions for members, conflict
resolution, amendments to the statutes, and procedures for dissolution and liquidation.
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 21.
391
Id. art. 22.
392
Id. art. 24.
393
Id. arts. 26–30.
394
Id. art. 28.
395
Id. art. 29.
396
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 30.
397
Id. arts. 67–68.
386
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Articles 33 through 45 provide rules relating to the governance organs
of the cooperative. Much of this is similar to the provisions of corporate
rules for private companies (such as ordinary and special meetings of
collective bodies, quorum rules, notice of meetings, and agendas), though
some of the rules are more specific. For example, collective bodies are
required to have an odd number of members.398 The General Assembly is
the supreme organ of cooperative authority. It elects a president. It has a
long list of attributes specified in the regulation.399 The General
Assembly’s authority resembles in a general way that of shareholders. The
authority of the President of the General Assembly is also specified,400 most
of which resembles that of the chair of a board of directors. The authority
of the Secretary is also specified.401 The Junta Directiva appears to act like
the standing committee of the General Assembly.402 The administrator (or
the administrative council) functions like a chief executive officer.403
Lastly, the Control and Audit Commission functions like a legal and audit
committee of a board of directors.404
Articles 46 through 59 deal with issues of cooperative capital and
accounting. Cooperatives account for the operations using the Normas
Cubanas de Información Financiera.405 The cooperative is required to
prepare an annual business plan,406 though its scope appears to be more like
the plans required for ministerial action in a centrally-planned economy
than in a market driven one. This again suggests that the pull of traditional
patterns of planning may hamper the already small opening that exists for
market based economic activity within the consumer retail sector.
Dividend distribution is tightly managed.407 Decreto No. 309
effectively mandates that at least thirty percent of profits (understood in this
case as revenues net of expenses and taxes) above reserves set aside to act
like a corporate stated capital account408 are meant to be reinvested by the
398

Id. art. 33.1(2).
Id. arts. 37(a)–(j).
400
Id.
401
Id. arts. 39(a)–(d).
402
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, arts. 40–41.
403
Id. arts. 43–44.
404
Id. art. 45.
405
Id. art. 52 (“La Cooperativa est obligada a llevar la contabilidad de sus operaciones a
efectos fiscales, a partir de las Normas Cubanas de Informaci n inanciera, con las
especificidades que al respecto se establezcan.”); see also Larry Catá Backer, Cuba Issues
New Cooperatives Regulations: Tentative Experiment in Socialist Market Enterprise or a
Privatization of State Management?, LAW END DAY (Jan. 20, 2013),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/01/creating-legal-structure-for-experiment.html.
406
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, art. 54.
407
Id. arts. 56–62.
408
See id. art. 56.1.
399
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cooperative in a number of specified areas.409 Reserves are meant to
provide funds for payment of workers in lean years and to pay
obligations.410 Advances are possible, and Article 60 specifies the
proportion of distribution to members.411 Lastly, Articles 70 through 74
provide procedures and structures for mediating conflict,412 while Articles
75 through 77 deal with dissolution and liquidation of cooperatives.413
iv. The Ministerial Resolutions
Two ministerial resolutions were included in the basic package of
cooperative resolutions. The first resolution provides the procedures for
bidding on state property that is to be contributed to the operation of a
cooperative.414
The second resolution deals with issues of taxation, accounting, and
pricing for goods and services provided by cooperatives.415 Its object is to
embed cooperatives within the state-based planning for prices and
production. This resolution is based on the premise that prices are set by
the market unless they are otherwise required to be set at a particular
amount by the State.416 Prices may be set in CUP (pesos cubanos) or CUC
(pesos convertibles).417 The State continues to regulate the price margins
between wholesale and retail markets.418 This can significantly limit
competition among cooperatives. It would follow that the State may be
discouraging price competition, evidenced by a regulatory web with the
potential to significantly affect the development of markets. The
consequence might be that cooperatives are expected to operate like
409
Id. art. 57.1(3) (“La diferencia con el 100% de las utilidades que no se distribuyen a
los socios, se destinan al fondo de operaciones, inversiones, actividades socio-culturales,
incrementar el fondo de contingencia y otros, seg n se aprueben en los estatutos.”).
410
Id. art. 59 (“Las Cooperativas que tengan pérdidas las solventarán, en primera
instancia, por medio de la reserva para cubrir contingencias.”).
411
Id. art. 60 (basing the proportion on the complexity, amount, and quality of the work
of each of the cooperative’s members). The operationalization of this standard remains
unspecified.
412
Complaints are to be made in writing, and provisions for notification are specified.
Decreto No. 309, supra note 56, arts. 70–71. The administrative organ mediating disputes
usually has thirty days to render a decisión. Id. art. 73.1.
413
Under these provisions, the supervising agencies are assigned responsibility for
dissolution. Id. art. 75. A liquidation committee established by the General Assembly has
responsibility for winding up. Id. art. 76.
414
Ministerio de Económica y Planificación Resolución No. 570/12, supra note 56.
415
Ministerios de Finanzas y Precios Resolución No. 427/12, supra note 56.
416
Id. ¶ 12.
417
Id. ¶ 13.
418
See Alejandro, supra note 105, at 63 (“En adición a estas limitantes se encuentra las
restricciones de divisas que tiene el país para apoyar el microcrédito y un mercado de
insumos mayoristas, tan necesario para el desarrollo de las Pymes.”).
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privatized state sector organs. But this essentially defeats the object of the
redirection of the Cuban economy at the heart of the objectives of the
Lineamientos. It also suggests the triumph of the factions within the Cuban
elite that view any change with great suspicion.
IV. THEORY AND ENGAGEMENT: CUBA AND COOPERATIVES IN
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
The development of a cooperative theory—which started as a solution
to the problem of organizing collective activity within a closely cabined
retail sector in which only the state can own productive property—
highlights the peculiarities of Cuba’s economic reform and engagement in
the global economy, and its distance from the path followed by the Chinese
Communist Party since the 1980s. The December 2012 Regulations sought
to establish this theoretical vision, adhering closely to the narrowly
constrained guidelines (Lineamientos) for economic reorganization. Cuba
is seeking to forge a third path between the market-oriented economic
model of the West and the pattern of economic control developed by the
great Asian Marxist-Leninist states. It remains committed to a significant
degree of central planning and suspicious of autonomous capital
aggregations and of individuals not directly controlled or managed by the
state. It has sought to build these notions into its international and regional
economic planning to the same extent it seeks to base its internal economic
model on those principles.419
The centerpiece of this internationalization of the Cuban model is
ALBA. But the internationalization is itself grounded in the exportation of
a new model of economic organization based on the primacy of the state as
the manager of economic activities and in which the private sector plays a
small and well-managed role.420 ALBA appears to be moving to reflect the
two-part division of economic activity within Cuba: a public sector
populated with state-owned corporate enterprises and a private sector
focused on small retail professions.421
ALBA is firmly grounded on the idea that internationalization must be
419

See Backer & Molina, supra note 36.
Larry Catá Backer, Globalization and the Socialist Multinational: Cuba at the
Intersection of Business and Human Rights, in 1 HANDBOOK ON CONTEMPORARY CUBA:
ECONOMY, POLITICS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND GLOBALIZATION (Mauricio A. Font & Carlos Riobó
eds., 2012).
421
See generally Nick Hoskyns & David McKnight, Another Way Is Possible: Fair
Trade, Cooperation and Solidarity, VENEZUELA ANALYSIS (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/6745. Hoskyns and McKnight, when describing the
idea of fair trade as a fundamental principle of ALBA trade policy used the example of
Venezuelan cooperatives as an example of the concept at work, and noted in connection with
his thought about Nicaraguan contributions to ALBA, that “Cuba is looking at the
cooperatives in Nicaragua as a model to develop their economy.” Id.
420

607

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:527 (2013)

effectuated through states and public action rather than individuals and
private markets.422 ALBA is not necessarily opposed to all private activity,
just those activities that have become liberated from precise control by the
state. ALBA is thus founded on the notion that traditional divisions
between public and private sectors remains valuable and important, and that
certain sectors, traditionally overseen by the state as agent for territorially
based communities, are essential for the maximization of the welfare of
people organized into states.423 To this is added a fundamental distrust of
private markets that are not strictly controlled and managed by the state.424
ALBA is both a system of free trade and as a nexus point for legal and
political resistance to economic globalization and legal internationalism
sponsored by developed states.425 In this respect, ALBA reflects the core
premises of the Cuban economic model: a suspicion of markets, a belief in
the primacy of the state as the welfare-maximizing source of economic
decision-making, and a mistrust of individual decision-making.
The organization of the Cuban economy and its understanding of the
notion that property remains a prerogative of the State, embedded in Cuba’s
regional foreign relations. Critical to that effort is the form of organization
that ALBA has developed for the structuring of economic life in the

422
ALBA is said to institutionalize radical conflict necessary to build an integrated
political space in Latin America, develop a model of twenty-first century socialism, and
support the radical revolutionary processes within member states. See Joel D. Hirst, What Is
the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas and What Does It Do?, AMERICAS Q.,
http://www.americasquarterly.org/HIRST/ARTICLE (last visited Mar. 20, 2013);
Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty—TCP, ALBA-TCP (Oct. 17, 2009),
http://www.alba-tcp.org/en/contenido/fundamental-principles-tcp. (“The fortification of the
State like central actor of the economy from a country at all the levels, facing the opposite
private practices the public interest, such as the monopoly, oligopoly, the cartelization,
hoarding, speculation and usury.”).
423
Fernando Bossi, ¿Qué es el ALBA? Construyendo el ALBA desde los Pueblos [What is
the ALBA? Building the ALBA from Peoples], ALBA-TCP ¶¶ 3.5, 4–6 (Nov. 2009),
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=470.
424
Fifth Extraordinary Summit of the ALBA Final Declaration, ALBA-TCP (Apr. 17,
2009),
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1982.
425
Bossi, supra note 423. Thus, in framing the fundamental principles of ALBA, it was
stated:

Vindicating expressed the revolutionary processes and of liberation in the firm
decision of the peoples of our America, to break with the hegemonic schemes and
to surpass the neoliberal model and its effects in the region that implies to finish
with the logic of the accumulation, the profit, the gain, the competition and the
financial speculation, as well as to advance in the construction of an alternative
project based on the cooperation, principles of solidarity, complementarity and
respect to the sovereignty and the self-determination of the peoples.
Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty—TCP, supra note 422.
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transnational sphere, especially in the context of regional integration. A
central framing element of that organization is what ALBA has designated
grannacionales.426 Grannacionales, like cooperatives, are a form of capital
aggregation that rejects the fundamental market-oriented principles of
conventional economic globalization.427
The conception of the grannacional is understood as a political project
with three components: (1) historical and geopolitical, (2) socio-economic,
and (3) ideological.428 The first of these, the historical and geopolitical
premise, is grounded in the sense that the business of Latin America’s
construction, which started with the nineteenth century wars of liberation, is
unfinished. Its object is integration at the supra-national level, that is, to
understand grannacionales as the formal expression of efforts to create a
single nation. The second, the socio-economic component, incorporates an
understanding that the commercial activity and its traditional forms can be
used as a functional means to reach the political ends of integration.
Grannacionales are to serve as the great vehicles for state-directed
development.429
The third, the ideological premise, envisions the
grannacional as functional integration devices advancing political and
economic aims of the state. Specifically, the objective of grannacional
enterprise is to manifest a united front by generating a multi-national block
for the structuring of sovereign regional politics.
This
parallels
the
conceptual framework of cooperatives. And, of course, this approach
produces consequences when looked at from the perspective of
conventional economic globalization. Efficiency is measured differently
than in classical economics or under the framework of conventional
economic globalization. It is understood only in relation to the aims of the
state in meeting its political goals, measured to some extent on the state’s
assessment of its ability to meet the needs of a majority of its people.430
426

ALBA Grannacional, supra note 113.
See Empresas Grannacionales [Grand-National Companies], EMBAJADA DE LA
REPÚBLICA DE CUBA [EMBASSY OF CUBA], http://www.embajadacuba.com.ve/alba/empresasgrannacionales/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).
428
Conceptualización de Proyecto y Empresa Grannacional en el Marco del Alba:
Documentos de la VI Cumbre [Conceptualization of the Project and Company Grannacional
Under ALBA: Documents of the VI Summit], ALBA-TCP (Oct. 30, 2009),
http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=2074.
429
Fundamental Principles of the Peoples´’ Trade Treaty-TCP, supra note 422, princ. 15
(“Execution of joint investments in trade issues that can adopt the form of Grand National
companies. The association of state companies of different countries to impel a sovereign
development and of mutual benefit.”).
430
See Siete empresas grannacionales del Alba benefician a un mercado de 75 millones
de personas [Seven Companies of Alba Grannacionales Benefit a Market of 75 Million
People], AGENCIA VENEZOLANA DE NOTICIAS [VENEZUELAN NEWS AGENCY] (Oct. 26, 2011,
11:34 AM), http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/siete-empresas-grannacionales-del-albabenefician-mercado-75-millones-personas.
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Both these goals are also constructs of state policy. This approach
somewhat inverts classical economic concepts.
The grannacionales’ theoretical framework is implemented through
grannacionales projects (proyectos grannacionales) (PG) and
grannacionales companies (empresas grannacionales) (EG).431
The
relationship between PGs and EGs follow the organization of the economy
within Cuba—one in which economic sectors (including social and cultural
production) are organized through ministries charged with planning and
control, and specific production is devolved to economic units organized in
“corporate” form. PGs form the structuring element for reorganization of
key sectors of state activity.432 These include key fields, encompassing
political, cultural, economic, scientific, and industrial activity. This
organization is grounded in ALBA’s normative construction of principles of
“just trade” and solidarity commerce.433 The basis of just trade and
solidarity, also foundations for cooperative operation, are based on
principles of barter transactions, non-reciprocity in trade relations, and
differential treatment of trade partners to advance national and development
objectives (commercio compensado, no-reciprosidad, y trato
diferenciado).434
EGs are entities created to carry out the economic and trade activity
organized through PGs. If PGs are meant to organize productive activities,
EGs are meant to implement them in an orderly way. EGs are SOEs,
establishing separate juridical persons, interests measured through
ownership by participating ALBA Member States.435 But they might be
organized in other ways by special legislation or as a ministerial
department. PG and EG projects are not limited to the supra-national
level—single-state PGs and EGs may be created as long as they are
consonant with ALBA principles and goals. The relationship between PGs
and EGs is not strictly linear. It is clear that every EG must derive from a

431

Backer, supra note 420.
For an example from the medical sector, see Qué es el proyecto Grannacional
“Centro Regulador de Medicamentos del ALBA”.ALBAmed? [What is Grannacional Project
“Center of Drug Regulatory ALBA” ALBAMED?], ALBAMED (Sept. 7, 2009, 10:40 AM),
http://salud.alianzabolivariana.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&It
emid=56.
433
See Norman Girvan, ALBA, PETROCARIBE and CARICOM: Issues in a New
Dynamic, in CARICOM: POLICY OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT 218–234
(Kenneth O. Hall et al. eds., 2010).
434
Backer, supra note 420.
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ALBA Grannacional, supra note 113 (“Las Empresas Grannacionales no se definen
como tales por el ámbito donde se hayan constituido, ni por su composición accionaria, sino
por su naturaleza constitutiva. Esto quiere decir que podrán existir Empresas Grannacionales
entre dos países (Bilaterales), entre tres países (Trilaterales), entre cuatro países
(Multilaterales).”).
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PG, but not every PG will require the establishment of an EG. The EG and
PG embody alternatives to the model of private multinational enterprises.
They substitute the state and public welfare maximization for private
shareholders and profit maximization as a foundational ordering element.
EGs are said to invert the traditional maximization model by seeking to
maximize the welfare of the objects of economic (or other) activity, rather
than those involved in the production or financing of that activity. EGs are
organized as autonomous state enterprises that might enter into joint
venture arrangements with private sector enterprises and whose primary
focus is within the ALBA zone, with “excess” activity directed outbound.
The effect is to develop a regionalist globalization model with economic
activity directed by states rather than through markets. This suggests a new
face for traditional command economy activity, but it is unclear whether it
also suggests a change in function.
EGs embrace the form of organization and production of private
multinational corporations, including supply and production chain
principles, and resource procurement optimization. But their intense
connection to states makes them both regulatory and commercial vehicles.
Pricing grounded in notions of “fair price,” an ambiguous term likely based
on principles of just trade and solidarity as defined by the state. Fair price
might best be understood as a political rather than a conventional economic
principle. The idea of fair price, paralleling the Cuban theory of a tight
integration between centralized planning and the state enterprises as
vehicles through which central planning is effectuated, is grounded in
harmony and deep management rather than competition and markets.436
This theory is in line with ALBA’s core notion of the conflation of
politics and economics.437 That, in turn, is in line with ALBA’s core
political principle of the inseparability of public (sovereign) activity and
market activity of state or private actors. The concept of the grannacional,
then, internationalizes the organizational forms and premises of the
Lineamientos. It internationalizes state-based central planning model
within a regional trade zone. It adopts conventional organizational forms
from emerging private markets framework of economic globalization. It
changes conventional welfare maximization model from a focus on the
shareholder (or the firm) to something like national welfare maximization
effected through firms.438
Together PGs and EGs represent the state sector in the international
arena. But, as in Cuba, ALBA also contemplates a private sector.439 That
436

LINEAMIENTOS, supra note 39, ¶¶ 1–10.
Backer & Román, supra note 36.
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Id.
439
See Ivan Barrios, Un 84% de las transacciones que ejecuta El ALBA proviene del
sector privado [84% of Transactions Running ALBA is Private], YVKE MUNDIAL [YVKE
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sector, however, is understood to be most valuable when closely tied to the
state.440 ALBA reflects the idea, as well, of transnational and national
private sector enterprises organized as cooperatives and similar entities,
built around transnational commitments to public “purchases [which] are a
planning tool for the development and promotion of national production
that must be strengthen through participation, cooperation and the joint
execution of purchases when convenient.”441 The ALBA Fundamental
Principles also commit ALBA states to “favoring to the communities,
communes, cooperatives, companies of social production, small and
medium companies. The Joint promotion towards exports markets of our
countries and of productions that result actions of productive
complementation.”442
The duplication of the Cuban organization model now has a parallel in
Venezuela, where cooperatives are organized by the State to serve the local
demand of neighborhoods in the production of consumer goods, the training
and capital is provided by the State, and the cooperative is managed to
produce an aggregate benefit to the people contributing their labor.443 As in
WORLD] (Sept. 25, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.radiomundial.com.ve/node/232106 (“The
Executive Secretary of ALBA confirmed that ALBA remained committed to a private sector
within ALBA state economies, which remains a driving force in local economies and
contributed 84% $110 million in Sucre zone transactions.”).
440
In 2007, for instance, then-President Chavez declared that Venezuelan socialism did
not exclude private property but rather contemplated a closer relationship between the state
and private sector reflected in proposals for constitutional reform in Venezuela. Chávez:
Alianza estratégica Estado-sector privado es una de las propuestas de la Reforma
Constitucional [Chavez: New Partnership State-Private Sector is One of the Proposals of the
Constitutional Reform], APORREA [CLUB] (July 27, 2007, 11:04 AM)
http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n98609.html (“[E]l jefe del Estado venezolano anunció
que el acercamiento entre el sector privado y el Estado es una de las propuestas que será
presentada en la reforma constitucional.”)
441
Fundamental Principles of the Peoples’ Trade Treaty—TCP, supra note 422, princ. 14
442
Id. princ. 9.
443
A participant describing MUDEBAR, a women’s cooperative producing textiles for
local consumption, explained:
In reality, we didn’t have money or anything until the government offered us credit
so that we could achieve our objective, which was to associate ourselves as a
cooperative. The process was a call made by the government to participate in a
social mission called Vuelvan Caras, a call to all the women who were in their
houses without work, simply doing domestic work, doing housework until god
called, watching our grandchildren and taking care of the house and when all of
the women were called to the mission we began taking the courses. We took really
good courses, and from that they prepared us to become a cooperative.
Radio al Revés, Cooperatives in Venezuela Promote Solidarity, Equality and Dignity,
UPSIDE
DOWN
WORLD
(Apr.
6,
2011,
10:40
PM),
http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/2988-cooperatives-in-venezuelapromote-solidarity-equality-and-dignity. MUDEBAR was a product of the efforts of a PG,
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Cuba, these are closely connected conceptually to agricultural
cooperatives.444 And like the emerging Cuban cooperatives, these are
meant to serve political, social, and economic objectives—all in the service
of the local people (micro-planning) in a way that furthers the larger
objectives of the State (macro-planning).445 Within ALBA, this process is
socio-political—capital is aggregated in corporations that are vehicles for
state trade policy and economic management and that the non-state sector is
encouraged to aggregate labor and production (but not capital) within
proletarian corporations.446
Cuban cooperatives thus serve a political purpose beyond the internal
organization of the Cuban domestic economy. They provide a basis for the
division and organization of labor within Cuba in ways that are compatible
with Cuba’s efforts to internationalize its vision of a socialist command
economy. Organizations that privilege capital are consigned to the state
sector as the only location for capital ownership and exploitation. The
private sector may aggregate labor but not capital. For that sector, the labor
cooperative offers the model of organization best suited to its circumstances
and to the fundamental Marxist notion that the proletariat ought to focus on
the offer of its labor in the context of collective economic activity. Capital
is to be supplied by the State as the guardian of that means of production for
all people. As a consequence, the state sector has the responsibility of
organizing the economy, and controlling macro-economic policies and
operations at the national and regional levels. The private sector is to
provide micro responses to local needs under the supervision of the State,
which supplies capital and ensures policy purity. The EGs and PGs are the
analogues to Cuba’s state sector. Cuban cooperatives are meant to join
their counterparts in Venezuela and elsewhere to focus on the local retail
meant to organize the private clothing sector at the neighborhood level to meet national
planning needs.
444
LUCIA MICHELUTTI, SMALL-SCALE FARMERS UNDER SOCIALIST GOVERNMENTS:
VENEZUELA AND THE ALBA PEOPLE’S TRADE AGREEMENT 11–18 (2012), available at
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/16516IIED.pdf?.
445
Revés, supra note 443. Describing a cooperative that runs neighborhood buses, a
person noted:
So we organized an assembly in the neighborhoods and those assemblies decided
what the bus routes were going to be and who would be some of the workers. And
out of those buses we also had political discussions and distributed fliers. So we
broke with this business model of division, the separation into a business that gives
a service and those who receive it.
Id. It is not clear, of course, whether these stories are ordinary or exceptional and meant to
serve hortatory purposes.
446
See, e.g., Ken Cole, ALBA: A Process of Concientazión, 2 INT’L. J. CUBAN STUD. 31–
41
(2008),
available
at
http://cubanstudies.plutojournals.org/Portals/8/Issues/sissue_2_bw.pdf#page=31.
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sectors to the extent permitted by state policy.
More generally, combined with the opening of the non-state sector for
small scale goods and service businesses, the regulatory framework
suggested by the Lineamientos seeks to provide a basic framework for
reconceptualizing the economic organization of Cuba. What emerges is an
outline of an economic structure that is, even among Marxist-Leninist
states, somewhat unique. It confirms the state’s role as owner of the
productive capital of the nation. This capital can be utilized directly
through allocations by state ministries, or decisions about allocation and
pricing can be devolved to sub-units—corporations, grannacionales, or
mixed enterprises.
This re-worked economic model does provide for the creation (or
better yet, the recognition and regularization) of a private sector
economy.447 But that sector is understood to be small and limited to the
retail sector. The formal rules for its operation are structured to make large
or independent activity difficult. This private sector is not meant to grow
large enough to challenge the state sector. Nor is it meant to strip the state
of its control of capital. As such, this sector is tightly regulated. However,
within the scope of its permitted operations, the state is allowing a limited
range of aggregation of activity. In the form of cooperatives, individuals
engaging in permitted private activities may aggregate their labor and the
objects they may sell for mutual gain. This system is then internationalized
within the context of ALBA ideology.
For non-Marxist systems, the ability of individuals to aggregate labor
power the way that financial institutions aggregate capital could prove
useful in reshaping the usual marginalization of labor within globalization.
But the model of the Cuban cooperative—situated within the confines of a
system that remains suspicious of non-state economic activity and retains
control of goods markets necessary for the sort of activities that are the
lifeblood of cooperatives—is likely to substantially reduce the utility of
these ventures to effectuate Cuba and CCP’s goals. The Cubans appear to
insist on doing Lenin one better: Lenin would have combined private
interest with state supervision,448 the Cubans insist on private enterprise
through state control with little privilege.
Conceptually, the cooperative fits nicely within Cuba’s efforts to
develop a complex and well-integrated program of economic organization
that means to tie local activity first to national socio-economic goals and
447

In effect, the reworked economic model could be understood as seeking to recognize
and regulate the black market economy. See PÉREZ LÓPEZ, supra note 293.
448
LENIN, supra note 16, at 91–92 (“For we have now found that degree of combination
of private interest, of private commercial interest, with state supervision and control, that
degree of subordination to the common interests which was formerly a stumbling block for
very many socialist.”).
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then in a parallel manner, to international economic activity coordinated
through networks of state-to-state arrangements. The cooperative could
serve as an important ingredient in the construction of these economic
structures, providing an alternative to the private markets principles of
economic globalization, grounded in state control capital directly and
indirectly through SOEs and individual aggregation of labor. This
organization is then replicated in the international arena where state-to-state
transactions grounded in principles of popular welfare are organized
through state sector enterprises with goods and services delivered at the
retail level through individuals and private cooperatives.
But the elegance of the system bumps up against the realities of Cuban
politics—especially the reluctance of the CCP’s left wing to move far from
the economic model that has been in place since the 1960s. What this
tendency produces is some of the outward forms of a new system but one
that is hobbled by the insistence of perhaps too great a space for central
planning and control by the state sector and too small a space for the
operation of private enterprise. This is well-illustrated by the differences
between the Lineamientos as proposed and as adopted relating to the
provisions on cooperatives. The regulations adopted in late 2012
underscore this point. Both are driven by a mistrust of the power of
individuals to aggregate resources without a substantial degree of
supervision, management, and control by the state. It is also grounded in a
mistrust of principles of social obligation to serve state interests in the
absence of state direction. Indeed, the fear of operation in corporate form,
in aggregations of people and capital that appear autonomous of the state
(something permitted in China) may do more to reduce the success of this
opening than any measure of Cuba’s external enemies. Sometimes a mania
for control may prove fatally counterproductive to the maintenance of that
control. The Chinese Communist Party understood this in 1978 (though it
took a generation to produce results); it is not clear that the CCP is willing
to open itself to that lesson.
Thus, the greatest threat to the development of a proletarian
corporation comes, ironically enough, from within Cuba rather than from
outside. The reluctance to abandon a state based central planning model for
a model in which the non-state sector is given more autonomy in economic
decision-making, even within the general parameters of Marxist-Leninist
economic organization, is a premise that pervades the final form of the
Lineamientos and the implementing regulations. The debates about the
problem of the cooperative and corporation in Cuba highlights a
fundamental conundrum of Cuban economic development—the extent to
which the current economic situation, and the change of leadership, has
made possible a reconceptualization of what policy and policy discussion is
permissible because it falls within the context of revolutionary thought and
what policy alternatives remain outside and therefore likely to be dismissed
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as counter-revolutionary.449 Until recently, what fell within the Revolution
was very narrowly circumscribed. Necessity, and perhaps time, has
permitted something like a small broadening of what might fall within the
Revolution and thus be a permissible approach to reform. Moreover, Cuba,
especially in the context of the Lineamientos, must still confront the basic
issue that has been troublesome since the first days after the 1959
Revolution: if something falls outside the Revolution, does it necessarily or
invariably constitute an anti-revolutionary act, or might there be a space
outside the revolution that is not against the revolution?450 Cuban
economists looking at the cooperative have suggested yet another
interpretation: the issue is not whether there is a space outside the
Revolution that is not against the Revolution; instead the question is what
constitutes revolutionary space.
The proceedings of the Sixth Party Congress showed just how little
revolutionary space there is. On the one hand, in theory, it appears that
revolutionary space has indeed been growing. That growth has permitted
the development of new forms of economic organization that may find use
not just in developing Marxist-Leninist states but also in other states where
aggregations of labor, production of other economic forces might be
profitable. More importantly, it parallels trends in developed states that are
also tentatively moving toward opening a space for stakeholder models of
corporate activity, including the enactment of “benefit corporation” statutes.
But the CCP appears less mindful of Lenin’s comment with respect to
cooperatives and free enterprise within a socialist system:
We went too far when we reintroduced [the New Economic Policy],
but not because we attached too much importance to the principal of
free enterprise and trade—we want too far because we lost sight of

449
Fidel Castro, Address at the Closing Session of a Series of Meetings of Intellectuals
and Cultural Figures at the José Marti National Library (June 30, 1961), translated in THE
CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY READER: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF FIDEL CASTRO’S
REVOLUTION
117
(Julio
García
Luis
ed.,
2008)
available
at
http://www.oceanbooks.com.au/static/pdfs/cuban_revolution_reader_TOC.pdf (“Within the
revolution, everything; against the revolution, nothing. Against the revolution, nothing,
because the revolution also has its rights, and the first right of the revolution is the right to
exist, and no one can oppose the revolution’s right to exist.”).
450
See Larry Catá Backer, Freemansons in Cuba: New Scholarship, LAW END DAY (June
30, 2010) (discussing Jorge Romeu, The Cuban Freemasons in the Development of Civil
Society and Political Opening, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY CUBA: ECONOMY,
POLITICS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 420). This tension also evidences
itself in the struggles of Afro-Cubans for a spiritual space. See generally Zoya Kocur, The
Sparks of Civil Society in Cuba: Afro-Cuban Cultural Production, Art Collectives, and the
Struggle for a New Public Sphere, in POLITICS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 333 (Mauricio Font ed.,
2011),
available
at
http://www.cubaproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/PoliticsandCivSocFinal.pdf.
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the cooperatives, because we now underrate cooperatives, because
we are already beginning to forget the vast importance of the
cooperatives . . . .451

The tentativeness with which the state organs have created its
cooperative experiment, and the thoroughness with which it has enveloped
the operation of cooperatives within the framework of state economic
oversight suggest a reluctance to exploit the potential of cooperatives as
both bridges to market efficiency and as vehicles for the internalization of
social objectives in economic relations that serve Cuban state ideology and
emerging global consensus on corporate social responsibility.452 But even
the possibility of discourse about cooperatives within an altogether too
small operational space is a step in the right direction. Until the role of the
State is better clarified, and until structures are developed to permit the
State to trust the economic instincts of individuals acting both for social and
personal advantage, the cooperative, will continue to run the risk of
becoming no more than an instrumentality of the State. And these failures
will be borne by Cuban cooperative members even as it they contribute the
fruits of cooperative labor to the State.
V. CONCLUSION
Is it possible to theorize a proletarian corporation? Is it possible to
transpose theory into a working model of a proletarian corporation using the
cooperative as a platform? Will cooperatives make a difference and set the
stage for the development of new forms of economic aggregations that
could substitute, to some extent, the benefits the corporate form offers
private individuals? The Cubans have been attempting to make the
cooperative a reality within their highly regulated system. Theoretically,
the cooperative could be a very useful means of modernizing the Cuban
economic model within the broad framework of Marxist-Leninist state
organization. Indeed, it is well understood that the Cuban form of the
cooperative has strong Leninist roots.453 Cooperatives offer a means of
aggregating products and labor in ways that do not threaten the national
control of the direction of national economic policy. Nor does it impede
state planning with respect to macroeconomics. Limiting the financial
cooperative (the corporation) to the State, while permitting other forms of
aggregation, provides at least some method of communal activity at the
simplest levels of economic activity that could stimulate small-scale retail
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Transformation in Alienated Consumer Society (May 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
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453
See discussion supra Part III.A.
452

617

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

33:527 (2013)

activity and increase public welfare in Cuba.
The cooperative arose as a part of a solution to the stresses on the
Cuban economic model that sought to retain its socialist character while
also acknowledging that the conventional system of direct state control of
virtually all aspects of economic activity was not working. But the solution
was constrained by the conceptual limits of restructuring, one in which the
State would retain the power to aggregate capital and in which private
economic activity was conceived as limited to a small and local retail
sector.
This Article considered the cooperative as an alternative to the
corporate form, suggesting both its benefits and its limitations, even within
the confines of Cuban political ideology. It examined the development of
new theoretical approaches, the use of the old conventional agricultural
cooperative as a platform for innovation, and the limited success of
transposing theoretical innovation first into the guidelines for reshaping the
economy (the Lineamientos) and then into a regulatory system for
cooperatives adopted in late 2012. This Article concluded with an analysis
of the internationalization of the Cuban approach to private capital
aggregation in light of Cuba’s regional trade structures and the realities of
globalization, as well as the lingering effects of the tensions, still
unresolved, about the nature and limits of the role of the State in managing
or controlling economic activity. This Article thus ends where it started,
with the institutional limitations of the current Cuban approach and its
effects of both spurring innovation and constraining it. As long as Cubans
continue to politicize the property component of corporate ownership, and
split economic aggregation between aggregations of capital in corporate
form operated as instrumentalities of the State, and aggregations of labor
operated as highly regulated private cooperatives, it will not be able to meet
its objectives under the Lineamientos or realize the promise in the new
regulations. If the State is the only capitalist and labor is dependent on the
State for the ownership of the fruits of the cooperative’s efforts, then the
structural asymmetries of a capital-privileging regime remains. Yet
reinforcing this system of State capitalism supported at the margins by labor
cooperatives perpetuates the dominance of capital in a socialist society,
denies the cooperative the space to meet its potential to rebalance the
relationship between labor and capital in production, and ultimately may
make it much more difficult for the functional realization of the potential of
this experiment in cooperatives.
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